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This thesis examines massacres that were committed during the American 
Revolutionary War, seeking to recontextualise their importance within the 
broader frame of the study of violence while building a narrative that holds 
that the American Revolution, though broadly conceived in ideological terms, 
was both driven and decided by acts of extreme violence on the battlefield – 
in short, that wartime massacres shaped military outcomes to a degree that 
has been hitherto underappreciated. Late twentieth and early twenty-first- 
century studies have sought to highlight the central role that violence played 
during the revolutionary war, helping to bring an end to the sanitised 
nineteenth century view of a revolution driven by principle rather than force 
(see Gelb, Hoock, Breen et all). Despite this there has been no complete 
study of the many massacres committed by both sides during the war, or an 
attempt to identify the broader role they played in the conflict’s outcome. 
 
Massacres frequently emphasised both the superior combat proficiencies of 
Crown Forces and the superior propaganda capabilities of the Patriots. 
Unable to respond militarily to small-scale British successes especially in the 
years 1777 and 1778, the Patriots instead created a highly successful 
atrocity narrative – nascent and growing since the Boston Massacre of 1770 
– that offset the damage done on the battlefield. Massacres came to define 
entire theatres of the war, such as the western frontier or the south from 1780 
onwards. 
 
Modern efforts such as Holger Hoock’s Scars of Independence (2018) have 
used occasional accounts of massacre to reinforce various points about 
revolutionary violence, but have failed to offer a comprehensive analysis of 
massacres throughout the conflict or assessed how these events had a 
decisive impact on the war. This thesis will seek to rectify that. Beginning with 
the Boston shootings of 1770 and closing with an assessment of the effect 
that massacres had on the Treaty of Paris, this thesis uses massacres as the 
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central narrative focus for a reassessment of the course of the entire conflict, 
ultimately showing that many of them were pivotal events and not mere by- 





During the American Revolutionary War, massacres of soldiers and civilians 
were common events that had a powerful impact on the progress of the 
conflict. Both sides conducted massacres, and such acts often came to 
define parts of the war. They influenced the strategies of senior leaders and 
had a great impact on the attitudes of combatants. Revolutionary forces were 
especially skilled at using news of massacres to demonise their enemies and 
motivate support for the revolution. Britain and her supporters, meanwhile, 
often under-appreciated the impact of massacres. Because of these reasons 
the massacres of the American Revolution played a key role in the outcome 
of the war, a fact that remains largely unacknowledged today. Although 
modern historians are increasingly highlighting the importance of violence in 
general during the American Revolution, until specific massacres are treated 
as subjects worthy of study in their own right our understanding of the conflict 





I would like to thank my two academic supervisors, Professor Frank Cogliano 
and Doctor David Silkenat, without whom this thesis would not have been 
possible. Their patience, guidance and knowledge remained constant 
throughout, and ultimately gave me the confidence to see this project to 
fruition. 
 
Further thanks go out to the staff at the National Archives of the United 
Kingdom, the National Library of Scotland and the National Army Museum, 
whose expertise were of great help to a rookie researcher. 
 
Thanks also to the staff and students at the University of Edinburgh’s School 
of History, Classics and Archaeology, especially the close-knit academic 
family of the American studies department, whose sense of community 
provided valuable chances to escape the more gruelling aspects of study. A 
particular thanks to Doctor Catherine Bateson for helping to guide the ship 
home in the final few months. 
 
Last, but never least, I would like to pay tribute to the love and affection of my 
parents, Donald and Jessica, who were there alongside me not only 
throughout this project but also my entire, lengthy university student career. 
They remain, as ever, my greatest source of both happiness and inspiration. 
vi  
Contents 
Title Page ........................................................................................................ i 
Abstract ........................................................................................................... ii 
Lay Summary… ............................................................................................ iv 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ v 
Contents Page .............................................................................................. vi 
List of Illustrations ........................................................................................ vii 
Introduction: Defining a Massacre ................................................................. 1 
Chapter One: 
Boston ........................................................................................................... 29 
Chapter Two: 
Lexington ..................................................................................................... 56 
Chapter Three: Paoli and Tappan ................................................................ 93 
Chapter Four: Cherry Valley  and Gnadenhutten ....................................... 131 
Chapter Five: Waxhaws and Haw River .................................................... 173 
Conclusion: Fort Griswold .......................................................................... 234 
Bibliography ............................................................................................... 250 
vii  
List of Illustrations 
 
 
Amos Doolittle, The Battle of Lexington, April 19th 1775, Plate 1. Amos 
Doolittle engravings of the Battle of Lexington and Concord, December 1775, 
reprint by Charles E. Goodspeed, Boston, 1903 - Concord Museum - 
Concord, MA. 
 
Amos Doolittle, Plate IV, A View of the South Part of Lexington. Amos 
Doolittle engravings of the Battle of Lexington and Concord, December 1775, 
reprint by Charles E. Goodspeed, Boston, 1903 - Concord Museum - 
Concord, MA. 
 
John Trumbull, The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker's Hill, 
June 17, 1775, oil on canvas, 1834, Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford, CT. 
 
Benjamin Franklin Wiatt, Affair at Lexington, print, 1850, Wallach Division 
Picture Collection. 
 
The fight at Lexington, April 19, 1775--from a print of the time, print, 1860 – 
1864, Wallach Division Picture Collection. 
 
The Lexington Massacre, print, 1876, Wallach Division Picture Collection. 
 
 
François Godefroy, Journée de Lexington, print, Emmet Collection of 
Manuscripts Etc. Relating to American History. 
 
Xavier della Gatta, The Battle of Paoli, detail, oil on canvas, 1782, Museum 
of the American Revolution. 
 
Xavier della Gatta, The Battle of Paoli, oil on canvas, 1782, Museum of the 
American Revolution. 
viii  
If a stop cannot be put to these massacres, the country will be depopulated 
in a few months more.1 
 
– General Nathanael Greene to Colonel William Davies, 


















































1 Nathanael Greene in The Life of Nathanael Greene, Major-General in the Army of the 
Revolution, Volume 3, ed. George Washington Greene (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1884), 227. 
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Introduction: Defining a Massacre 
 
Soon after the end of the American Revolutionary War an outspoken British 
opponent of the conflict, Thomas Mullett, met with George Washington. 
Whilst being entertained at Mount Vernon, Mullett proposed to Washington 
that he ought to write a full history of the war, in much the same way as 
Caesar had once recounted his campaigns in Gaul. Washington's answer, 
according to Mullett, was unequivocal. 'But Sir, I know the atrocities 
committed on both sides have been so great and so many, that they cannot 
be faithfully recorded, and had better be buried with oblivion.'1 
We cannot be certain whether the quote, recorded by Mullett's biographer 
four decades after the fact, is wholly accurate. But regardless of whether 
Washington said it or not, it serves as a reminder that wars are not bloodless. 
Despite nineteenth and early twentieth-century efforts to sanitise the violence 
of the American Revolution, a student of the period does not have to go far 
before they will inevitably trip over one of the darker events Washington 
hinted at. Atrocities in general and massacres in particular had an impact on 
the war that remains heavily under-appreciated, even after recent efforts to 
better understand the revolution’s violence. Massacres provided high points 
for the Patriot propaganda efforts throughout the war, emphasise the inherent 
violence of British imperial response to the rebellion, and came to define 
British officers operating far out of their depth in the southern colonies 
towards the war’s end. Taken together, massacres played a 
disproportionately important role in setting the tone for different phases of the 
conflict. For the purpose of this study, these phases are defined as the shift 
to open warfare in 1775, a period of further escalation in violence and military 
aggression from the years 1776 to 1778 and a total degeneration in terms of 
both social order and strategic objectives precipitated and fuelled by 




1 John Evans, ‘Memoirs of Mr Thomas Mullett,’ in The Gentleman’s Magazine Volume 85, 
ed. Sylvanus Urban (London: Nichols, Son and Bentley, 1815), 84. 
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every year of the war, massacres defined the ongoing course of the conflict, 
ultimately proving that wartime massacres vitally shaped military outcomes. 
While recent studies have sought to put the full gamut of violence back into 
the American Revolution, these undertakings have often relegated the 
extreme violence of massed killings such as Fort Griswold in 1781 or 
Gnadenhutten in 1782 to brief descriptions that help emphasise wider 
violence but stop short of considering the profound impact of acts of 
massacre on the course of the war, the following peace negotiations or the 
legacy that extended well into the nineteenth century. Massacres are, in 
short, underappreciated as decisive acts of war during the revolution. Without 
studying them we are still failing to appreciate the true, violent nature of the 
American Revolution and the notably brutal war that defined it. 
 
The American Revolution and the Study of Violence 
 
In the introduction to his multi-volume A History of the United States, George 
Bancroft wrote that: 
 
Much error had become incorporated with American history… 
the early history was often written with a carelessness which 
seized on rumors and vague assertion which satisfied prejudice 
by wanton perversion, and which, where materials were not at 
hand, substituted the inferences of the writers for authenticated 
facts. These early books have ever since been cited as 
authorities, and the errors, sometimes repeated even by 
considerate writers, whose distrust was not excited, have 
acquired a prescriptive right to a place in the annals of 
America.2 
 
At the time Bancroft was addressing the fact that much of the history being 
written in America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was 
plagiarised, and ‘so general was the practice that one is led to the conclusion 
that it was the rule rather than the exception.’3 Taken out of context, 
 
 
2 George Bancroft, A History of the United States, from the Discovery of the American 
Continent to the Present Time, Volume 1 (Boston: Charles Bowen, 1834), vi. 
3 R. Kent Newmyer, ‘Charles Stedman's History of the American War’ in The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Jul., 1958), 924. 
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however, Bancroft’s opening passage could have been written by a number 
of authors in the late twentieth or early twenty-first century. Since the 
Bicentennial, and particularly in the past decade, an ever-growing number of 
studies have emerged that seek to reassess the nature of America’s 
founding. In the late 1970s John W. Shy wrote – in a book that at the time did 
much to remind Americans of the chaotic violence of their origins – about a 
new generation of historians seeking to answer questions about ‘slavery, 
poverty, violence, Indian relations, and the place of women’ during the period 
of the revolution.4 
 
Shy’s predicted reassessment of America’s founding conflict – its 
combatants, contexts and legacies – has now been underway for over a 
decade, widening the field of study and emphasising narratives that would 
have been unfamiliar or of little interest to the custodians of the revolution in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Books such as Jill Lepore’s 
These Truths (2018), Gerald Horne’s The Counter-Revolution of 1776: Slave 
Resistance and the Origins of the United States of America (2014) and 
Douglas R. Egerton’s Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary 
America (2009) have helped emphasise the experiences of enslaved peoples 
and the racial aspect that underpinned and, at times, defined the revolution. 
Maya Jasanoff’s Liberty’s Exiles (2011) reframes the war from the 
perspective of the Loyalist struggle. Jeanne Munn Bracken’s Women in the 
American Revolution (2009) and Barbara B. Oberg’s Women in the American 
Revolution: Gender, Politics, and the Domestic World (2019) have brought 
the study of gender during the revolution into the twenty-first century. Patrick 
Griffin’s American Leviathan (2008) and Ethan A. Schmidt’s Native 
Americans in the American Revolution: How the War Divided, Devastated 
and Transformed the Early American World (2014) both emphasise the plight 
of Native American peoples in the face of the powerful expansionism that 
was evidenced by white colonists even during the war. Andrew 
O’Shaughnessy’s The Men Who Lost America (2014) and Brendan Simms’ 
 
4 John W. Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for 
American Independence (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 13. 
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Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire 
(2007) have helped to properly place the revolution within its British imperial 
context, while the efforts and experiences of the British Army are better 
understood today thanks to books such as Matthew H. Spring’s With Zeal 
and with Bayonets Only (2012), Don Hagist’s British Soldiers, American War 
(2012) and Mark Urban’s Fusiliers (2007). 
 
Shy’s prediction regarding a new wave of revolutionary histories was based 
on the belief that ‘the most recent generation of historians’ would challenge 
older narratives through the ‘exploration of some of the disturbing sides of life 
in eighteenth century America.’5 And while many of the previously mentioned 
books do feature the concept of violence as a specific subject previously 
mentioned by Shy, the study of violence as a central driving force during the 
Revolutionary War remains in its infancy. The diversification of studies has 
slowly been establishing a broad narrative of violence that challenges the 
fallacious belief that the American Revolution was less prone to bloodshed 
than other revolutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, 
emphasising the extent of that misconception is still the central premise of 
only a few works. 
 
Gordon S. Wood’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book The Radicalism of the 
American Revolution provides a useful illustration of the studies that, even in 
the early nineties, were still backing the concept of a revolution denuded of 
popular violence and unfettered imperial aggression. Considered at the time 
– though not without controversy – as a great reassessment of the nature of 
the revolutionary struggle, Wood challenged the idea that the conflict was a 
conservative one and sought to remind readers of the powerful social 
upheaval the revolution created. Yet, while he reignited the radical thought 
that affected so many Americans and their institutions during the period, he 







preferring the older, established view of a struggle that was radical in 
conception, but less so in execution: 
 
If we measure the radicalism of revolutions by the degree of 
social misery or the economic deprivation suffered, or by the 
number of people killed or manor houses burned, then this 
conventional emphasis on the conservatism of the American 
Revolution becomes true enough.6 
 
For Wood there were ‘no peasant uprisings, no jacqueries, no burning of 
chateaux, no storming of prisons’– the revolution was revolutionary in its 
thoughts, in its new institutions, in its social change, but not in its violence. 7 
This in spite of destitute Ulster Scots frontiersmen who fought with such 
ferocity against the Crown, or the thousands homesteads and plantations put 
to the torch by marauding warbands, or the thousands who languished in 
royal prison hulks, or the firing of royal soldiers into a crowd of civilians, or  
the Committees of Safety that arrested and examined their fellow 
countrymen’s loyalties to the revolutionary cause. While Wood overcomes his 
target – the staid, nineteenth century view of a conservative revolution – he 
does so in a way that isolates the ideology from the existence of the bloody 
war that gave birth to it. In this sense it remains a part of a legacy of sanitised 
retellings that have existed almost since the closing years of the revolution 
itself. 
 
An early contrasting view is best emphasised by Normal Gelb’s 1984 book 
Less than Glory. In it he made the claim that ‘most popular accounts of the 
Revolution have been cosily laundered or tidied up’ and that ‘its countless 
moments of heroism, virtue and sacrifice were accompanied by equally 
countless acts of cruelty, selfishness, venality, small-mindedness and 
oppression… like all wars, it was a shambles.’8 At the time Gelb described 
Less than Glory as the revisionist’s view of the revolution, and though it 
 
 
6 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: A. A. Knopf, 
1992), 5. 
7 Ibid, 3. 
8 Norman Gelb, Less than Glory: A Revisionist’s View of the American Revolution (New 
York: G. Putnam’s Sons, 1984), 12 – 14. 
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certainly leaned into that claim, it also provided an insight into the shifting 
priorities of the field of study. Gelb’s conception of the revolution was of a 
struggle based on principals, but very much driven by violence and ultimately 
overwhelmed by its own discordance. While commentators once had little 
time for such a view, the opposing theory promoted by Wood is now the one 
being challenged. Violence is coming to be viewed for what it was – a 
defining aspect of the revolution, rather than a by-product that can be largely 
discarded by those who would rather emphasises a traditional founding 
father ideology. 
 
Newer Revolutionary War literature is helping to emphasise this shift. In 2002 
Sarah J. Purcell’s Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in 
Revolutionary America assessed the impact of violence and memory on the 
formation and growth of the early United States. The book shows how ‘the 
violence of the Revolutionary War had an indelible effect on the politics of the 
American Revolution’ and how ‘Americans created a set of stories that 
sought to give meaning to the real violence of war.’9 However, it does not, by 
its own admission, set out to actively investigate individual acts of extreme 
wartime violence and use them for the purposes of broader study. The book 
concerns itself with memory, legacy and how violence affected political and 
cultural institutions, rather than immediate cause and effect of violence – and 
massacres – on the course of the war. 
 
A collection of essays, brought together and published in 2016 under the title 
Between Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of Violence in the American 
Revolutionary Era, provides a wider and even more recent view of violence in 
both an eighteenth century American and transatlantic setting. Among the 
diverse themes and methodologies employed, it is worth quoting Andrew 





9 Sarah J. Purcell, Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 2. 
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The Oxford English Dictionary’s leading definitions of violence 
highlight a sensibility that emerged in the long eighteenth 
century… to do violence to another human being is to violate 
them… Violence, in sum, is a form of power that negates liberty 
and denies another person’s humanity by abandoning 
persuasion for force, consent for coercion. In eighteenth- 
century language, violence amounted to an artificial 
interference with nature.10 
 
As we shall see, defining potentially nebulous words like “violence,” 
“atrocity” and “massacre” in the context of the eighteenth-century 
Anglo-American world is not an easy process. It is important to note 
that during his study Cayton assesses how eighteenth-century Britons 
viewed and describe their own violence, highlighting the powerful 
juxtaposition between a violent society that also attempted to cast 
itself as, ultimately, a non-violent “civilising” force. The importance of 
studying acts of violence in the language of those who experienced it 
– whether victim, perpetrator, or onlooker – will be addressed in the 
following sections. 
 
Other modern works deal with violence either as a central theme, or a topic 
of great importance, though none address the very tangible and defining 
effect such violence had on the course of the Revolutionary War. Timothy H. 
Breen’s 2010 book American Insurgents, American Patriots, shows the 
ground-up anger that fuelled the revolution in the early years of the 1770s. 
The revolution no longer revolved around eloquent documents signed by 
staid men in periwigs, but focussed on impassioned local gatherings and, at 
times, mob rule. Other studies have focussed on specific aspects of the 
revolution’s grim realities, like Robert Watson’s work on the brutalities 
inflicted on Patriot prisoners in The Ghost Ship of Brooklyn (2017). On a 
broader scale, Alan Taylor’s latest grand work, American Revolutions: A 
Continental History (2017) reminds us of the difficulties of the revolutionary 
 
 
10 Andrew Cayton, ‘“The Constant Snare of the Fear of Man” – Authority and Violence in the 
Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic’ in Between Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of 
Violence in the American Revolutionary Era, eds. Patrick Griffin, Robert G. Ingram, Peter S. 
Onuf, Brian Schoen (Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 2015), 21. 
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struggle across generations, helping to emphasise both the constraints upon, 
and the potential of, a new nation formed through violent conflict and 
aggressive expansionism. It builds on two previous books, The Internal 
Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772 – 1832 (2014) and The Divided 
Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American 
Revolution (2007), both of which underscore the problematic nature of 
removing violent narratives from a nation that wrestled with the justifying use 
of force from the beginning. Taylor’s work dispenses with the elegance of the 
original American Experiment and the straight path drawn by some between 
1776 and eventual full emancipation, and instead we are presented with all of 
the initial difficulties and wrong turns of a revolution and an early republic that 
was initially built up by violent expansion and violent institutions. 
 
Research Aims, Findings, and Scars of Independence 
 
Though the disturbing aspects of America’s birth mentioned by Shy are 
indeed coming under increasing scrutiny, a modern study of violence as a 
narrative frame for the fuller revolutionary experience appeared most recently 
in 2018, with the publication of Holger Hoock’s Scars of Independence: 
America’s Violent Birth. Hoock’s work sets out to cover the breadth of the 
pain caused by the conflict that engulfed North America, from the suffering of 
civilians and the brutalities committed by British regular forces to the cruelties 
inflicted on Loyalists and the merciless bloodshed and town-burning of the 
war on the frontier. Hoock writes about a number of instances of massacre 
during the war, and uses them to highlight his central argument – that the 
revolution was a chaotic and violent affair that, at times, spun wholly out of 
the control of its actors and instigators. Hoock’s interest in massacres is 
centred on his interest in the revolution’s violence in general, and therefore 
he does not treat the study of massacres as an objective in its own right. 
Because of this, his writing does not amount to a comprehensive account of 
massacres throughout the revolutionary war, and at times fails to appreciate 
how the conflict itself turned on incidents of massacre (and the propaganda 
which such massacres fuelled). This thesis seeks to redress that failing. In 
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Scars of Independence, massacres are just another form of violence 
explored by Hoock and used to support his central thesis – that the American 
Revolution was a fraught and pained experience. This research treats 
massacres as the central subject and seeks to show that they were an 
engine of revolutionary violence that is worthy of independent analysis. 
 
During the course of the war acts of massacre perpetrated by Crown Forces 
became the central theme of a Patriot “atrocity narrative”, an aspect explored 
by authors such as Hoock, who also highlights its work emphasising the 
mistreatment of civilians and prisoners, the destruction of property and the 
incitement of Native Americans and enslaved peoples to violence against 
white settlers. The atrocity narrative was a system of propaganda that was 
utilised to offset the small-scale tactical damage done by British victories, 
with wide-ranging military and political strategic successes. It was an ‘ethico- 
polemical war that shadowed the war on America’s battlefields’ and ultimately 
lead to advantages for the Patriots ranging from motivating recruitment to 
legitimising the revolutionary struggle against imperial aggression in the 
minds of onlookers, both in America and abroad.11 
 
While Scars of Independence and similar works (Jus In Bello, 2015 and 
Mangled Bodies, 2016) explore the range of atrocities harnessed for their 
atrocity narrative by the Patriots, Hoock’s studies fail to identify massacres as 
the single most important acts of violence within this narrative, ones which 
defined previously-mentioned phases of the war and fatally undermined 
British efforts at either reconciliation, or the restoration of what Crown Forces 
viewed as law and order. Most importantly, Hoock’s work fails to (or more 
accurately, doesn’t wish to) address massacres in their context as decisive 
military acts. Like other studies concerned more with charting political or 
societal impact during the Revolutionary period, Scars of Independence 
doesn’t provide a particularly robust military overview of the conflict and 
doesn’t concern itself with comparing and contrasting multiple cases of 
 
11 Holger Hoock, ‘Jus In Bello, Rape and the British Army in the American Revolutionary 
War’ in Journal of Military Ethics, 14:1 (2015), 88. 
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massacre. Because of this it fails to promote an understanding of just how far 
the Revolutionary War was driven and defined by massacres. 
 
The question therefore remains; how did wartime massacres shape military 
outcomes? In answering this it will be important not only to compare separate 
cases of massacre and the varied, often divergent accounts that detail them, 
but also deal with topics as wide-ranging as the Patriot atrocity narrative, 
British command and control in the field, attitudes towards what was termed 
“Indian War” on the frontier, the nature of slave society in the south, the links 
between race-based antagonism and popular fears of massacre, the impact 
of reports of massacre on wartime recruitment and many more. All of these 
sub-topic questions will be listed and addressed in the relevant chapters, 
while the methodology used to answer them will be discussed in the following 
section. The research findings conclude that in spite of the secondary 
importance given to them in wider studies of violence, like Hoock’s, 
massacres were decisive in shaping the progress of the Revolutionary War, 
evidencing a cycle of aggression that dragged in both sides and ultimately 
emphasising a conflict that was built upon and defined by acts of extreme 
violence in a military setting. 
 
A dedicated study of massacres not only helps to properly emphasise the 
vital role massacres played during the revolution while also deconstructing 
the older, pre-existing framework of restraint and bloodlessness that has 
often been used to discuss the revolution. Documenting and attempting to 
explain the Revolutionary War’s massacres helps us to overcome two 
centuries’ historiographical hindsight that has sought to sterilise and sanitise 
the story of American’s birth, leaving behind only a glorified concept of 
acceptable violence. Shy put it succinctly when he wrote that ‘the ink was 
barely dry on the Treaty of Paris before myth and reality about the 
Revolutionary War were becoming entwined… Much about the event called 
the Revolutionary War had been very painful and was unpleasant to 
remember; only the outcome was unqualifiedly pleasant; so memory, as 
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ever, began to play tricks with the event.’12 Certainly, it is important to 
acknowledge that studies of the revolution have now moved on from the likes 
of Robert Leckie’s George Washington’s War, of great battles and great men 
and the overwrought, exceptionalist belief in ‘that spirit of independence so 
fierce that it was an absolutely new phenomenon in the history of mankind.’13 
Rather, we are increasingly coming to acknowledge that ‘instead of staring 
the realities of death and warfare in the face, Americans sometimes diverted 
their eyes to focus on a glorified version of violence that was at once more 
patriotic and more palatable.’14 Addressing this continues the work of Hoock, 
Griffin, Purcell and others by reemphasising the violence at the heart of the 
revolutionary struggle, the violence either overlooked or carefully set aside by 
the likes of Wood. 
 
A study of the revolution’s many “unpalatable” moments is also valuable in 
expanding the field of massacre studies, a small but growing subset of books 
and articles that examine the cause and effect of extreme violence on 
cultures and societies throughout history. Massacres, as we shall see when 
we come to the matter of definitions, remain separate from events such as 
genocide or general atrocities, and their causes and outcomes can provide 
insight into the political and sociological events that contextualise them. 
 
The Massacre in History (1999) is one of the few works to date which 
attempts to use the topic of massacres as a vehicle for broader study. 
Complied by Mark Levene, it presents a series of essays that explore the 
cause and effect of a wide variety of historical cases of massacre upon wider 
culture, politics, society and religion. Perhaps most importantly, in the book’s 
introduction Levene reminds us that massacres can provide researchers with 
a microcosm of the nature of historical study itself, with the emphasis not ‘on 
what ‘actually’ happened so much as how it was remembered.’15 Because of 
 
12 Shy, A People Numerous and Armed, 26. 
13 Robert Leckie, George Washington’s War: The Saga of the American Revolution (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1992), 10. 
14 Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 12. 
15 Mark Levene, ‘Introduction’ in The Massacre in History, eds. Mark Levene and Penny 
Roberts (Berghahn Books: New York, 1999), 3. 
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this, ‘massacre can help give a shape to history… history, after all, involves 
empirical observation of societies more often than not in conflict and crisis… 
ensuing tensions, frequently leading to violence cannot be ignored or 
sidestepped; on the contrary they are absolutely integral to understanding 




The next five chapters will do as Levene suggests and seek to provide a 
shape that further reframes the study the American Revolutionary War as an 
conflict both grounded and driven by violence, particularly acts of massacre. 
Each chapter uses one or two primary cases of massacre as its locus, 
exploring how they impacted the wider war and looking at what specific 
events can tell us about the driving force that not only violence, but 
specifically acts of massacre, represented during the revolution. While the 
eight headline engagements – Boston in 1770, Lexington, Paoli and Tappan, 
Cherry Valley and Gnadenhutten, Waxhaws and Haw River – provide the 
initial focus for each section, they also act as a vehicle to discuss numerous 
other counts of massacre during the war, such as Fort Griswold, Crooked 
Billet, Drake’s Farm, Wyoming, Hayes’ Station, Little Egg Harbor and more. 
The chapters act as an arc of progression for the war itself, exploring a 
number of themes relating to the central premise that massacres played a 
decisive role in three main phases of the conflict. As well as examining the 
Boston massacre of 1770, the first chapter will assess the legacy of 
massacre that was familiar to American colonists through preceding conflicts, 
and establish the racial hierarchy that shaped concepts of “whiteness” and 
“savagery” in relation to acts of massacre. The second chapter, based on the 
battle – or massacre – of Lexington, also establishes the disparities between 
how massacres are documented during and after wartime. The third chapter, 
centred on the Paoli and Baylor massacres, charts the increase in 
aggression in the fighting waged by both sides between the years 1776 to 
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1778. The particular focus is on regular on regular violence – the massacres 
that occurred between Continental and British Army soldiers while in close 
proximity to one another during the occupation of Philadelphia and New York. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the frontier war particularly between the years 
1778 and 1783, examining how concepts of massacre differed between the 
west and other theatres of the conflict, and how acts of massacre were 
capable of blurring lines usually drawn along older racial enmities. The final 
chapter deals with the southern colonies in the years 1780 to 1782, and 
explains how a cycle of massacres came to totally define both Britain’s 
southern strategy and the overall outcome of the war. 
 
The majority of the massacres examined during this thesis have received 
little individual scholarly attention. The killings such as the ones which 
occurred at Fort Griswold or Haw River (both in 1781), have had no major 
independent treatment. Others, like the Waxhaws massacre or the night-time 
engagement at Paoli, have received only one major, dedicated analytic work 
(in this case Jim Piecuch’s The Blood Be Upon Your Head, 2010 and 
Thomas J. McGuire’s Battle of Paoli: The Revolutionary War “Massacre” 
Near Philadelphia, 2000). More commonly, such events attract a great deal  
of passing mention in popular histories and broader studies of the war, but far 
less detailed assessment, be it through the examination of primary sources, 
studies of the wider impact or simply a general appreciation of the 
exceptional violence that made such massacres commonplace during the 
war. 
 
In order to fully rectify this the use of primary evidence is key. Given the 
contested nature of many of the events described, eyewitness statements 
and testimonies are of great interest. As we shall see, Patriot authorities  
often sought out and documented eyewitness accounts as part of a strategy 
to mitigate the military effects of massacres by turning them into propaganda 
coups. While there is obviously a danger of inherent bias, these depositions – 
collected after engagements such as Lexington or Tappan, and indeed the 
Boston massacre – often twinned with later pension statements in interesting 
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ways, at times corroborating facts, and on other occasions providing very 
different views. 
 
Along with depositions and pension records, correspondence can provide an 
insightful understanding of attitudes towards violence and massacre, 
particularly among the officers on both sides. Following many cases of 
massacre, commanders would frequently exchange accusations, which 
sometimes devolved into full-blown diatribes – see, for example, Horatio 
Gates to John Burgoyne during the Saratoga campaign, Adam Stephen to 
William Erskine following Drake’s Farm or Elijah Hand to Charles Mawhood 
after Hancock’s Bridge. Along with these are letters exchanged between 
leaders and their subordinates, which can give an important view of how 
ranking officers sought to mitigate or utilise massacres. Nathanael Greene’s 
worries to his colonels about the frequency of the massacres taking place in 
the south in 1781, or George Washington’s instructions regarding the 
treatment of British Indian agent William Hamilton offer a perspective that is 
removed from the more public image projected to superiors, opponents or to 
the popular press, and can help to form an understanding of the more 
genuine and pressing attitudes towards massacre during the war. 
 
Contemporary media, especially the printed sources of the colonial press, 
also provide insights into the wider impact of massacres. Of especial interest 
are disparities between primary accounts and the media reports which 
followed, and the divergent claims made by British and colonial publications. 
These were often at the sharp end of the propaganda struggle that continued 
throughout the war, with Patriot authorities relying on the well-established 
North American print media to accentuate the propaganda fallout from 
massacres, as well as seeking to use the British press (at times very open to 
Whiggish narratives) to put pressure on the governing ministry. 
 
These sources have been accessed either through archival visits to the 
British National Archives, the British Library and the National Records of 
Scotland, or original source reprints of collected works, whether in specific 
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collections such as various volumes of The Papers of General Nathanael 
Greene (reprinted in paperback in 2015), the Cornwallis Papers (2010 
edition), or more general compositions of Revolutionary War sources, like 
The Spirit of Seventy-six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by 
Participants (1968). They have been further supplemented by online 
databases, such as the Founders Online section of the National Archives, 
which includes the digitised writings and correspondence of a large number 
of leading Patriots, and the Southern Campaigns Revolutionary War Pension 
Statements & Rosters catalogue of revwarapps.org, an underused resource 
that compiles all pension data from southern combatants over the course of 
the revolution. 
 
Though analysis and cross-examination of primary evidence drives the 
thesis, assessment of secondary sources is important in establishing the 
legacy of the Revolutionary War’s massacres. Late eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century histories of the revolution are important in understanding 
how Americans were able to shed the violence of the conflict while still 
building on the foundational qualities of many of the combatants. These 
books include Benson J. Lossing’s Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution 
(1850), Bancroft’s aforementioned History of the United States (1834) and 
George Trevelyan’s The American Revolution (1899). Some nineteenth- 
century works also include valuable reprints of primary sources, like Lyman 
C. Draper’s King’s Mountain and its Heroes: History of the Battle of King’s 
Mountain, October 7th, 1780 (1881) or archival collections such as Henry 
Howe’s Historical Collections of Virginia (1845) and Samuel Hazard’s 
collected volumes of the Pennsylvania Archives (1853). Though these do 
have to be treated with care, the sources they include are still often valuable. 
 
As previously mentioned, this thesis is not just a military study of the 
American Revolution, but a study of the specific impact of massacres on the 
military and political dynamics of the conflict. When examining how easy it is 
to shy away from the ugly, oft-partisan nature of the “Massacrology,” Levene 
lays down a challenge to historians that find the topic unpalatable – ‘is it not 
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the correct thing to do to dispense with the mythic transformation that the 
“massacre” has undergone to return to as thorough and comprehensive an 
investigation as is possible of the event itself?’17 Doing so speaks to the 
realities of historical study across all disciplines, and provides greater clarity 




Most dedicated studies of massacre open by attempting to clarify the 
parameters of just what the word itself means, and what that in turn means 
for the study in question. Here definitions need to be carefully considered 
against the general backdrop of the study of violence, an aspect that defined 
the American Revolution far beyond recorded cases of battlefield atrocities, 
massacres or massed killings. 
 
Plainly put, ‘all massacre is violence, but not all violence is massacre’ – the 
use of British prison hulks where thousands of Patriot prisoners languished in 
terrible conditions can rightly be described as an atrocity, while numerous 
other acts of violence such as the burning of homes and the mistreatment of 
civilians, especially women, were as reprehensible as they were 
commonplace.18 It is impossible to look at incidents of military massacre in 
the Revolution without mentioning such activities, but assessing them in full 
in their own right is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
How, though, do we come to a working definition of massacre? In attempting 
to build a framework to allow us to study specific cases of massacre, it is 
important to first take stock of previous attempts do so in other conflicts. As 
Philip G. Dwyer and Lyndall Ryan make clear, until recently the study of 
massacres as a topic in and of itself has been overshadowed by the broader 
study of genocides. While understandable, such a connection is unhelpful 
insomuch as it is entirely possible for massacres to occur in a non-genocidal 
 
 
17 Levene, ‘Introduction’ in The Massacre in History, 3. 
18 Ibid, 5. 
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setting. Even in academia it is common for scholars not heavily invested in 
the subject to fail to 'differentiate between massacre, mass killing and 
genocide.'19 Similarly, studies analysing twentieth-century massacres, such 
as Brenda K. Uekert's Rivers of Blood, typically define their terms using 
parameters created in the late nineteenth and twentieth-centuries, engaging 
with concepts such as human rights and war crimes. While the basic ideology 
behind such ideas can be found throughout history – soldiers during the 
Revolution could look to either the British Articles of War of 1765, the 
American Articles of War of 1775, or popular theorists such Emer de Vattel – 
any work seeking to analyse massacres in a pre-twentieth-century context 
should steer clear of twentieth-century definitions of the word. This therefore 
rules out neat classifications such as the one provided by the Guatemala 
Human Rights Commission, which states that massacres are 'extrajudicial 
executions' specifically of three or more people.20 
How, then, have historians of earlier periods defined the idea of massacre? 
In his analysis of bloodshed during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, Will 
Coster assigned three criteria to the meaning of massacre. Firstly, killings 
had to be conducted 'not by individuals, but by groups.'21 Secondly, there had 
to be a degree of 'superior, even overwhelming, force,' exerted in 
concentration by the perpetrators.22 Lastly, and perhaps most interestingly, 
Coster holds that the final criteria is fulfilled when the bloodshed is 'outside 
the normal moral bounds of the society witnessing it.'23 
Especially in the belief that a massacre must be the work of multiple 
perpetrators, Coster's criteria do not seem entirely satisfactory, but his ideas 
do point in the right direction. Levene and Roberts agree that massacres are 
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best defined when 'people lacking in self-defence, at least at that moment, 
are killed - usually by another group... who have the physical means, the 
power, with which to undertake the killing without physical danger to 
themselves.'24 Such an event also involves a 'limited, though not defined 
geographical arena, as well as a limited, though again not clearly defined 
time period.'25 This second definition helps rule out incidents such as the use 
of nuclear bombs, or the Stalinist purges, which Dwyer and Ryan agree are 
better defined as ‘mass killings’ rather than specific massacres.26 Thanks to 
these descriptions it is possible to reach an imprecise consensus that an 
event must match a broad set of criteria before it can be considered a 
massacre. 
If finding a definition is difficult, it is even harder when considering the term 
"atrocity," the term used by Washington when talking with Thomas Mullett, a 
word so often used alongside, and sometimes conflated with, massacre. If 
dedicated academic efforts to define what David El Kenz has described as 
"massacrology" are scarce, attempts to categorise what we might mean 
specifically by the word "atrocity" are even harder to come by. Dwyer and 
Ryan offer probably the best working definition for physical atrocities, 
specifically that they were 'exactions committed by perpetrators against the 
body of a victim, living or dead, such as rape and torture or the removal of 
body parts.'27 This of course excludes the whole spectrum of non-physical 
acts people instinctively think of as atrocities – forcing families from their 
homes into an inimical wilderness, for example, or the deliberate withholding 
of medical aid from the sick and injured, both of which occurred during the 
American Revolution. While such acts certainly contain elements of 
physicality, they are not as obvious as the laying on of hands. The Oxford 
English Dictionary merely describes "atrocity" as meaning 'an extremely 
wicked or cruel act, typically one involving physical violence or injury' that 
 
 
24 Levene, ‘Introduction’ in The Massacre in History, 5. 
25 Ibid, 6. 
26 Dwyer and Ryan, ‘The Massacre in History’ in Theatres of Violence, xvi. 
27 Ibid, xii. 
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evolved from the sixteenth century onwards.28 Even more so than massacre, 
the idea of atrocity is left wide open to personal interpretation, and thus 
defies a hard and fast definition. 
This leaves us with two problems. Firstly, though a massacre can be 
constructed by adding together certain sets of criteria - it requires multiple 
victims, it must be carried out in a specific locale, the victims must be largely 
defenceless at the time of death - it defies precise numerical qualifications 
insomuch as it seems impossible to agree on the threshold number of victims 
and perpetrators, or to impose a set amount of time over which it must occur, 
or a precise physical boundary within which it must take place. The second 
problem – with the definition of atrocity – is even more pronounced. At a 
basic level the word is defined simply as cruelty. Without a workable 
definition for either phrase it is difficult to know how to approach acts of 
massacre and atrocity during American Revolution. 
Hoock himself wrestles with the terminology used for Revolutionary War 
killings, writing that a massacre was usually defined as ‘the killing, and often 
especially cruel and wanton killing, and often the mutilation, of several or 
many unresisting or defenceless human beings by, typically, an 
overwhelming force, in an action that is specific to a particular place as well 
as limited in time.’29 Even this broad a definition is not perfect by eighteenth 
century standards – in Hoock’s own work he describes a Patriot minister, 
John Rosburgh, who was apprehended and killed by Hessians on January 2 
1777. Despite being taken and killed alone, those relating his death describe 








28 Oxford Dictionary of English, 3rd Edition, ed. Angus Stevenson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 101. 
29 Holger Hoock, Scars of Independence: America’s Violent Birth (New York: Crown, 2017), 
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In his work on the Boston massacre, Eric Hinderaker also points out this 
eighteenth-century capacity for describing even singular deaths as 
massacres, thus intensely broadening the potential scope of study; 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, its [massacre’s] 
primary definition in the eighteenth century was “the 
indiscriminate and brutal slaughter of people or (less 
commonly) animals; carnage, butchery, slaughter in numbers; 
an instance of this.” In modern usage, a massacre seems to 
require a high body count. But in the early modern sense of the 
word, the “cruel and atrocious murder of a single individual” 
could constitute a massacre. It was identifiable by the spirit in 
which it was undertaken, its wantonness and brutality. To 
invoke the term was to make a rhetorical claim with political 
significance.31 
Dwyer and Ryan at least partially accept this same problem in The Massacre 
and History by admitting that ‘it is not uncommon, in other words, for 
historians to refer to the killing of one or two people as massacre.’32 John 
Docker’s article ‘The Origins of Massacres’ adds that ‘the term massacre 
then encompasses within itself the possibility of both event and process or 
sequence,’ one which could reasonably include even a single victim. Docker 
also hypothesises that the word’s nebulous origins may be found in 
sixteenth-century France, where ‘the term massacre was thus once used for 
a butcher’s chopping block’ before it became closely associated in the 
English language with the infamous Saint Bartholomew’s Day killings in 
1572.33 Ultimately there is no generally accepted answer as to how many 
deaths constitute a massacre, bringing us no closer to finding an accurate 
definition to apply to acts of massacre during the Revolutionary period. 
A Workable Definition 
 
The solution to the difficulty of definition lies in the parameters initially set by 
Coster. His final requirement was that a massacre counted as such when 
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bloodshed was considered excessive by the society or period in which the 
massacre took place. At a stroke, this removes the problem of conflating 
modern and legal definitions of war crimes and human rights violations with 
earlier events that do not fit neatly into a twentieth or twenty-first-century 
worldview. It also instantly removes the obfuscating debate about time, 
location and casualty numbers that ultimately distracts from, rather then 
helps construct, a working definition of massacre. 
There was hardly a single incident of extreme violence during the 
Revolutionary War that was acknowledged by both sides as a massacre. 
Contesting narratives, though part of what makes such events worthy of 
study in the first place, further muddy attempts at a concrete definition that 
can be applied in all cases. The only viable option is to reframe the question 
being asked. Following Coster’s ideas, we should not concern ourselves with 
being able to define a massacre with modern terminology and ideas. It is 
better to simply ask whether one side or another considered a particular 
event to be a massacre or not. If the answer is yes, then that event deserves 
a place in this study. As we shall see, during the Revolutionary War there 
were a great many acts considered to be a militarily sound operations by one 
side, and acts of barbaric, excessive violence by the other. The technicalities 
of definition will not be allowed to preclude the analysis of any of them. 
Such a methodology is supported not just by Coster, but also by works like 
those of Andrew Cayton. In his aforementioned study of transatlantic colonial 
violence, Cayton emphasises the importance of understanding the subject 
matter in eighteenth century terminology, and reiterating the fact that their 
notions of “violence” – both as a strict definition and as a broader concept – 
differed in important particulars from the modern usage. The same will be 
attempted here with the eighteenth-century concept of “massacre.” Utilising 
modern definitions or applying strict criteria will simply not suffice. 
By basing this study on acts considered to have been massacres during the 
conflict in question, we also resolve the inability to decide on the correct 
application of the term "atrocity." Simply put, if an event in the past was 
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hailed by its contemporaries as a massacre or an atrocity, it should be 
analysed as such. With regards to the Revolutionary War, this starts to give 
us a workable criteria, for there were many events described as such by 
either or both sides. 
Ultimately then, massacres are best defined by the societies within which 
they occur. When at least part the chosen society – in this case the broad 
transatlantic British and British-colonial North American society of the 1770s 
– describes an event as a massacre it can be considered worthy of inclusion 
in this study. No further criteria is required, and attempting to artificially 
enforce parameters such as necessary body count or geographic locale 
misses the point of the study – this work intends to explore and understand 
both the immediate military impact and the legacies of acts of massacre in 
the American Revolution, not debate the exact validity of massacre claims 
using ahistoric definitions. 
Eighteenth Century Conceptions of Massacre 
 
If massacres should be defined by the societies within which they occur, 
when considering occurrences of massacre during the American Revolution 
we must first look at the state of the Anglo-American society in the mid to late 
eighteenth century. Samuel Johnson's 1755 Dictionary of the English 
Language defines the phrase "massacre" with four words, 'Butchery; 
indiscriminate destruction' and 'murder.'34 It is also listed as part of the 
definition for ‘destruction’ alongside the word 'murder.' Slaughter, meanwhile, 
is listed as 'massacre; destruction by the sword.'35 It also defines "atrocity" as 
meaning 'horrible wickedness; excess of wickedness.'36 A later edition 
pinpoints two specific historical cases of what it defines as massacre - 'the 
great massacre of Protestants in Paris' in 1572 and 'the massacre in Ireland, 
when 40,000 English Protestants were killed' in 1641.37 Such definitions, 
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while certainly not as fixed in the universal consciousness as the dictionary 
definitions of today, can certainly be considered as representative of the mid 
to late eighteenth century understanding of the words. 
Looking beyond his dictionary at the world of Samuel Johnson and his 
perception of massacre in North America is also useful. Johnson himself was 
certainly not ashamed to wield language that invoked his own definition of the 
word. As far as American Whigs were concerned he would have made an 
excellent colonial caricature of a brutal British officer - according to his 
biographer, James Boswell, he once said 'I am willing to love all mankind, 
except an American.'38 He 'breathed out threatenings and slaughter; calling 
them rascals - robbers - pirates; and exclaiming, he'd burn and destroy 
them.'39 Of course, Johnson was a marked opponent of the colonial drive for 
independence, and famously once said 'how is it we hear the loudest yelps 
for liberty among the drivers of negroes?'40 
Johnson's personal feelings are made clearer still by the tone he uses when 
writing on subjects relating to America; he frequently references slaughter 
and barbarism. In Indian's Speech to his Countrymen, Johnson's eighty-first 
essay among the collection of papers known as The Idler, he writes from the 
perspective of Native Americans viewing the British Army during the Seven 
Years War, and speaks tellingly of their belief that colonial settlers 'ranged 
over the continent, slaughtering in their rage those that resisted, and those 
that submitted, in their mirth.'41 The essay's unstinting criticism of colonial 
America is not so much representative of Johnson's understanding of the 
plight of Native Americans, nor necessarily an attempted critique of the 
British empire, but is rather indicative of the man's intense dislike for 
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a British view of North America as a place wracked by violence, where 
bloodshed was inherent. 
In the 20th of his Idler essays, Johnson imagines himself as a historian 
viewing the Seven Years War a century after its conclusion. The acts of the 
colonists are described as those of 'barbarians' who conducted themselves 
'with a degree of outrageous cruelty... a trader always makes war with the 
cruelty of a pirate.'42 In Johnson's descriptions of all the barbarisms of the 
colonial experiment, from his critique of slave-owner hypocrisy to the 
ruthlessness of the wars practiced against the Natives, we see a more 
general belief that the North American societies were more violent than those 
found in Europe. 
Contemporary dictionaries and their authors were not the only means of 
insight into how eighteenth-century Britons and their colonial cousins viewed 
massacres, or violence in general. Much of the period's debate was rooted in 
the work of seventeenth-century philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, and 
focussed on the idea of just war. One particular contemporary, Emer de 
Vattel, was widely read in British North America. Both Franklin and 
Washington were students of his most influential work, The Law of Nations, 
which is frequently cited as having had a degree of influence over the drafting 
of both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. While covering 
a broad range of moral topics, de Vattel brought a new perspective to the 
secular, natural rights ideology behind the Just War theory that eighteenth- 
century Americans would have been familiar with. His thinking revolved 
around the concept that war could be 'undertaken with vicious motives but 
with just causes.' Despite the fact that when 'war had begun he was anxious 
to moderate its conduct,' de Vattel promoted the idea that everyone 'not 
incapable of handling arms, or supporting the fatigues of war... was subject to 
becoming a soldier.'43 Although he introduced nuances to this concept – 
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specific groups such as women, the old and the young could not be targeted 
– in general his writings promoted the idea that all able-bodied males were 
potential combatants, and that an entire nation's strength should be pitched 
against its opposition. Concerning surrendering combatants, de Vattel wrote 
that surrendering soldiers should always be given quarter, and if the heat of 
battle inclined men to murder it was the duty of their officers to restrain them 
– ‘if sometimes in the heat of action the soldier refuses to give quarter, it is 
always contrary to the inclination of the officers, who eagerly interpose to 
save the lives of such enemies as have laid down their arms.’ De Vattel 
considered a refusal of quarter permissible only if the enemy ‘has been guilty 
of some enormous breach of the law of nations… this refusal of quarter is no 
natural consequence of war, but a punishment for his crime.’44 In general, the 
laws of nature and of war subscribed to by many eighteenth-century 
combatants and commentators were ‘Vattelian rules [which] encompassed 
the prohibition of unlawful acts, for example, the massacre of a surrendered 
enemy.’45 
Thanks to the definitions of Johnson and the writings of de Vattel we can 
understand broadly what Washington would have meant to his 
contemporaries when he spoke of the many terrible – yet thankfully forgotten 
– atrocities of the Revolutionary War; horrible and excessive wickedness, 
and the unrestrained damage caused when peoples throw themselves wholly 
into a conflict. Through these criteria any study of the revolution's massacres 
has a wide range of events to choose from. Defining the fine line between 
genuine massacres and the products of hysteria or propaganda becomes a 
worthwhile objective in its own right. 
Understanding the eighteenth-century worldview of massacres both as a 
concept and as literal events is vital if workable study parameters are to be 
created. While contemporary definitions and theory-based critical thought go 
some way to improving our knowledge of how British and North American 
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colonists viewed massacres, perhaps the clearest understanding can be 
gleaned from the attitudes towards contemporary or recent acts of extreme 
violence. While the likes of Johnson’s examples of the 1572 Saint 
Bartholomew’s Day killings or the 1641 massacres in Ireland give us a view 
of British (and Protestant) ideas of historical massacre, there were more 
current cases in the 1760s and 70s that coloured British and colonial 
attitudes to extreme violence. The first chapter in particular will look at events 
such as the 1769 Spittalfields shootings or the Saint George’s Field 
massacre of 1768, as well as examining how fears over massacre were an 
ever-present spectre in colonial America. From the highly publicised events 
following the surrender of Fort William Henry in 1757 to the first Jamestown 
massacre of 1622, racial prejudices and past antagonisms between colonists 
and Native Americans not only influenced the colonial understanding of 
extreme violence and warfare but helped promote the importance of “the 
massacre” as an emotive subject during Revolutionary War discourse. 
The progression of a North American understanding of massacre and the 
impact the Revolutionary War had upon it can be charted in part by the 
changing definitions of the word. The popularity of dictionaries continued to 
rise rapidly during the late eighteenth century, culminating most notably in 
Noah Webster's 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language. It offers 
a more expansive set of definitions than the earlier works of Johnson. Its 
description of "massacre" is lengthy – according to Webster a massacre is: 
The murder of an individual, or the slaughter of numbers of 
human beings, with circumstances of cruelty... It differs from 
assassination, which is a private killing... If a soldier kills a man 
in his own defense, it is a lawful act; it is killing, and it is 
slaughter, but it is not a massacre. Whereas, if a soldier kills an 
enemy after he has surrendered, it is a massacre, a killing 
without necessity, often without authority, contrary to the 
usages of nations, and of course with cruelty. The practice of 
killing prisoners, even when authorized by the commander, is 
properly massacre; as the authority given proceeds from 
cruelty.46 
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Here we see Webster deliberately wrestling with the very issues more 
modern commentators have faced in their efforts to form a single, 
comprehensive definition of massacre. He harks back to Johnson with 
his repeated references to the cruelty which must be inherent in the act, 
as well as later referencing the massacres of Protestants in France. He 
goes much further, however, by choosing to single out the specific 
cases of soldiers killing ‘without necessity’ as massacre. It is also 
interesting that he clarifies that the killing of prisoners even with the 
authority of superior officers must also be considered as a massacre. 
Webster was seventeen when the revolution broke out, and twenty-five 
when it finished. He served in the Connecticut Militia. While not 
otherwise militarily involved in the conflict, he undoubtably experienced 
the Revolutionary War intimately. It is impossible to know how much the 
conflict affected his later writings, but even if there was no connection it 
is interesting to note the extension of the analysis of "massacre" in the 
seventy-three years between Johnson's and Webster's publications, an 
analysis that must have had some basis in the bloodshed of the 
revolution. Here we see the impact that massacres had written into the 
public consciousness. It was this understanding that would define how 
massacres were both conducted and then described, and how a later 
historiography of the war developed that sought to minimise them – in 
the spirit of Washington's plea to Thomas Mullett, to forever forget the 





Chapter One: Boston 
 
No event during the eighteenth century is more regularly associated with 
the word massacre than the shootings in Boston on March 5 1770. The 
deaths of five colonial civilians and the wounding of six others by British 
soldiers became a rallying cry for the revolutionary elements in New 
England, and was used as an example of the brutality of British rule and 
the barbarism of the British Army. The word massacre itself was applied 
by commentators quickly after the incident, something that was in itself 
noteworthy – as Eric Hinderaker points out, ‘simply to call the Boston 
shootings a “massacre” was to make a claim for the event’s 
significance.’1 Contesting narratives, not only between the British Crown 
and the radicals but also between mob actors and well-off leaders of the 
movement, highlighted colonial unrest and provided an insight into both 
the power and the subjectivity of massacre claims. This chapter will 
assess the Boston shootings before looking at how massacres were 
viewed more widely in the colonies during the period, laying a 
foundation for later discussion about the intersection of race, 
propaganda and violence. 
The British Occupation of Boston 
 
The speed and intensity of the response to the events of March 5 is 
indicative of the situation in Boston in 1770. On September 28 1768 a 
fleet of Royal Navy ships and over two regiments of British Army 
regulars put into the town’s harbour. An officer met representatives of 
the town on Castle Island the next morning where he ‘acquainted them 
in a very genteel Manner that he was ordered to quarter one of the 
Regiments at Boston; that he hoped he was going among Friends and 
that his Men would on their Parts behave as such.’2 When advised that 
some of his men may be quartered in public houses, he added that ‘he 
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could not be answerable for the good Order of his Men, which it would 
be impossible to preserve if they were intermixed with the Townspeople 
and separated from their Officers.’3 
The fleet subsequently ‘ranged themselves as if for a siege’ while the 
infantry – the 14th and 29th regiments and two companies of the 59th, 
plus an artillery detachment – landed on Boston harbour’s Long Wharf 
and marched into town ‘with drums beating, fifes playing, and flags 
streaming.’4 
Deployed initially to uphold the British government’s unpopular 
Townshend Acts and support the activities of Massachusetts’s Crown 
officials, the presence of the garrison had a profoundly negative impact 
on colonial attitudes towards the mother country, causing unease 
throughout New England and providing ammunition for a number of 
increasingly vocal Whig radicals. Though British troops were generally 
not quartered en-masse upon the people of Boston and did not conduct 
punitive raids or snatch operations on known dissenters, they did 
participate in a cycle of low-level antagonization with colonists, who 
believed their presence was at best unwarranted, and at worst an 
infringement on their liberty. The census of 1765 put Boston’s 
population at 15,520 inhabitants, around 4,000 of whom were adult 
males, all occupying a town with a circumference of about four miles. 
The British forces that arrived in 1768 totalled roughly 2,000 men, and 
that was without counting the regiment’s camp followers and the crews 
of the Royal Navy ships stationed in Boston harbour. Consequently, 
during the British occupation around one in every three men in the town 
were soldiers.5 
Unsurprisingly, the military presence caused trouble. Led by Samuel 
Adams, anonymous Whiggish and radical writers began to keep a 
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record of British misdemeanours in Boston they variously entitled the 
Journal of Occurrences, the Journal of the Times and the Journal of the 
Transactions in Boston.6 Printed in the New York Journal, such 
accounts set out to 'portray all things British as the embodiment of evil,’7 
delivering a steady stream of reports for over a year that claimed the 
British ‘assaulted men and raped women with frequency.’ 8 
Unsurprisingly the stories related by Adams and his co-agitators were largely 
unverifiable, 'for in these reports of daily outrages there was rarely a name or 
address... dates for the incidents gave a false appearance of 
documentation... the Journal was first published outside of Boston, where 
readers had no way to check the accounts... the source was usually 
hearsay.'9 But whether or not most of the stories related were true or not 
ultimately did not matter. The Journal 'put revolutionary ideology into 
language ordinary people could understand, distilling the grand notions of 
democratic revolution into dramatic stories of corruption and abuse of 
power.'10 
North America proved to be fertile ground for such ideological work, for 
'every week stories of Boston under military rule appeared in papers 
from Salem, Massachusetts Bay, to Savannah, Georgia.'11 New England 
itself was the perfect hub for literary opposition to the British 
government, given that New Englanders were 'the originators of popular 
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an American audience, on American presses.'12 Indignation spread from 
the already well-established papers of the northern colonies via a rapidly 
growing press network to all corners of British North America. Such 
networks would play a vital role in elevating the importance of the 
Boston shootings, and laid the foundations for the atrocity narrative that 
ultimately fuelled Patriot propaganda during the revolution. 
After two years of military occupation, clashes between British soldiers and 
Bostonians became increasingly violent. On February 22 1770 an angry 
crowd attacked the house of a British customs officer, Ebenezer Richardson, 
who had earlier defended the shop of a Loyalist merchant from a similar mob. 
Richardson shot several members of the crowd, including eleven-year-old 
Christopher Seider, who died that evening from his injuries.13 Boston reacted 
with outrage. In an act that would echo the fallout from the March 5 
shootings, Samuel Adams arranged a large and elaborate funeral for Seider, 
including obituaries and poetry that lambasted his killer. The Boston Gazette 
printed a damning article on February 22 describing the ‘barbarous Murder’ 
and stating that the blood of Seider ‘crieth for Vengeance, like the Blood of 
righteous Abel.’14 The radicals understood that they required the use of fatal 
force by the occupying army in order to fully establish themselves as the 
victims, and thus claim unequivocal moral superiority. Seider's death meant 
that 'Adams and the Sons [of Liberty] could transform hitherto anonymous 
accidental victims into martyrs for freedom.'15 
The situation continued to deteriorate, with more fight and street brawls 
between soldiers and town residents. Eventually on the evening of March 5 
1770, an argument broke out between a lone sentry and passers-by that 
soon attracted a gathering crowd. A small group of soldiers led by Captain 
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Thomas Preston arrived in support of their comrade. The crowd became 
abusive and physically aggressive. ‘A heedless mob, playing with legal fire; a 
rash band of frightened soldiers, confused by the noise, distracted and 
provoked by the swearing and taunting in front of them' – the situation was 
ripe for disaster. 16 Eventually, and contrary to Preston’s orders, the soldiers 
opened fire. Within days, the event was being framed by the radical Sons of 
Liberty as a massacre. 
New England’s agitators made full use of the media networks and means of 
communication already available to them. A series of rhyming couplets 
produced anonymously and entitled A Verse Occasioned by the late horrid 
Massacre in King-Street described how the soldiers had been brutalising the 
Boston inhabitants prior to the shooting, which it described as the ‘sad 
massacre.’17 Various newspapers also damned the actions of the soldiers - 
the Boston Gazette falsely reported that Preston had deliberately ordered his 
men to fire and claimed that the soldiers 'showed a degree of cruelty 
unknown to British troops'.18 The Essex Gazette told of how the regulars had 
been 'abusing the people' for weeks before they opened fire 'in a most 
wanton, cruel and cowardly manner' and 'without the least warning of their 
intention.'19 
The five victims were buried with elaborate ceremony, while one of the 
injured boys, Christopher Monk, was paraded before the townsfolk. Entirely 
aware of the incident’s potential, radical New Englanders anticipated a 
government cover-up and rushed to assemble as many damning eyewitness 
testimonials as possible. There proved to be no shortage of primary accounts 
that used the phrase ‘massacre’ in their description of events – Charlotte 
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Bourgate called the shootings the ‘horrid massacre,’20 John Wilme ‘the late 
massacre,’21 John Gray ‘the massacre of Monday evening’22 and David 
Cockran also ‘the late massacre.’23 In total ninety-six people gave their 
version of events, of which 'ninety-four placed the blame on the soldiers, or 
other government officials.'24 These were collated in the tellingly named Short 
Narrative of the Horrid Massacre, edited by a number of prominent Bostonian 
Whigs. As we shall see, such efforts to supplement the massacre account 
with what appeared to be thorough judicial process and fact-finding was a 
technique that was employed repeatedly by the Patriots throughout the 
Revolutionary War. 
The collected testimonies were disseminated throughout the colonies and 
used as proof positive that the British government was an institution no 
longer worthy of loyalty or respect. The pamphlets themselves were 
impounded prior to the trials of the soldiers responsible for the shootings, but 
not before they had reached England. This achieved the radicals' secondary 
aim - to counter the depositions collected by the authorities. When it came to 
harnessing the press and affecting public opinion, the Loyalists 'for once, 
beat them [the Whigs] to the punch.'25 Following the shootings Lieutenant 
Colonel William Dalrymple, commander of the British garrison in Boston, had 
ordered his subordinates to bring together their own eyewitness statements 
exonerating the actions of the soldiers. Within eleven days, thirty-one pro- 
government testimonies had been compiled and smuggled off to England, 
collected under the title of A Fair Account of the Late Unhappy Disturbance at 
Boston in New England. The collection actively acknowledged the efforts of 
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the radicals to paint the event as a massacre, with the anonymously-written 
preface stating 'we see no footsteps of a massacre, or intended massacre, of 
the inhabitants' in the actions of the soldiers.26 
Loyalists and Whigs continued the war of words, with suspicions and 
recriminations abounding – 'looking back on the events of March 2, 3, 4 and 
5, townsmen and soldiers alike would discern carefully laid plotting, always 
on the other side.'27 Such anger and distrust did nothing to ease tensions 
between the occupying forces and the New Englanders. The Fair Account 
and the Narrative of the Horrid Massacre became the soul of debate, ranged 
against one another in a trans-Atlantic propaganda war that continued a long 
process of raising tensions and eroding bonds of commonality between 
Britain and her colonies. The goal of the radicals following the shootings 'was 
not so much truth and accuracy in reporting, but propagation of hatred for 
British rule,' and in the events of March 5 they seemed to have found 
justification for their efforts.28 
More justification, however, would be required before the radicals were able 
to have their way with the perpetrators of the shootings. While Samuel 
Adams strove 'to pressure the court into conducting the trial immediately,' the 
soldiers did not stand at the dock until eight months after the incident itself, 
once the immediate furore had abated.29 In total four trials took place – one 
for Captain Preston, one for his soldiers, one for four men accused of firing at 
the crowd from a building in King Street, and a final trial of a fourteen-year- 
old servant who changed his testimony during earlier proceedings.30 The 
trials of Preston and his men especially were to be a curious juxtaposition - 
the king's soldiers defended by radical-sympathising John Adams, while the 
prosecution was led by the Loyalist-leaning Samuel Quincy. Bostonians went 
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out of their way to show that the trials of Captain Thomas Preston and the 
enlisted men – held separately – were all being conducted fairly. The more 
astute radicals understood that, even if the soldiers were largely exonerated, 
maintaining the persona of the fair and reasonable victim would be of best 
advantage to their cause. 
Tellingly, while the public dealt with the dramatic outpouring of claims of 
massacre and all the emotive accusations that accompanied it, behind court 
doors the incident of March 5 was dissected with somewhat more detached 
language. The phrase "massacre" hardly appears at all during recorded 
proceedings, whether from among Adams' speeches in defence, or even the 
deposition testimonials of witnesses like Theodore Bliss or Benjamin Burdick, 
who were part of the hostile crowd that had gathered around the soldiers. 
The accounts 'did not include any analysis the townspeople or soldiers might 
have offered on the larger causes behind the Massacre,' and frequently 
'reverberate with the intensity of the speaker's desire to avoid tragedy.'31 
This more measured analysis - conducted for longer than was usual for the 
court cases of the time - resulted in most of the defendants being freed, and 
the minor branding of two as punishment. While publicly radicals like Samuel 
Adams fumed, in reality they had scored another victory by showing that, far 
from being unreasoning rebels-in-waiting, Bostonians and New England 
Whigs were strict adherents to the laws of England. Even in his defence of 
the soldiers John Adams had done the work of a radical, removing the focus 
from the street agitators to allow the Sons of Liberty to craft a politicised 
massacre narrative while at the same time asking the prosecution to vent 
their anger not upon the unfortunate regulars, but upon the British 
government that had sent them. Such a carefully conducted series of trails 
was a world away from the anger whipped up in Boston prior to March 5, and 
it was even further removed from the many massacres of the later war, none 
of which ever resulted in any sort of public legal hearing. In effect it marked 
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the beginning of the atrocity narrative mentioned by writers such as Hoock, a 
key aspect of later Patriot propaganda and a device by which the 
revolutionaries would harness almost all future massacres perpetrated 
against them. 
The Framing of Violent Unrest in America and Britain 
 
As the months passed the radicals busied themselves with keeping the 
memory of the ‘Bloody Incident’ alive. The engravings, prints and poetry, the 
elaborate funerals for the shooting's martyrs and the barrage of damning 
testimonials all imply that the Boston shootings did indeed come as a terrible 
shock to most New Englanders, though the specific narrative of a massacre 
rather than a street brawl or mob action was one that was being pushed 
primarily by the Sons of Liberty. Even at the close of the nineteenth century 
George Trevelyan, British author of The American Revolution, struggled to 
understand the idea of the shootings as a massacre – ‘there was a sputter of 
musketry, and five or six civilians dropped down dead or dying. That was the 
Boston massacre. The number killed was the same as, half a century 
afterwards, fell in St. Peter’s Fields at Manchester.’32 Indeed, even some 
initial eyewitness accounts ‘did not resemble a massacre, but rather a much 
more traditional crowd action… a street fight pitting elements of the town 
against the soldiers had escalated.’33 Peter Messer’s study of the event has 
shown that the narrative of a massacre rather than a brawl was largely born 
out of the efforts of the Sons of Liberty – well-to-do individuals who saw 
themselves as the leading lightings of the radical movement – to avoid giving 
the mob agency in retellings of the night’s events. Eric Hinderaker exposes a 
similar juxtaposition in his recent work on the subject, Boston’s Massacre 
(2017). Here we see John Adams faced with a problem – he can defend the 
soldiers who fired by claiming they were being beset by an unruly and 
lawless mob, but in doing so he frames Boston as equally unruly and lawless, 
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something the leading radicals in the Sons of Liberty were desperate to 
avoid. Adams’ solution is to place much of the blame on what he considers a 
small number of undesirables that could be said to not represent Boston’s 
populace, most notable the mixed-race Crispus Attucks. These are Adams’ 
‘motley rabble of saucy boys, Negroes and mulattoes, Irish teagues and 
outlandish jacktars.’34 In framing the crowd as unrepresentative he removed 
agency from ordinary Bostonians and helped clear the way for the massacre 
narrative being crafted by the Sons of Liberty. 
As we shall see, clashes between mobs and soldiers were not uncommon in 
either Britain or America during the period. While Trevelyan references the 
Peterloo Massacre of 1819, just seven months prior to the killings in Boston 
soldiers in the town of Spitalfields, England, had deliberately fired upon a 
crowd of weavers, killing two before violently dispersing the rest. Similarly, in 
1768 an event popularly known as the Massacre of Saint George's Fields 
took place in London in which six or seven men were shot dead and fifteen 
wounded by British soldiers. The killings had stemmed from a riot begun in 
protest over the imprisonment of radical politician John Wilkes. The 
Londoners had shouted slogans that would have been familiar to any New 
England radical - 'Wilkes and Liberty' and 'Damn the King, damn the 
Government.'35 One witness even claimed he heard it said that 'this is the 
most glorious opportunity of a revolution that ever offered.'36 
In an almost direct parallel to the Boston shootings, a young man named 
William Allan was initially pursued by a soldier who 'killed him in particularly 
outrageous circumstances.'37 Enraged by the murder, the crowd then 
assaulted the soldiers with stones. The redcoats proceeded to open fire in 
great confusion, some shooting into the crowd, others deliberately aiming 
over their heads. Drawing yet more parallels, in the immediate aftermath of 
the incident Allan's large funeral was used 'to raise the passions of the 
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people and to strengthen the... cause... in which their leaders had engaged 
them.'38 Adams himself referenced Allan in relation to the events in Boston, 
and New Englanders were very much aware of the Saint George's Fields 
killings. They were also aware of the fact that the death of Allan, so similar in 
circumstances to that of Seider, had been, as the Boston Gazette asserted, 
'cover'd in Britain,' something the gazette promised would not be allowed to 
happen with the killings in Boston.39 Following March 5 1770 one Boston 
newspaper ‘underscored that what happened in Boston was far more serious 
than what had transpired on St. George’s Filed in London – a warning “for 
both Countries.” It was a message that apparently resonated with many 
readers.’40 
An even more powerful example of the British Army's use of violence towards 
civilian populations in the eighteenth century came a decade later. In 1780, 
during the height of the Revolutionary War, the British Army was heavily 
involved in suppressing the anti-Roman Catholic Gordon Riots in London. In 
clashes that made the shootings in both Saint George's Fields and Boston 
seem paltry, troops killed almost three hundred civilians and wounded around 
two hundred more. Nor were these the only cases of public gatherings being 
dispersed with force. The Sacheverell Riots of 1710, the Coronation Riots of 
1714, the Priestly Riots of 1791 and Bristol Bridge Riot of 1793 all marked 
periods of disturbance in eighteenth century Britain that more often than not 
were met with direct force by the military. There were also notable food or 
bread riots in the years 1709, 1740, 1756, 1757, 1766, 1767, 1773, 1782 and 
1785. Indeed, in England between 1740 and 1775 there were 159 major riots 
recorded, not to mention the 1745 Jacobite rebellion and suppression, as 
well as minor rebellions in Ireland in 1771 and 1772.41 
The army also understood its place in maintaining the peace, and it should 
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inexperienced when it came to handling civilian unrest. While the British 
Army had not been involved in a full-scale conflict since 1763, many units 
had been conducting policing duties in Britain prior to their redeployment. As 
Fischer points out: 
Just before coming to America, the Royal Welch Fusiliers had 
been used to “restore order” throughout Devon and Cornwall… 
The 18th Foot had been called upon to stop riots against Press 
Gangs in Whitehaven. The 43rd and eight other regiments had 
been assigned to put down agrarian risings… the 4th, and many 
other units, had been busy along the south coast of England, 
suppressing rings of highly organised tea smugglers.42 
Colonial radicals might have viewed the lack of English outrage over military 
brutality as stemming from the fact that the British public had lost that radical, 
liberty-loving streak which they still cleaved to, those oft-touted rights of 
Englishmen that fuelled such discord in seventeenth-century Britain. The 
reality was somewhat more complex. Britons remained suspicious and wildly 
critical of their government - the very reason that the military was often 
required to intercede during bouts of rioting was because Britain still 
possessed no police force or regulated militia, partly due to the fact that 'they 
were convinced such a force would be used by the Government for the 
violation of personal liberty.'43 
Mob violence, whether spontaneous or orchestrated, was also a frequent 
feature of the American colonies in the 1760s, and confrontations between 
rioters and regular British soldiers certainly occurred well before even 1768. 
The Stamp Riots exposed limits of British authority and the fraying edges of 
empire North America while also coming perilously close to a large-scale, 
bloody confrontation years before even the Boston shootings. In November 
1765 a New York mob torched an effigy of the local royal governor while a 
garrison force of British regulars under a Major Thomas James were holed 
up in the nearby Fort George. Rioters ‘seized the guards posted to protect 
Major James’s house, then gutted the structure with extraordinary 
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thoroughness; surrounded the fort, hammered on its gates, chucked rocks at 
the troops, and taunted them for lacking the courage to shoot.’44 While New 
York was the most direct scene of tension between British troops and 
American rioters, the unrest was mirrored in Boston and dozens of other 
locations across the colonies. 
While the Stamp Riots showed ‘the complicated and underappreciated role 
that violence played in creating the innovative political practices and ideals 
that underpinned the American Revolution,’ there were further incidents 
during the period that further illustrated the potential for violence between 
settlers and soldiers. 45 The year 1766 saw an outbreak of unrest amongst 
squatters and tenants occupying territory on the disputed New York and 
Massachusetts border. General Gage deployed two regiments of regulars, 
the 28th and 46th Foot, to quell the disturbance, hoping that by doing so he 
would curry support and from both the local gentry and the colonial 
legislatures. The operation proved largely fruitless. The agitators ‘confronted 
the regulars as guerrillas… leading [Captain John] Clarke’s troops on a wild 
chase around eastern Albany County.’ At one point British soldiers even 
found themselves confronted by a battalion of Massachusetts militia who 
believed they had illegally crossed the border with New York. Ultimately the 
intervention did nothing to improve relations between the regular army and 
the colonies.46 
If the 1760s showed the potential for violent confrontation between soldiers 
and civilians in both Britain and her American colonies, the specific concept 
of massacre in the latter was built on something more than just a potential 
outcome of mob disorder. Indeed, the impact of the Boston shootings and the 
outcomes it helped to create cannot be understood without first addressing 
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the history of massacres in colonial America, particularly the fraught history 
of racial tensions between settlers and Native Americans. 
Legacies of Race and Massacre 
 
The fact that the Boston shootings were specifically regarded as a massacre 
in the colonies is better understood when contextualised within the history of 
British North America. The radicals did not happen upon the phrase 
massacre by chance. They were aware that the word would incite particular 
emotions among their readers, cultural memories that had previously helped 
bring the colonists together in the face of a common foe. In order to fully 
understand how massacre became almost the norm at certain stages of the 
Revolutionary War it is necessary to first contextualise the more negative 
aspects of Native and colonial relations in the century-and-a-half preceding 
the American Revolution. Further exploration of race, violence and the 
frontier will feature in chapter four, and while a comprehensive retelling of 
early American massacres between Natives and settlers is beyond the scope 
of this work, touching upon the core race dynamics involved in the enforcing 
of colonial and imperial “white civility” is vital as a basis for understanding 
violence – and thus massacre – in eighteenth-century America. 
In The Barbarous Years (2012) Bernard Bailyn points out there was ‘never a 
time, over half a century of settlement, when there was not a racial conflict in 
one or another of the European colonies in coastal North America… not only 
random killings, but concerted wars of devastation.’47 His claim was that the 
frequent ‘merciless slaughter’ was directly descended from European 
experiences of the Thirty Years War and the Dutch rebellion, carried over as 
it was by settlers who had been involved in those infamously brutal 
seventeenth century conflicts.48 
Almost from the beginning then, massacres proliferated between settlers and 
Natives. In 1622 Powhatan tribesmen attacked Jamestown and nearby 
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settlements, wiping out a third of the white population. A colonial account 
delivered to the Virginia Company told how the natives ‘came unarmed into 
our houses, without bows or arrows, or other weapons’ seemingly in order to 
sell and trade, but then ‘basely and barbarously murdered, not sparing either 
age or sex, man, woman or child.’49 The Powhatan were subsequently 
decimated by 'three Indian wars... together with constant killings and 
destruction on a smaller scale; by a system of clearances and man hunts 
inaugurated in 1644 and continued for some years; by smallpox and other 
epidemics.'50 
By the 1760s both colonists and those in Europe were also expressing the 
“othering” of Natives via Enlightenment and Humanist ideology. The tribes 
were held to be culturally, rather than “essentially” savage - their otherness 
could be reduced through Christianisation and submission to “civilising” white 
laws and authorities. As Patrick Griffin put it, ‘the Indians were “savages,” 
“heathens,” and “brutes.” But they were redeemable. These terms were used 
over and over again, suggesting that the framework for understanding human 
difference was rooted in the concept of civility.’51 Those who did not accept 
white civility could safely be demonized in their “savage” state, and became 
fair game to expansionist colonists – ‘to these settlers, “savage” Indians did 
not improve the land, and therefore the land was forfeit to Christians.’52 
Christianity thus remained the central strand in the definition of white civility 
versus savage otherness. This remained the case even as Enlightenment 
thinking expanded Humanist concepts of society. Civility through 
Christianisation could redeem Natives in the eyes of their white neighbours – 
‘the idea of civility, in a word, justified both reform and slaughter.’53 If the 
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concept of Christianisation played a role in defining the racial dynamics 
between settlers and Natives, it therefore also played a role in excusing the 
shedding of Native blood in acts of massacre, and had done since the first 
settlement of North America. Following the massacre of a Pequot town on 
the banks of the Mystic River in 1637, an English soldier, John Underhill, 
declared ‘I defer you to David's war... Sometimes the scripture declares 
women and children must perish with their parents... we had sufficient light 
from the Word of God for our proceedings.'54 Such an explanation must have 
sat well with Underhill, for the events at Mystic River were mirrored by later 
massacres he was involved in during his service with the Dutch. Similar 
religious language would emerge during the Revolution, as colonists on both 
sides of the divide sought to rationalist and explain explain how their society 
had degenerated into open violence with such apparent swiftness. While use 
of the specific phrase "massacre" varies depending on the bible translation 
used (the King James Version actually makes little mention of the word 
itself), the Old Testament in particular is replete with massed killings of 
unarmed or helpless people, from Elijah burning 102 men to death to Doeg 
the Edomite slaughtering men, women, children and animals. The spectre of 
violence was not alien to the Christianising process whites expected Natives 
to undertake in order to remove their perceived savageness. 
There was plenty of religious fervour, and no evidence of regret or distaste, in 
another account left by the leader of the Mystic River expedition, John 
Mason. He wrote that 'thus did the Lord judge among the heathen, filling the 
place with dead bodies... and thus in little more than one hour's space was 
their impregnable fort with themselves utterly destroyed, to the number of six 
or seven hundred... there were only seven taken captive, and about seven 
escaped.'55 Such writings show how colonists, particularly New Englanders, 
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turned to their faith to successfully rationalise their actions. They continued to 
do so, even when the enemies became fellow-Christians, whether the French 
or later the British. Indeed, it did not take long for Europeans to turn 
techniques of bloodshed and brutality against one another on a large scale in 
North America, proving that even well before the Revolutionary War concepts 
of white civility could be bent or entirely subverted in the “othering” of an 
appropriate enemy. 
Some of the earliest incidents of colonists unleashing massacre upon fellow 
settlers occurred during King William’s War. Ostensibly a continuation of the 
conflict began in Europe in 1688, in the northern colonies its causes were 
heavily wrapped up in competition for the lucrative beaver pelt trade and 
jostling for power and position between England, France and a number of 
Native tribal confederations. On August 5 1689, a large warband of Mohawks 
allied to the English, attacked the French colonial settlement of Lachine. After 
a spate of killings and the torching of buildings, the Mohawks ‘burned five 
Frenchmen, roasted six children, and grilled some others on the coals and 
ate them.’56 Similar French accounts speak of the most savage brutalities 
meted out against those taken prisoner. 
While the veracity of such tales can never be checked against the Mohawk 
accounts – none of which survive – we can at least be certain of the events 
stemming from the Lachine massacre. On February 8 1689, at a settlement 
called Schenectady in what had until recently been the Dutch colony of New 
York, a combined force of French-Canadian colonists and their Native allies 
fell upon the unsuspecting homesteads. ‘All was massacre and pillage for 
two hours,’ wrote one account, stating that the inhabitants ‘fell beneath the 
tomahawk, or were taken prisoners,’ and that when one woman tried to flee 
with a ‘infant child in her arms. They snatched the innocent from her arms, 
and dashed out its brains.’57 
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Massacres had been occurring between colonists and Native Americans 
almost since the arrival of the first European settlers, but the fact that the 
brutality evidenced at Schenectady had been conducted at the orders of 
fellow Christian Europeans and not those painted as barbarous outsiders 
ultimately did not prove difficult for English colonial authors to rationalise. 
Writers were able to damn the acts of French “papist” brutality as easily as 
they did the ravaging of the Natives, and they would do so with equal ease 
when, eventually, it was British soldiers who found themselves unwelcome in 
parts of North America. 
Deerfield and the Retrospective Construction of Massacre 
 
In the decades following King William’s War the use of joint colonial and 
Native raids designed to terrorise frontier settlements became almost entirely 
normalised. On February 29 1704, at the start of Queen Anne’s War – again 
an extension of a wider European struggle – a force of French and combined 
Native American tribes struck at the New England town of Deerfield. During 
the assault 44 of the town’s residents were killed, 25 of whom were children. 
At a glance it may seem as though this is yet another example of excessive 
violence meted out in an effort to force the abandonment of frontier 
settlements through fear. It might be expected that the New Englanders 
would have decried the attack as a massacre, as had been the case with 
other such incidents. In fact, the idea that the bloodshed at Deerfield 
constituted a massacre did not emerge until over a century afterwards. 
In their study of the attack on Deerfield, Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney 
established that: 
It took the founding of the United States to turn the “destruction 
of Deerfield” into a massacre. The word massacre first 
appeared in print in 1804, when the Revered John Taylor of 
Deerfield used the word five times in his centennial sermon 
commemorating the “Destruction of the Town”… After this 
sermon, some nineteenth-century writers occasionally spoke of 
47 
 
“the massacre of the Inhabitants of Deerfield” or “the Deerfield 
Massacre.”58 
Interestingly, modern commemorations of the event similarly try to avoid the 
phrase “massacre,” acknowledging just what a heavily loaded term it is – 
‘current commemoration seeks to bring people together by helping them 
understand the cultures… that converged in what one organiser referred to 
rather blandly as “the Deerfield Incident.” For the organiser of these annual 
events “massacre is a dirty word.”’59 In this regard the modern view is in 
keeping with the original understanding of what happened at Deerfield, for 
‘massacre also was not a word used by the English colonists themselves to 
describe what happened… Colonial New Englanders, though shocked and 
outraged by the raid, did not call it a massacre.’60 
At a glance the incident at Deerfield should have possessed all the 
prerequisites for a seventeenth or eighteenth-century colonial massacre. A 
surprise assault resulted in unarmed civilians being killed in their homes 
regardless of gender or age, while the settlement was looted and torched. 
During the French withdrawal more civilian prisoners, including young 
children, were killed because they were proving too much of an 
encumbrance. The reason colonists were not immediately outraged may lie 
in the fact that, as far as the perpetrators were concerned, the attack did not 
actually go as planned. Unlike raids such as Schenectady, the French and 
Natives did not have the luxury of infiltrating Deerfield while the inhabitants 
slept. This was partly due to the difficulty of coordinating the five separate 
Native tribal contingents that comprised the French force, but the attackers 
were also severely hampered by the fact that the townspeople had a degree 
of forewarning. Consequently, when the fighting actually broke out a number 
of the New Englanders successfully fortified themselves, others escaped, 
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All this meant that ‘casualties among the raiders had also been heavier than 
one would expect for a battle later characterised as a massacre… the 
Deerfield raid was the costliest for the French and their Native allies.’61 
Because of this, the English colonists felt as though they had given a good 
account of themselves during the town’s defence, while the French 
exaggerated figures in official reports to cover up for a raid that had not gone 
as planned, enhancing the number of settlers killed while reducing the 
number of their own participants that had supposedly been involved. The 
results of all this are illuminating – even if an engagement was able to match 
almost all of the details of past incidents which had been labelled as 
massacres, perception was key. The New Englanders did not believe they 
had been massacred and so, in a sense, they had not been, at least until 
commemorators a century later decided that that was what had happened. 
Such a divergence in point of view would occur frequently during American 
Revolutionary War massacres and their later commemorations, especially, as 
we shall see, with the war’s opening engagement at Lexington. 
After labelling the fight at Deerfield as a massacre in the nineteenth century, 
the event’s importance grew in the public consciousness. Despite the 
similarities to a dozen other violent incidents in the decades before and after, 
the Deerfield raid came to hold a particular place in the minds of post- 
Revolutionary Americans. It became embroiled in Turner's Frontier Thesis of 
the late nineteenth century, which argued that the national consciousness of 
the United States was formed on the colonial borders in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Within such a narrative Deerfield became an early 
touchstone, an example of how the fledgling American spirit triumphed in the 
face of what was painted as the bloodiest and most savage kind of adversity. 
The reconstruction of a massacre formed through acts of remembrance 
heightened the importance of Deerfield and the events that had occurred 
there. In short, ‘the Deerfield raid continued to be remembered… because it 
had acquired a distinctive name: the Deerfield Massacre.’62 Singling out a 
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particular event for the title of massacre, despite the fact that there were any 
number of similar events that were not labelled as such, is a theme that 
would reappear again both before and during the Revolution. 
Fort William Henry and Massacre as a Propaganda Leveller 
 
As the eighteenth century progressed tensions in the colonies continued to 
lead to spates of extreme violence – the torching of Fort Neoheroka by 
colonial troops in 1713, which led to the burning to death of hundreds of men, 
women and children, or the raid on Norridgewock in 1724, which again saw 
dozens of Native American civilians killed in an attack specifically designed to 
sow terror and drive Natives from land that could be settled by colonists. 
The Seven Year’s War brought the imperial contest between Britain and 
France to a head. Despite the much-discussed arrival of European-style 
warfare in North America, the reality of the conflict was still one of small-scale 
raids, skirmishes, ambushes and, indeed, massacres. It opened with 
accusations of atrocity, when Native Americans, in defiance of the entreaties 
of a young George Washington, killed a number of French prisoners in cold 
blood. Three years later, in 1757, the most infamous massacre of the war 
occurred at Fort William Henry, near Lake George in the colony of New York. 
On August 8 the British garrison of the fort surrendered to a combined 
French and Native force commanded by General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm. 
In the terms of surrender, the garrison was permitted to march free, albeit 
under an 18-month parole. However, the Natives did not adhere to the 
directives of their allies. Having been denied the plunder and prisoners 
promised to them by the French, they attacked the column of soldiers and 
civilians soon after they abandoned the fort. 
In a now-familiar pattern, the popular idea of the massacre that followed 
became heavily removed from the realities of the event itself. 
Contemporaries read first-hand accounts that described how terrifying and 
chaotic the evacuation of Fort William Henry was. The idea then developed in 
the public imagination that the Natives fell upon the column en-mass and set 
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about slaughtering the British and their colonists indiscriminately, with few 
survivors. Such a view was made famous thanks in part to the fictional 1826 
novel Last of the Mohicans by James Fenimore Cooper.63 
The true events of the attack upon the column are far more complex than the 
traditional narrative permits. For a start the Native assault was not a unified 
undertaking, but was more a case of individual bands from separate tribes 
dogging the column over a prolonged march. The Natives did not so much 
attack as harass individual sections, not always with the clear intention of 
shedding blood. The situation did eventually degenerate, with the column 
ultimately disintegrating. Some Natives took the opportunity to kill and scalp 
(a cultural privilege they felt they had been denied by their French allies), 
while others carried off prisoners of all ages and genders. The French, not 
wishing to feed the chaos by becoming embroiled, ‘utterly failed to protect 
their British prisoners,’ a fact that outraged contemporaries as much as the 
massacre itself. 64 
While the exact number of those killed or carried off into captivity will never 
be known, it has been persuasively argued that the figure ‘could not possibly 
have exceeded 185’ and was in reality was probably closer to 69 – a far cry 
from the 1,500 that had been stated in popular literature. 65 Considering that 
the retreating column numbered over two thousand persons, it would seem at 
first that the scale of bloodshed does not match the infamy the events at Fort 
William Henry have assumed in the public mind. As we have established, 
however, the actual number or even proportion of those killed in any case of 
eighteenth-century violence often has little bearing on how an event is 
remembered. Ultimately ‘provincial outrage over “the massacre of Fort 
William Henry” would feed an already ferocious anti-Catholic tradition in New 
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England and intensify an undiscriminating Anglo-American hatred of Indians,’ 
thus bolstering Britain’s efforts in North America over the remainder of the 
Seven Years War.66 
The Fort William Henry incident deserves further attention because reactions 
to it down the centuries mirror many of the later reactions to incidents of 
massacre during the American Revolution. In Ian K. Steele’s book there are 
five phases of historiography identified that help the development of the idea 
of a dreadful massacre from the late eighteenth century to the end of the 
nineteenth.67 One eyewitness account that became popular in the immediate 
aftermath describes how ‘it is not in the power of words to give any tolerable 
idea of the horrid scene that now ensued; men, women, and children were 
dispatched in the most wanton and cruel manner, and immediately scalped. 
Many of these savages drank the blood of their victims, as it flowed warm 
from the fatal wound.’68 The writer, one Jonathan Carver, more or less 
directly blamed the French for not stopping the bloodshed, the consequences 
of which, he claimed, were ‘dreadful, and not to be paralleled in modern 
history.’69 
Conversely, it has been argued that the French did all within their reasonable 
power to avert bloodshed, especially given that the killings that did occur 
were not as sustained or wholesale as they could have been. Confusion 
reigned during the Native attacks, and remained prevalent in the immediate 
retellings. Within weeks of the event even British colonial papers were 
struggling to discern what had taken place.70 Steele argues that Montcalm 
actively tried to stop the Native attacks, demonstrating ‘outrage, courage, and 
determination to remedy the situation.’ 71 The chaos of it all, and the fact that 
it was happening over an extended, forested location, meant that it is almost 
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impossible to claim that there was a deliberate, blanket failure by the French 
to intervene. The fact that some junior officers decided not to set themselves 
between their enemies and their erstwhile allies while they were determined 
to take scalps is hardly surprising, nor can it be taken as an indictment of the 
larger French force. According to Steele, Anglocentric historians have gone 
out of their way to vilify the French, latching onto accounts such as Carver’s 
to build a massacre narrative that fitted a particular agenda. The killings were 
not so much a massacre as ‘a series of misunderstandings and betrayals’ 
largely revolving around the fact that the British surrender deprived the 
Natives the ‘promised scalps and plunder in exchange for their participation 
in the expedition from Canada.’72 
The debate over the events of Fort William Henry offers an example of the 
wider historiographic struggle that also takes place over many accounts of 
Revolutionary War massacres. As early as 1859, one biographer of British 
general Israel Putnam talked about how many ‘different writers have taken 
different views of the conduct of the French general [Montcalm], in relation to 
this cruel massacre,’ with the author in question deciding that ‘charity inclines 
us to accept’ that Montcalm had done all he could to avoid the bloodshed. 73 
Such discourse has only intensified in the past few decades. In Massacre at 
Fort William Henry, David R. Starbuck actively combats Steele’s belief that 
the event was not truly a massacre, opening with a discussion about how 
‘none of the controversies pertaining to the fort have ever been resolved, and 
scholarly interpretations diverge on every aspect of what happened and 
why.’74 He actively cites Steele’s thesis as something he disagrees with on 
multiple levels, and points out problems with events at Fort William Henry 
that are pertinent for many of the later studies relating to precise casualties, 
motivations and even the exact location of events – ‘there is a host of specific 




73 William Cutter, The Life of Israel Putnam, (New York: Derby and Jackson, 1859), 4. 




Starbuck is of the belief that ‘repeated unwillingness to upholds the peace 
terms, especially in light of the massacre at Oswego just a year earlier, 
strongly indicates French indifference to English life and property, and the 
French richly deserve the blame that has been given them by past authors.’76 
The divide between Steele and Starbuck is merely the latest set of 
interpretations that would dog similar events throughout the period, from 
Deerfield to Boston. 
For their own part, the French were not inclined to view the events of the Fort 
William Henry surrender as an atrocity, proving that, as ever, the specific 
concept of massacre is in the eye of the beholder. While the French 
acknowledged that the aftermath of the siege had been unfortunate – 
Montcalm’s own aide, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, actually predicted a 
massacre after the surrender – the general French attitude was best 
described as ‘ambivalent.’77 In contrast, and much like the Whigs in the 
aftermath of the Boston shootings of 1770, the British and their colonial 
forces were swift to turn the outcome of Fort William Henry against their 
enemies. In the months following the killings newspaper articles and 
accounts ‘exaggerated the number of those killed and captured by the 
attacking French and Indian force’ and, at least according to Starbuck, ‘were 
understandably outraged by what they described as a massacre.’78 It is also 
interesting to note that the majority of the victims were not native Britons, but 
colonial troops from New Hampshire that made up the rear of the 
withdrawing column. The incident therefore helped feed a particular mind-set 
that, first of all, saw the colonists (rightly or wrongly) styling themselves as 
victims and, secondly, using the massacre as a rallying cry not only in the 
local area, but across British North America. In terms of the Revolution, the 
incident at Fort William Henry was therefore a taste of things to come. 
In her book on the impact of King Philip’s War on later American identity, Jill 
Lepore defined the importance of language in warfare, especially when it 
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came to massacres and atrocities - ‘the words used to describe and define 
war are among the tiredest in any language. “Bloody,” “brutal,” “cruel,” 
“savage,” “atrocious” – all overused and imprecise. Yet they remain shocking, 
perhaps because of their very vagueness… I call your attack a massacre, 
you call my resistance treachery.’79 If nothing else, an examination of events 
described as massacres in colonial America bears out the fact that the North 
American continent had been the site of what can easily be described as 
frequent incidents of extreme violence between Europeans almost since the 
founding of the first colonies. By 1775 colonists of all political persuasions 
were adept at conducting massacres and remembering defeats in a way that 
cast themselves as the victims. The largely misplaced kill or be killed 
mentality that some later hailed as part of the pioneer spirit meant that 
concepts of massacre were not just a natural addition to the mindset of 
colonists – whether Patriot or Loyalist – they were frequently a driving force 
behind violence and how it was perceived. The word “massacre” was used to 
describe the shootings in Boston in 1770 not at random, but because it 
evoked older fears and emotions among the colonial readership, fears the 
radicals wished to play upon. 
Events such as Deerfield and Fort William Henry also show that the term 
"massacre" was not only highly subjective and effective in eliciting an 
emotional response, but it also helped embed an event in the public 
consciousness. Militarily Deerfield and Fort William Henry did not have a 
tumultuous impact on the course of either war, but once assigned the title of 
massacre – whether immediately afterwards or many decades later – they 
became focal points in popular colonial memory. Understanding this, the 
radicals in New England set out to ensure the Boston shootings were 
immortalised in the same way. After the shootings, those colonists who 
wished to create further unrest were able to draw upon the legacy of those 
who had come before. This “massacre mind-set” is part of the reason why 
colonists reacted with such outrage to Boston, while similar events in Britain 
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had provoked far less consequential backlash. It also explains why the British 
military, so used to peacekeeping and the use of deadly force during riot 
control in Britain, was unprepared for the backlash its actions caused in the 
colonies. 
Differences between British and colonial attitudes towards massacre were 
further highlighted by two aspects. Firstly the radicals in America were too 
clever to squander their position as victims and lose public approval through 
unrestrained rioting. Secondly, the pace and nature of events had allowed 
the growth of a radical movement that had already laid down strong roots in 
the press and among intellectual circles by 1770. The Boston massacre 
provided them with a case of seemingly unjustifiable barbarity on the part of 
the government, and could be used to help Americans transform their views 
of the British into something foreign, something which, like the Natives and 
the French before them, could be freely demonised. In doing so they helped 
form what Hoock would term the atrocity narrative, a particular propaganda 
slant that would allow the later Patriots to both condone the massacre of the 
enemy, and further vilify them when they in turn committed massacres. Such 
a strategy ensured that the opening shots of the war set the tone for 






Chapter Two: Lexington 
 
He said to his friend, "if the British march 
By land or sea from the town to-night, 
Hang a lantern aloft in the belfry-arch 
Of the North Church tower as a signal light, - 
One, if by land, and two, if by sea; 
And I on the opposite shore will be, 
Ready to ride and spread the alarm1 
 
 
An extract from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's poem, known most 
commonly as Paul Revere's Midnight Ride, gives an insight into the power of 
the mythology that had already arisen around the opening of the American 
Revolutionary War less than a century after it began. Quite apart from the 
fact that in Revere's day North Church was known as Christ Church, or that it 
was Revere who lit the signal lamps for his compatriots and not the other way 
round, it is safe to assume the well-known phrase the British are coming (a 
line that is itself merely extrapolated from Longfellow's poem) was never 
uttered. For a start, Revere's mission to alert the countryside to the incursion 
of government soldiers had a covert element. Disguised British officers 
patrolled New England's roads and lanes looking for radicals, and indeed, 
Revere was actually apprehended during his famous ride. Furthermore, the 
concept of Revere referring to the British as though they were some alien 
power does not fit the worldview of people living in Massachusetts in 1775. 
Even most revolutionaries in New England were not yet drawing definitive 
distinctions between their status as Americans and their status as English or 
British subjects. Given context, the phrase makes little sense. A better 
candidate, if Revere shouted anything at all during his ride, would have been 
the regulars are out. 
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Context, then, is everything, especially when considering the events in and 
around Lexington and Concord on April 19 1775. The start of the 
Revolutionary War has long been burdened by the weight of nation-building 
and national memory, anchored by such artistic retellings as Longfellow's 
poem, Ralph Waldo Emerson's Concord Hymn or William Barns Wollen's 
painting, The Battle of Lexington, April 19 1775. These later accounts all 
share a dramatic, magisterial quality that is removed from the confusion, 
panic, anger and bloodshed of April 19. Violence plays little or no role in their 
retelling. The reality was somewhat different – the final shots had barely rung 
out on April 19 before both sides were jostling to impose their understanding 
on the day's events, and nor were concerns purely relegated to wartime 
propaganda. Well into the nineteenth century, exactly what had happened at 
Lexington and Concord remained a point of fierce controversy. 
This chapter revisits the engagement at Lexington and the withdrawal from 
Concord to Boston on April 19, re-examining it in the context of a contested 
massacre. The importance of Lexington and Concord as the first scenes of 
bloodshed during the revolution are highlighted, as is how they were used as 
a rallying cry for the revolutionary cause. In the second half of the chapter 
Lexington is again revisited, this time in order to show how the understanding 
of massacres can change over time. The shift of Lexington from massacre to 
battle, even among the opinions of those involved in it, is revealing of the 
subjectivity involved in the many similar cases throughout this thesis. 
Lexington the Battle versus Lexington the Massacre 
 
At the 2010 Memory Matters conference, hosted by the Miami University of 
Ohio, historian Edward T. Linenthal spoke on the topic of ‘the perils and 
promise of public history.’2 The event that framed the start of his discussion 
was the battle of Lexington. Linenthal spoke about the first image produced 
of the engagement, Amos Doolittle's lithograph that appeared for sale in the 
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Connecticut Journal in December 1775, eight months after the battle. He 
described how the artwork showed a relatively minor engagement, a 'fairly 
accurate depiction of what happened on Lexington Green,' where a small 
band of Patriot militia had encountered the advance companies of a column 
of British regulars.3 Linenthal went on to discuss how the understanding of 
this event – and the images that portrayed it – changed and became more 
embellished in the nineteenth century. Much of the process began, Linenthal 
claimed, following Lafayette's visit to Lexington and the surrounding area for 
the fiftieth anniversary of the battle. At Concord bridge Ralph Waldo Emerson 
told the Frenchman that 'this is where the first battle of the Revolution took 
place.'4 
The wording did not sit well with the people of either Lexington or Concord. 
Those from Lexington stressed that their green was where the first true 
"battle" had occurred, while the people of Concord and nearby Acton claimed 
'that [Lexington] was a massacre. It wasn't a battle.'5 The difference was 
clear in the minds of the inhabitants during the early nineteenth century, as 
was its importance. 
In his talk, Linenthal described the vital nature of 'the primacy of redemptive 
sacrifice and blood sacrifice. Those who die in a massacre are not making a 
conscious sacrifice. Their blood doesn't carry that same symbolic weight, and 
it was terribly important for people in Lexington to think about this as a 
meaningful blood sacrifice.'6 They worked hard throughout the 1820s, 1830s 
and 1840s to transform the first clash of the American Revolution from the 
status of massacre to battle, while others persisted with the distinction. 
Frederic Hudson, for example, writing in the mid-1800s, specifically entitled 
his account of the opening clashes The Massacre at Lexington Green and 
the Fight at Concord Bridge. Similarly, a resident of Concord went so far as 
to publish a book dedicated to arguing that Concord was the first scene of 
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armed Patriot resistance, whereas 'Lexington was merely a massacre.'7 In 
what retrospectively seems like a strange parody of the events in Boston 
after the 1770 shootings, a committee was founded in Lexington that 
collected the testimonies of eyewitnesses and participants from the 1775 
engagement on the Green, seeking to prove that the incident had been a 
battle, and not a massacre. Following the committee's published rebuttal, in 
1825, a Concord resident in turn wrote a reply 'backed by his own 
depositions, supporting the massacre claim.'8 He went so far as to grapple 
with the definition of a massacre, stating that 'there seems to be some 
difficulty in forming an idea of hostility and battle, when one party only 
assaults; it seems like one fighting alone. A violent attack, however, may be 
an important step in bringing on mutual conflict.'9 He cites primary accounts 
of the clash at Lexington as indicating that 'no one would ever think of a 
battle, or a firing of both sides, but only of a cruel and horrid massacre.'10 
One Reverend Doctor Ripley, meanwhile, donated a plot of land in 1834 to 
the town of Concord specifically to commemorate ‘where the Battle at the 
North Bridge took place.’11 
Even today the distinction remains important to some - Linenthal related how 
he had once claimed Lexington was a massacre to a museum curator in 
Lexington itself. He was told 'in no uncertain terms that this, in fact, was a 
battle and not a massacre.'12 Illustrating the contrary view, the modern-day 
website for the Concord Museum invites its visitors to explore 'the first shots 
in the battle for American Independence' at Concord. Contrasting the pointed 
use of the phrases battle and massacre, in his 1978 work The First Stroke 
Thomas Fleming writes about how militia colonel James Barrett's military 
experience ensured 'there was no chance of the Lexington massacre being 
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repeated on a bigger scale in Concord.'13 Fleming uses the phrase battle and 
massacre interchangeably and does not pause to consider that the fight at 
Lexington may or may not have been specifically a massacre. Nor does he 
spend any time considering whether or not the word in itself is a loaded one 
for those describing the events of April 19 1775 - something that far too many 
previous scholars have overlooked. 
That some inhabitants of New England should try so hard to distance 
themselves from the idea of massacre may seem surprising given the highly 
politicised fervour they displayed when applying the same word to the Boston 
shootings of 1770. The situation becomes even stranger when considering 
the initial reactions of the colonists to the fighting at Lexington and Concord 
and the atrocity narrative that developed throughout the war. Initially, New 
Englanders held the use of force by British regulars against the militia to be 
just as heinous a crime as the killings in Boston. There was certainly no 
hesitation over calling the day's fighting – whether at Lexington, Concord, or 
along the road back to Boston – a massacre. British and Loyalist 
commentators were similarly unequivocal when it came to the actions of their 
opponents. Accounts spoke not of open conflict and battle, but of murder, 
treachery and assassination. Despite this, later commentaries proved that the 
idea of Lexington as a massacre would only persist for as long as the 
description fitted a wider narrative. Lexington the massacre or Lexington the 
battle – both were held to be true under different circumstances. The word, 
like the concepts surrounding it, remained malleable, a fact that was put to 
good use by writers and propagandists throughout the war. 
The March to Concord 
 
In the early hours of April 19 1775, around one thousand two hundred British 
regulars – mostly grenadiers, light infantry and marines - disembarked from 
Royal Navy barges near Phipp’s Farm, close to the village of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. After a pause to unload equipment and eat, the column 
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assembled into marching order and headed into the New England hinterland. 
Only a few officers among the column were aware of the expedition's 
purpose. The objectives were so secret that even the column’s commander, 
Colonel Francis Smith, had received his orders in a sealed envelope with 
instructions not to open it until his men were underway. 
The regulars could have dispensed with such secrecy, for while the soldiers 
themselves may not have known the precise details of what they were about, 
the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside seemed perfectly aware. As 
the march continued, the regulars could hear bells tolling in the dark, alerting 
New Englanders to their presence and calling out the colonial militia. After an 
hour on the road, Colonel Smith sent six companies of light infantry ahead of 
the main column in an effort to reach their primary objective – the village of 
Concord – faster. An hour later, and doubtless with a growing sense of 
foreboding, Smith sent a rider back to the British garrison in Boston 
requesting reinforcements. 
In the five years since the Boston shootings, the situation in the Thirteen 
Colonies had continued to deteriorate towards outright violence. Despite the 
repeal of most of the Townsend Acts in 1770, radicals continued to agitate 
against Parliament’s policies. In 1772, a British ship engaged in anti- 
smuggling activities was burned off of Rhode Island. Later that year 
permanent Committees of Correspondence and Committees of Safety began 
to appear first in New England and then across all of the Thirteen Colonies. 
These formed the basis of the radicals’ new government, and allowed the 
colonies to operate independent of royal authority. 
Britain’s 1773 Tea Act caused fresh disorder in Boston when a band of 
radicals stormed ships carrying tea imports and dumped vast quantities of it 
into Boston harbour. As a direct consequence Parliament passed the 
Coercive Acts – styled by Whigs in America as the Intolerable Acts – in an 
attempt to make an example of Massachusetts. The Acts closed the port of 
Boston until it had paid for the lost tea, removed the colony’s seventeenth- 
century charter, removed the trials of royal officials in New England across 
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the Atlantic to Britain, and reinforced the Quartering Act that permitted the 
housing of British soldiers in unoccupied buildings. On top of this, a fifth Act 
enlarged the neighbouring colony of Quebec and gave benefits to its Franco- 
Catholic inhabitants. While not directly concerning Massachusetts, such a 
step certainly did not meet with the approval of Protestant, Puritan New 
England. 
The Coercive Acts caused outrage not just in New England, but throughout 
the Thirteen Colonies. In September 1774, disaffected colonists formed the 
First Continental Congress, which sought to provide a focussed and unified 
front to oppose the measures being passed by Parliament. By this stage, the 
British government’s authority in New England was in the process of total 
collapse. The Continental Congress, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress 
and the Committees of Safety ensured that British law and order was almost 
wholly restricted to Boston. General Thomas Gage, who had been 
appointment Britain’s new military governor in Massachusetts, was occupying 
Boston with around four thousand regulars, but communicated his unease at 
the political situation to Britain – ‘if you think ten thousand men sufficient, 
send twenty; if one million is thought enough, give two; you save both blood 
and treasure in the end.’14 
Aware that the radicals now had complete control over the colonial militias, 
Gage authorised a series of punitive strikes in late 1774 and early 1775 on 
caches of weapons and ammunition throughout New England. These 
stockpiles variously belonged to the provincial government or local towns, but 
by removing them Gage hoped to disarm the growing threat posed by the 
revolutionaries. The reaction of colonists to the seizure of supplies came to 
be known as the Powder Alarms. The most famous of these incidents 
occurred on September 1 1774, when British soldiers rowed up the Mystic 
River and seized the largest cache of gunpowder in Massachusetts along 
with two cannons, which they took from nearby Cambridge. The presence of 
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the regulars caused panic throughout the countryside. While assembling too 
late to stop the seizure of the powder, Patriot militias flocked to Cambridge, 
where they forced prominent Loyalists to evacuate to Boston for their own 
safety. Rumours abounded, with John Adams reporting that some even 
believed the Royal Navy had bombarded Boston.15 
The incident on September 1 caused the Patriots to accelerate the process of 
organisation, forming specific “minuteman” militia companies and pre- 
emptively seizing powder supplies before the regulars could reach them. 
This, combined with the general breakdown of British authority throughout 
New England, resulted in King George declaring the colony of Massachusetts 
in open rebellion on February 9, 1775. Alongside this declaration, Parliament 
undertook the Restraining Acts, extending its blockade of Boston’s trade to 
encompass the whole of Massachusetts and forcing New England to trade 
only with Britain, as well as barring New England ships from the North 
Atlantic fisheries. Such actions not only further enflamed colonial mood, but 
came too late anyway – by 1775 the Patriots had ‘seized all political authority 
from British officials and vested it in their town meetings, county conventions, 
and a Provincial Congress.’16 
All of this ensured that New England in April 1775 was a place on the brink of 
total armed rebellion. It nearly broke out on February 27, when another 
British expedition to seize arms and ammunition was foiled. The Patriots 
delayed the column long enough to remove their weapons from a cache at 
Salem. There was physical violence and abuse but, crucially, no shots were 
fired. As far as the British government was concerned, such a state of 
flagrant lawlessness could not be allowed to continue. On April 14, Gage 
received orders from the British Secretary of State, the Earl of Dartmouth. He 
was to ‘arrest and imprison the principle actors and abettors in the Provincial 
Congress,’ albeit at his own discretion. Dartmouth went so far as claim that it 
 
 
15 John Adams in Adams on Adams, ed. Paul M. Zall (Lexington KY: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2004), 57. 
16 Ray Raphael, Founding Myths: Stories that Hide our Patriotic Past (New York: The New 
Press, 2014), 84. 
65  
would be better to engage the radicals openly sooner rather than later, 
stating that ‘it will surely be better that the conflict should be brought on upon 
such a ground, than in a riper state of rebellion.’17 
Aware that the situation would not be improved with inaction, Gage 
immediately formulated a plan to move against one of the largest remaining 
militia supply depots at Concord, as well as attempt to snatch up two of the 
foremost agitators, Samuel Adams and John Hancock, who had fled Boston 
and were sheltering at Lexington. Unbeknownst to Gage, on April 8 the 
radicals had pre-empted his plans and spread most of their supplies in 
Concord among the surrounding towns and villages. Gage went ahead with 
the operation, oblivious to the change. The orders he gave to Colonel Smith, 
to be opened only once the column of regulars had departed Boston, 
specified that ‘you will seize and destroy all Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, 
Tents, Small Arms, and all Military Stores whatever’ at Concord. Gage added 
that ‘you will take care that the Soldiers do not plunder the Inhabitants, or 
hurt private property.’18 
Direct confrontation and bloodshed was not the desire of most of those 
present at Lexington on the morning of April 19. Despite a decade of ill will 
and unrest, the vast majority of colonists in 1775 still considered themselves 
British, and both sides were hesitant to fire the Concord Hymn’s immortal 
“shot heard around the world.” The British officer commanding the light 
infantry that first encountered the Patriot militia at Lexington told how he 
‘called to the soldiers not to fire, but surround and disarm them.’19 Likewise 
Captain Parker, commander of the militia, stated that he had ordered ‘our 
Militia to disperse, and not to fire.’20 The fact that the militia had been drawn 
up in rank and file on Lexington common seems to support the hypothesis 
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that the militia as a whole were not seeking bloodshed, since they had not 
physically blocked the road being used by the regulars. Parker was aware 
that most of the stores in Concord had been moved to safety, and that there 
was no need to attempt to impede the regulars. He later stated that he had 
‘concluded not to be discovered, nor meddle or make with said Regular 
Troops.’21 The militia that morning had assembled in the darkness when the 
alarm had first gone round before disbanding to go 'into houses near the 
place of parade' to rest and refresh themselves.22 When the regulars arrived 
some militia were still hurrying from the surrounding buildings through the 
predawn gloom. Had the leading companies of the column not decided to file 
off the roadway and confront the small band of militiamen, the entire 
expedition may well have passed them by without incident. 
At this point confusion, fear, and frayed tempers took over. Just as individual 
human emotions had proved to be the fatal tipping point with the shootings in 
Boston five years earlier, so again unnamed and unremembered persons 
transformed the fraught encounter between the regulars and the militia into a 
military engagement. Someone, somewhere, fired. The light infantry rushed 
in with their bayonets, all discipline gone. Eight militiamen were killed, at the 
expense of a single wounded regular. Colonel Smith rode up from the main 
column and, with his grenadiers, eventually brought his advance guard back 
under control. In order to revive shaken spirits and ensure such an accident 
could not happen again, Smith ordered his men to loose off a victory salute, 
thus emptying their muskets. This done, their march resumed.23 
The Concord militia had been drawing up in the town in anticipation of the 
British arrival, but had decided to withdraw to more defensible ground, atop a 
rise beyond Concord's North Bridge. Smith's regulars therefore entered 
Concord unopposed and set about the work they had left Boston to do. 
Searches turned up food and ammunition supplies and, most surprisingly, 
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three heavy twenty-four pounder cannons. The salted meat and flour was 
dumped in a nearby pond along with captured musket balls, while the 
cannon’s trunions were destroyed. In burning the cannon carriages the 
soldiers accidentally set fire to Concord's meetinghouse. The deposition of a 
local woman described how she ‘ventured to beg of the officers to send some 
of their men to put out the fire’ until ‘at last, by one pail of water after another, 
they sent and did extinguish the fire.’24 
Seeing the smoke rising from Concord, the Patriot militia advanced towards 
the northern bridge leading to the town, where they encountered a small 
force of Smith's regulars sent out to secure the same route. The British 
panicked and opened fire, killing a number of militiamen. A retaliatory salvo 
left three soldiers dead and thirteen wounded. Exhausted, outnumbered four 
to one, with little previous combat experience and on the brink of becoming 
surrounded, the regulars fell back towards the main force at Concord. Rather 
than pursue, the militia took up defensive positions around the town, 
tightening the noose around Smith's men. 
While the majority of the regulars continued to search Concord, one 
detachment sent to investigate the nearby home of a militia officer found itself 
on the wrong side of the river. Fortunately for them the militia had abandoned 
the bridge were they had first driven off the regulars, so the detachment was 
able to cross it and return to Concord unopposed. As they did so they passed 
the bodies of those killed in the earlier clash. One of the corpses seemed to 
have suffered a vicious head wound from a bladed weapon - the rumour that 
the colonists were scalping British dead and wounded ‘multiplied and took 
flight.’25 
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Among the Crown Forces that day was Ensign Jeremy Lister. At the age of 
23, he was the youngest officer present with the column.26 He had only 
joined the expedition hours before it departed, to replace an officer who had 
fallen ill.27 In his account of the events of April 19 1775, Lister told how 'at 
this place [Concord's North Bridge] there was 4 Men of the 4th Company 
Killed who were afterwards scalp'd their Eyes goug'd their Noses and Ears 
cut off, such barbarity exercis'd upon the Corps could scarcely be paralleled 
by the most uncivilised Savages.'28 Five soldiers likewise testified that they 
had seen 'a man belonging to the Light Company of the 4th regiment with the 
Skin over his Eye's cut and also the top part of his ears cut off.'29 
The truth of the matter was likely somewhat less sinister. It has been argued 
that in reality a 'simple-minded youth' killed a soldier at North Bridge with the 
hasty stroke of an axe when the wounded man startled him.30 The wound he 
caused 'resembled a scalping.'31 Such an appearance could not have been 
better calculated to antagonise the soldiers – scalping was viewed by many 
as the height of Native savagery, and consequently a uniquely American 
form of barbarism that the soldiers now believed had been turned against 
them. Since colonisation ‘Euro-American settlers… transformed a native 
practice [scalping] into a macabre tool of terror. They demonized Indians for 
doing something they regarded as unnatural, then adopted the practice 
themselves to overawe their enemies.’32 The rumours told by the returning 
regulars, with all the implications of colonists abandoning the mores of their 
own “white civility” in exchange for brutal savagery, 'instantly changed the 
tone of the engagement… now a spirit of hatred began to grow. The thin 
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veneer of eighteenth-century civility was shattered by this one atrocity at the 
North Bridge.'33 
As soon as the last of his scattered companies had arrived, Smith moved out 
of Concord, heading back to Boston. It was not long before they were again 
engaged by ever-increasing flocks of militia. Sharp fighting at places such as 
Meriam's Corner, Hardy's Hill, the Bloody Angle and Fiske Hill drained the 
regulars, the militia preferring to engage them at range and simply withdraw 
when threatened with reprisals. By the time the British got back to Lexington 
nearly all of their officers were dead or wounded, and the rank and file were 
exhausted, thirsty, outnumbered and had little ammunition left. Just when it 
seemed as though the column would disintegrate in panic, help arrived. 
Alerted by Smith's request for reinforcements that morning, Gage had 
dispatched Earl Percy and a second contingent of regulars to assist the first. 
They arrived in the vicinity of Lexington to loud cheers, and immediately fired 
a salvo from the two small cannons they had wheeled with them, an act that, 
while doing little physical damage to the scattered militia, shook their resolve. 
Smith informed Percy of the nature of the fighting that had plagued them 
since Concord, and the column's new commander took appropriate steps to 
combat it. The formation was weighted more heavily on the flanks and rear, 
detachments were deployed to in turn outflank militia units striking at their 
sides, while a strong vanguard of marines cleared obstructions. Smith's 
exhausted troops were placed protectively in the centre, and as the British 
resumed their return to Boston Percy used the advantage of interior lines to 
rotate fresh units to the most beset areas. This kept the column together until 
it reached what was in effect its final challenge – the town of Menotomy. 
The militia had heavily occupied the town and its surrounds, and it was only 
with great difficulty that the British fought their way through it, often having to 
go door to door. This part of the interior was more heavily populated than the 
areas of Lexington and Concord, with a greater number of homesteads and 
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taverns dotting the roadside. The militia occupied these buildings or, in some 
cases, defended their own homes from the passing regulars, who in turn 
responded with killing, looting and burning. A British officer later related how 
‘all that were found in the houses were put to death.’34 Another gave a similar 
account - ‘the soldiers were so enraged at suffering from an unseen enemy 
that they forced open many of the houses… and put to death all those found 
in them.’35 
One particular event was later recounted as a prime example of excessive 
violence meted out by the British on the return march. Against the advice of 
more experienced militiamen, a group of Patriots set up an ambush close to 
the road in an orchard belonging to a local man, Jason Russell, who himself 
was killed on the doorstep of his home by the regulars. The militia found 
themselves ambushed by a group of British flankers. According to the 
account of one of the Patriots, Dennison Wallis, the militiamen surrendered, 
only for the British to begin summary executions. Wallis 'bolted for freedom 
when he realised he was about to be massacred.'36 He was shot, but 
managed to make his escape. His account of the massacre in the orchard is 
the only one to exist, so its veracity is difficult to gauge, but it is supported by 
similar events throughout the day. In the house of Jason Russell, adjacent to 
the orchard, militia Lieutenant Gideon Foster claimed that three or four of his 
men were executed by the British after they had surrendered.37 Such acts 
are corroborated by the reports mentioned of British officers describing how 
no quarter was given to those in the houses caught up in the fighting. As 
Fischer later stated, the Patriot scalping at Concord’s North Bridge ‘was 
repaid many times over in Jason Russell’s orchard.’38 It is clear that by the 
latter stages of the British return march, the fury of both sides had reached 
fever-pitch. It was at Menotomy, more so than any of the other flashpoints 
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along the road, that both the British and the Patriots suffered their highest 
casualties. 
Civilians also suffered at the hands of the regulars. The owners of a tavern 
testified one month after the battle that two of their unarmed clients were 
‘stabbed through in many places, their heads mauled, skulls broke and their 
brains out on the floor and the walls of the house’ by the regulars.39 Similarly, 
Hannah Bradish, a woman at home with her infant child, complained that ‘at 
least seventy bullets were shot into the front part of the house’ by regulars on 
the way back from Lexington and Concord, and that they looted her 
property.40 
The British engaged in yet more running battles beyond Menotomy, and may 
well have been completely overwhelmed were it not for Percy's tactical 
acumen. He chose to take the less direct route to Boston via Charlestown, 
instead of going through Cambridge, which was now seething with militia. 
The British soldiers limping into Charlestown would have been an image from 
Gage's worst nightmare. What a contrast their state was to what it had been 
just hours earlier, when they had obeyed the general's strict instructions to 
not harm private property or persons, helping to douse the accidental fire at 
the townhouse in Concord and even paying the townsfolk for food. Now they 
were laden with stolen goods, while behind them smoke rose from the 
plethora of buildings set alight by their rampaging progress. The Boston 
massacre had been a tragic accident. The perceived massacre at Lexington 
had escalated matters, but Concord and the return march, leaving behind a 
total of 88 casualties among the militia and 247 among the regulars, was 
nothing less than a declaration of war. 
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Many colonists treated it as such. More so than the Boston shootings or the 
tea harbour incident of 1773, Lexington and Concord were everything some 
radicals had hoped for. The massacre at Lexington and the killings along the 
road afterwards presented them with the biggest opportunity yet to fight ‘not 
with bayonets but broadsides, not with muskets but depositions, newspapers 
and sermons.’41 The first phase of the war was now afoot, and the killings at 
Lexington and elsewhere on April 19 would fuel it, ultimately seeing the 
British forced out of Boston less than a year later. News of the clashes 
across the New England countryside travelled fast throughout the colonies as 
the Patriots rushed to have their version of events heard, repeating a process 
first put into practice on a larger scale following Boston in 1770. The atrocity 
narrative was soon in full flow – a total of 27 colonial periodicals reported on 
the day’s fighting. The Massachusetts Spy was one of first to do so, its 
Patriot editors framing events in unequivocal terms: 
Americans! Forever bear in mind the BATTLE of LEXINGTON 
where British Troops, unmolested and unprovoked wantonly, 
and in the most inhuman manner fired upon and killed a 
number of our countrymen, then robbed them of their 
provisions, ransacked, plundered and burnt their houses! Nor 
could the tears of defenceless women, some of whom were in 
the pains of childbirth, the cries of helpless babes, nor the 
prayers of old age, confined to beds of sickness, appease their 
thirst for blood - or divert them from the DESIGN of MURDER 
and ROBBERY!42 
It is interesting that, while stressing the burning and pillaging, and even 
claiming the regulars harmed pregnant women and young children, the Spy 
still very specifically calls Lexington a battle. Such a distinction was important 
because battles are not events pertaining to civil unrest or riots – they are 
specifically an act of war. With the militia now bottling up the regulars in 
Boston, New England was in a state of open conflict. As the Hampshire 
Gazette reported on April 21 1775, ‘the sword is now drawn.’43 The Spy was 
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also reprinted Benjamin Franklin’s French and Indian War slogans "Liberty or 
Death" and "Join or Die,” an unmistakable call to unity as the Thirteen 
Colonies plunged into direct conflict with Great Britain. 
Printed commentary was not the only weapon employed by the Patriots in the 
weeks and months that followed. Religious sermons also frequently preached 
resistance or even outright rebellion to their congregations. Even March 5 
congregants in New England gathered to recall the Boston killings of 1770 
and ‘commemorate the bloody and horrid massacre perpetrated by a party of 
soldiers.’44 Following the battle at Bunker Hill, two months after Lexington 
and Concord, one British newspaper spoke of how ‘thirty of the Provincials 
who were taken prisoner, and brought to Boston, desired to be shot, but were 
confined in a prison... they declared they were led on entirely by their 
ministers enforcing the doctrine of resistance.’45 Gage himself directly 
accused ministers of fomenting and promoting massacre, writing as part of a 
declaration on June 12 that ‘to complete the horrid profanation of terms and 
of ideas, the name of God has been introduced into the pulpits, to excite and 
justify devastation and massacre.’46 
Justices of the peace, almost all of them Patriots by mid-1775, also collected 
the depositions of eyewitnesses capable of reporting on the events of April 
19, especially among the militia. It must have appeared to Crown officers and 
officials as though the entire apparatus of colonial life had been turned 
towards rebellion. On April 23 the Provincial Congress appointed a 
committee to draw up what it specifically referred to as a 'narrative of the 
massacre.'47 The depositions taken from the militiamen who resisted the 
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soldiers fired the first shots at Lexington Green and Concord's North 
Bridge.'48 
This they did. According to mass of testimonies, the British definitely fired 
first, and even then only after the militia were dispersing. Elijah Saunderson, 
for example, talks about how the Lexington militia were dispersing and 'did 
not fire a gun' before the regulars attacked them.49 Thomas Rice Willard said 
the militia were dispersing, and 'there was not a gun fired till the militia of 
Lexington were dispersed.'50 John Robins said that the militia began to 
disperse at the orders of the British, and 'Captain Parker's men I believe had 
not then fired a gun.'51 Simon Winslip said that 'there was no discharge of 
arms on either side till the word fire was given' by a British officer.52 Fourteen 
other militiamen issued a joint statement that the militia 'began to Disperse 
when the Regulars fired on the Company before a gun was fired by any of 
our company on them.'53 Interestingly British prisoners also had depositions 
taken by the Patriots. One, Edward Thoroton Gould, agreed that the militia 
were dispersing when the action at Lexington began, but claimed he could 
not tell who had fired first.54 Another prisoner, John Bateman, said he had 
heard an officer order the regulars to fire, and that 'I never heard any of the 
inhabitants so much as fire a gun on the said troops.'55 
It was this narrative of injured innocence, similar to the one used in Boston in 
1770, that combined with a desire for local recognition to lead the residents 
of Concord to argue that Lexington had been a massacre rather than a battle. 
Ezra Ripley, a nineteenth-century champion of the claim that Concord was 
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the first spot of true resistance, used the depositions to ask why the militia did 
'not say we saw and heard several guns fired on the British after they had 
fired on us.'56 Ezra found no evidence of resistance in the depositions at all, 
and cited an address by the Provincial Congress heavily implying the first 
opposition to British arms was at Concord, not Lexington.57 This generated 
the response from Lexington, where 'outraged citizens… responded by 
collecting depositions from surviving militiamen in their town, who now 
testified that the first American shots were fired not at Concord's North Bridge 
but on Lexington's village green' – contrary to what they had claimed 
decades earlier. 58 
The later semantics of massacre and battle were not pressing concerns for 
the Provincial Congress when drawing up its narration of the massacre in 
1775. The depositions, each toeing a similar descriptive line, were drawn 
together into a document entitled A Narrative of the Excursion and Ravages 
of the King’s Troops. Aware that Gage had already sent his version of events 
to London, the Patriots dispatched the Narrative across the Atlantic by a 
faster ship, along with a letter addressed to the British people complaining of 
the events at Lexington and Concord and telling how 'a great number of the 
houses on the road were plundered… several were burnt; women in child- 
bed were driven, by the soldiery, naked into the streets; old men peaceably in 
their houses were shot dead.'59 The Patriot's efforts beat Gage’s account to 
London and caused a storm in the British press. The Stamford Mercury, for 
example, wrote on June 1 1775 of: 
The massacre already attempted to be put in execution in New- 
England… the event of the first ministerial experiment of 
coercion and the sword, already begin to stagger the wavering 
and undecided Englishmen (for Scotsmen are out of the 
question) horror, consternation, and resentment, were strongly 
painted on the countenances of every honest man in London 
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yesterday, on the receipt of the melancholy news from 
America.60 
With even government ministers initially blaming Gage – rather than their 
own failed policies – ‘the ensuing contest for popular opinion was an epic 
disaster for the British government, and a triumph for the Patriots.’61 
Massacre had once more been put to excellent use by the Patriots. 
The official British response was mixed. On the one hand, British and Loyalist 
publications tended to try and play down the importance of the day’s events 
or claim that there were so many divergent reports in the immediate 
aftermath that it was impossible to give a single, true narrative of what had 
happened. For example the Boston News-Letter, whose editors were 
Loyalists, stated that 'the Reports concerning this Unhappy Affair... are so 
various that we... cannot therefore with certainty give our Readers any further 
Account of this shocking Introduction to all the Miseries of a Civil War.'62 Here 
again we see the reference to all-out war rather than a riot or a disturbance. It 
is also important that the News-Letter identified it especially as a civil war. 
One need only look at the place titles to understand that this was, at its heart, 
a fratricidal conflict right from the beginning - militiamen from towns with 
names like Chelmsford, Reading, Sudbury and Tewksbury were attacking 
soldiers from regiments raised in the vicinity of Lancaster, Lincoln and 
Stafford. Apocryphal or not, one New Englander was said to have called 
upon his neighbours to help him defend his home from the regulars by 
paraphrasing Shakespeare, stating ‘an Englishman's home is his castle.'63 
Boston and Massachusetts, steeped in the revolutionary heritage of 
seventeenth-century England, saw themselves as the true inheritors of those 
ancient rights and liberties, more English than the English themselves. 
For their own part the British chose to push the story later recounted by 
Ensign Lister, of the British soldiers scalped and tortured on Concord's North 
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Bridge. The Ensign was not the only one to record rumours regarding the 
incident. On April 28 another British officer described how the militia was 
'very numerous, and as bad as the Indians for scalping and cutting the dead 
men’s ears and noses off, and those they get alive, that are wounded, and 
cannot get off the ground.’64 Letters regarding such atrocities criss-crossed 
the Atlantic. One, penned by Loyalist Bostonian Ann Hulton to a friend in 
England, claimed the British had 'found two or three of their people lying in 
the agonies of death, scalped and their noses and ears cut off and eyes 
bored out, which exasperated the soldiers exceedingly.'65 The British press 
also took the opportunity to vilify the colonists, writing lurid accounts of the 
incident while repudiating colonial claims of British violence: 
Two soldiers who lay wounded on the field, and had been 
scalped by the savage provincials, were still breathing… Near 
these unfortunate men, another dreadful object presented itself. 
A soldier who had been slightly wounded, appeared with his 
eyes torn out of their sockets, by the barbarous mode of 
googing, a word and practice peculiar to the Americans… The 
rebels, to break the force of accusation, began to recriminate. 
They laid several instances of wanton cruelty to the charge of 
the troops: yet nothing is better ascertained, than that not one 
of the soldiers ever quitted the road, either upon their march or 
return from Concord.66 
Another British article written in 1776, presenting an angry series of rebuttals 
to the text of the Declaration of Independence, recalled how colonists ‘carried 
into the field the same thirst for torturing, which they had not been able to 
satiate in their towns. Their humanity is written in indelible characters with the 
blood of the soldiers scalped and googed at Lexington.’67 Gage himself 
seized on such rumours, claiming in a broadside that his men had 'observed 
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three Soldiers on the Ground one of them scalped, his Head much mangled, 
and his Ears cut off, tho’ not quite dead; a Sight which struck the Soldiers 
with horror.'68 It is interesting to note that Gage speaks of a single victim, 
while the other sources generally claim three or four, but the core of the tale 
remains. British officials deliberately ‘spoke in echoes of the Monogahela and 
Fort William Henry.’69 
While the full veracity of the account is impossible to establish, it is 
noteworthy that Patriot authorities considered the scalping story serious 
enough to suppress. Depositions that mentioned such irregularities were 
returned to their senders by committees collecting accounts from the militia.70 
While eager to promote the idea that Lexington and Concord constituted the 
beginning of a fully-fledged, armed conflict, the radicals were still wise 
enough to try and maintained their status as victims, as they had in Boston in 
1770, talking of ‘a slaughter of American innocents’ that ‘strengthened the 
moral foundations of the American side.’71 The first images of the 
engagement to appear, Amos Doolittle’s four representations of the battle 
and its aftermath, show the militia scattering in terror before the regulars on 
Lexington Green, and being cut down. Likewise, another of his engravings 
showed houses in flames as the British column passed by. Doolittle was 
himself a militiaman, and spent some months interviewing eyewitnesses for 
his work. His efforts helped the established narrative that would be used 
through the entire course of the war. In his view, as well as in the view of 
many of those actually present, ‘Lexington had been not a battle, or even a 
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A View of the South Part of Lexington by Amos Doolittle74 
 
From Massacre to Battle 
 
Lexington was a battle only insomuch as it promoted the idea of a war. The 
primary accounts had no issue with also describing it as a massacre, 
something that directly motivated Patriots to attack the British column later on 
that very day. Militiaman William Tay, for example, described himself as 
'being deeply touched with their [the regular's] bloody massacre and inhuman 
murders in their march at Lexington' and went on to describe: 
Cruelties to our aged fathers, and poor, helpless, bed-ridden 
women under the infirmities of child-bearing; together with their 
horrible devastations committed on their ignominious retreat the 
 
74 Wikipedia Commons. Plate IV, A View of South Lexington, Amos Doolittle engravings of 
the Battle of Lexington and Concord, December 1775, reprint by Charles E. Goodspeed, 







same day, (shocking to relate, but more so to behold,) to the 
eternal infamy of those British arms.75 
These accounts would rally tens of thousands of colonists to the rebellion in 
the months following Lexington, fuelling the force that successfully laid siege 
to Boston and thereby defining the first twelve months of the war. 
Interestingly though, the outraged claims of massacre that so effectively 
motivated the Patriots in 1775 began to change in the decades following the 
war, when the driving need was no longer to portray the colonists as innocent 
victims, but became more centred on the creation of national identity and the 
importance of American martial resistance. Artwork followed in the wake of 
public perception, changing over time as the view of the first shots also 
shifted. Now when describing what happened, aging veterans who had been 
at Lexington claimed they had fought back, rather than simply scattered. 
Thanks to this, engravings and prints increasingly showed the militia 
engaging the regulars toe-to-toe.76 One artist, François Godefroy, produced 
an engraving at an unknown date prior to 1819 that encapsulated the shift in 
perception. Gone was Doolittle’s limited engagement and fleeing militiamen, 
replaced by the serried ranks of hundreds of soldiers, fully uniformed and, 
incredibly, even wheeling two large cannons. The two sides exchange 
disciplined musket volleys while homesteads are fully ablaze. The engraving 




Despite this, nineteenth-century artists continued to press the idea of a 
formal engagement, changing the tone of the initial claims of massacre. The 
‘Fight at Lexington,’ published around 1860, showed militiamen in uniform.79 
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The ‘Affair at Lexington’, from 1850, portrayed vicious hand to hand 
fighting.80 The tellingly-named ‘Lexington Massacre,’ produced in 1876, 
shows disciplined ranks of redcoats delivering steady musket fire into well- 
attired Patriots.81 While inaccuracies concerning historical subjects are hardly 
unusual in the nineteenth century, such art is a valuable indicator of how the 
public perceived the opening shots of the Revolution, and harks back to the 
vigorous debate between the towns of Lexington and Concord themselves. 
When the word “massacre” was so ill-defined, context and perception meant 
everything, and artistic process followed on naturally from other works of 
commemoration, written and spoken. As Sarah Purcell noted in her study of 
memory and the American Revolution, ‘writers, preachers, and participants in 
public celebrations created images of sanitized violence and sacrifice… As a 
sentimentalized picture of violence helped to build the ideas of consensus 




The issue of who fired first also fed into the debate on memory. In the 
majority of colonial narratives, and all of Congress's depositions, the British 
shot first, mounting an attack on a people who supposedly did not desire 
conflict, but were willing to defend themselves if necessary. In the primary 
accounts, the militia then fled and were massacred. In the later retellings, the 
militia offered resistance before being forced to scatter. Both versions would 
be used at different times and for different purposes, the first to stoke outrage 
throughout the Thirteen Colonies in 1775, the second to give the newly 
founded United States a courageous and morally upstanding origin story. 
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The switch from massacre to battle became even more understandable when 
considering the importance of foundational narratives in the later perception 
of the revolution. Those ‘who actually did the fighting in 1775 had cultivated 
an image of themselves as innocent and even passive victims of British 
aggression. The next generation remembered them in a very different way – 
as bold, active, and defiant defenders of home and hearth.’83 This change, 
while applied to the narrative of the whole war, was crystallised most clearly 
around the cradle of the revolution, in New England. The narrative switch 
from helpless victims to bold martyrs is starkest when the champions of 
Lexington began claiming that a spirited resistance, rather than the base 
massacre, characterised their fight. As Neil L. York has written regarding 
muddled later testimonies about the Boston massacre, ‘memory is often 
formed as part of a quest for a usable past, one that teaches us lessons.’84 
The embattled farmers of Emerson's 1836 Concord Hymn fitted the role of 
noble heroism and sacrifice invoked by the popular memory of New 
England’s radicals. 
The idea of gallant, homespun defiance was further cemented by the battle of 
Bunker Hill, two months later, when the regulars won only the most pyrrhic of 
victories. After the Patriots occupied the heights overlooking Boston, the 
British mounted a faltering assault on their freshly entrenched positions. The 
classical view of the battle sees the king's soldiers marching doggedly into a 
storm of fire, throwing away frontal assaults and only taking the position after 
the Patriots had expended their ammunition. In reality the British attacks 
struggled because General Howe diluted his frontal assaults with repeated 
flanking efforts - only when abandoning tactical nuance and committing to a 
frontal attack did the British actually make it to the Patriot earthworks. After 
driving the Patriots off, Howe displayed the hesitation that would make him 
infamous, failing to push on into Cambridge. During the battle a Royal Navy 
bombardment also set light to nearby Charlestown, an act that further 
portrayed the Crown's authority as destructive and brutal, and led to inflated 
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reports claiming that ‘many people who had got up to the tops of houses, 
steeples, &c to see the engagement, were burnt to death, and the whole 
exhibited a scene of horror which cannot be described.’85 
Nor did the actions of the British immediately after the battle endear them. 
Not only did the thirty-one Patriot prisoners taken to Boston seemingly barely 
escape being shot out of hand, but over the next three months twenty of 
them died in captivity.86 The specific causes are not listed, but the news 
prompted a formal complaint from George Washington. While the conditions 
the prisoners were living in are not known, there are definite instances of 
British officers abusing Patriot prisoners immediately after Bunker Hill.87 
The effect of Bunker Hill and the ensuing siege of Boston was widely felt. The 
idea that the Patriots were not committed to rebellion, and made for poor 
soldiers compared to trained professionals, had been entirely disabused. In 
reality the king's forces had stood in the open before the breastworks being 
shot down because of the inexperience of officers in forming columns or 
keeping their men going forward, rather than letting them pause to fire 
ineffective, long-ranged volleys.88 This contributed to the idea espoused by 
Loyalist Peter Oliver, who wrote of ‘English courage, of standing undaunted 
in open field to be shot at.’89 Despite taking the hill, the days of the British in 
Boston were numbered. The massacre Lexington and the subsequent 
running battles had cost them the city. As a nineteenth-century historian put 
it, Boston ‘was surrounded by multitudes of armed men, exasperated to the 
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Yet again, the Patriots attempted to blindside the opposition by sending 
depositions describing their view of Bunker Hill to London. For once Gage 
was ahead of them, but news of the cost of the British victory still shocked 
the establishment. The hardening of British attitudes after the battle saw the 
last genuine hopes for peace slip away. The Patriots, meanwhile, took heart 
from their stand, and Bunker Hill became, like Lexington and Concord, a 
keystone of the revolutionary story. The first phase of the war, triggered and 
fuelled by an act of massacre, had been won by the Patriots. 
The Art of Bunker Hill and Narratives of Violence 
 
The place of Bunker Hill in the historical memory of the United States was 
further enhanced by the efforts of the artist John Trumbull. Alongside the 
various images of Lexington that developed throughout the nineteenth 
century, there are few more iconic portrayals of the American Revolution than 
Trumbull's The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker Hill. 
Trumbull, who had himself been a soldier during the Revolutionary War, 
actually painted two versions, the first between 1815 and 1831, and a 
second, larger copy in 1834. He was present at the battle in 1775, albeit as a 
young, distant observer. His version of Warren's death - the leading 
revolutionary was killed by a musket ball to the head as the militia withdrew 
following the final British assault - goes out of its way to depict a caste of 
well-known British and Patriot individuals. Front and centre is the mortally 
wounded Warren, while over him a British officer, Colonel Small, is stopping 
one of his grenadiers administering a bayonet stab to the dying Patriot. 
Behind them Major Pitcairn, who battled through the fighting at Lexington and 
Concord, is shown mortally wounded in the arms of his son, Lieutenant 
Pitcairn, while behind them generals Howe and Clinton are portrayed in the 









The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker's Hill, June 17, 1775 by 
John Trumbull.91 
Artistic licence can be used to explain away the fact that Howe and Clinton 
were certainly not on the front lines of the battle (though Howe was close 
enough to end up with an aide's blood on his breeches), or that Pitcairn and 
Warren were killed in different places in the battle for the hill. Of greater 
interest is the sanitisation of the conflict. There is almost no blood in evidence 
anywhere. Like many of the later nineteenth-century depictions of Lexington 
and Concord, the militia are clad in romanticised colonial garb, ruffled shirts 
open and feathers caught in the breeze. The grenadier seeking to stab a 
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defenceless Warren is being restrained by his own officer, and another 
grenadier behind the first is also having his musket thrust stopped by a 
warding hand. The very point of the painting is to portray both the sublime 
glory attained with military martyrdom, and the mercy of mutually honourable 
combatants - in describing why he chose to depict Small acting the way he 
did, Trumbull said that his 'conduct in America was equally distinguished by 
acts of humanity and kindness to his enemies, as by bravery and fidelity to 
the cause he served.'92 Warren is seen 'with a smile of mingled gratitude and 
triumph'93 on his peaceful and - given he was shot in the head - unblemished 
face. Interestingly, Trumbull also accounts for the seemingly savage act of 
the grenadier, he who 'in the heat and fury natural at such a moment, aims to 
revenge the death of a favourite officer.'94 
Here we see the frenzy and confusion of battle defeated by the genteel 
civility sometimes connected with the eighteenth century - an ideology that 
was largely born and bred from nineteenth-century works like Trumbull's, and 
reflected the 'ideal of disinterested virtue that formed the backbone of both 
American republicanism and English gentility.'95 Gone, then is the true 
savagery of the event, the violence of massacre that faded as the nineteenth 
century progressed. In Purcell’s words, for Trumbull the most important thing 
was that he ‘expressed artistic gratitude to American military men as a 
means of stressing the common bonds that the Revolution had created 
among far-flung members of the American nation.’96 The atrocity narrative, 
no longer relevant, has been discarded. 
For the catalogue of his paintings, Trumbull gives a brief, potted history of 
both Bunker Hill and the wider revolution. He makes no effort to hide any 
bias, describing the revolution as something that 'will forever remain, the 
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most interesting period of human history.'97 Trumbull's work is an example of 
the nineteenth-century effort to cleanse the revolution of its most violent and 
shocking aspects. It goes so far in its efforts that even the British, the 
monsters of Patriot propaganda in 1775, are granted a humane side. The 
distance between Trumbull's narrative in his painting catalogue and the 
accounts of the battle are about as far apart as Doolittle's initial depictions of 
April 19 1775, and the nineteenth century reproductions of the action on 
Lexington Green. In the safe, comfortable memorialisation of the nation's 
founding, American citizens did not wish to dwell on excessive bloodshed, 
extreme violence or summary killings, but looked instead to the noble 
defiance and sacrifice of the simple, honest folks they believed embodied the 
American spirit. 
Such a view was certainly not shared by most Americans in 1775. In 
recounting Lexington, the revolutionaries repeated the stance they’d adopted 
after the Boston shootings, and developed the part of the victim. The myth of 
injured innocence benefited the Patriots more than an image of bold – 
perhaps even overly antagonistic – defiance prior to the first shots. It suited 
Congress to portray the fighting after Lexington as a response to an unlawful 
massacre, rather than part of a premeditated plan that had been laid to help 
deal with the powder alarm incidents. As it had done in Boston in 1770, the 
Whiggish press in the colonies reacted brilliantly to the day’s events, seizing 
the initiative and constructing an empathetic narrative that it was even able to 
market to the very people it was proposing to fight. The idea of Lexington as 
a massacre played an integral part in that narrative. 
Lexington helped to move the Patriots into a new phase of revolutionary 
activity. Now the violence administered by Crown Forces could be followed 
not just with depositions and public outcry, but with retaliatory violence. 
Lexington was the last ‘massacre of innocents’ prior to the outbreak of the 
Revolutionary War. The fact that ‘at Lexington the farmers were clearly the 
victims, while at Concord they were not’ shows how, within hours, the idea of 
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a massacre had helped galvanise armed conflict.98 In the same way that the 
massacre of 1770 acted as a step along the road to conflict, so Lexington 
provided an immediate, short-term spark. 
It is interesting to consider just how Lexington, so associated with armed 
struggle, was not so far out of line with the Boston massacre, which was 
conversely synonymous with the killing of innocents. If anything the Boston 
event represented a greater danger to the regulars present, hugely 
outnumbered and surrounded as they were by a violent and antagonistic 
mob. At Lexington the regulars held every advantage, were faced with a 
cowed and likely dispersing enemy, and suffered scarcely more harm than 
the beaten soldiers did in Boston in 1770. In this light it seems as though the 
claims of the people of Concord, that the action at Lexington constituted a 
massacre rather than a battle, are true enough. And yet, going by the claims 
of the residents of Lexington, the scattering on the green supposedly 
represents the first battle of the revolution. Here then the core idiosyncrasies 
of massacre – with claim and counter-claim – are played out. We see how 
the initial status of a specific massacre is almost wholly dependent on time, 
context, and who is making the claim. We also see how the event turns not 
necessarily on the agency of its actors, but on the desires of those who 
remember and memorialise it. As the status of the massacre became 
disputed in the nineteenth-century the actions of the Lexington militia become 
emboldened, stripping away their victimhood and, in doing so, unintentionally 
also stripping away the shock and the horror that accompanied the first open 
fight between British soldiers and their American colonists. Works such as 
Longfellow’s tale about Revere, or Emmerson’s poem, or Trumbull’s heroic, 
sanitised version of Bunker Hill, sterilised the violence portrayed in accounts 
like the militia depositions. Lexington and Concord, once described as 'the 
places of bloodshed and massacre,' set the standard for the later removal of 
the Revolutionary War’s massacre narratives and the loss of focus on its 
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understanding both the revolution’s place in the public consciousness 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, and also grasping 
the importance of other claims of massacre that grew up – and were hotly 
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The Lexington Massacre.102 
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Chapter Three: Paoli and Tappan 
 
A few months after this, a most inhuman massacre took place 
near Tapaan in New-Jersey… The 33d regiment, to which I 
belonged, was about three miles off when the cruel carnage 
began; but as we approached, the shrieks and screams of the 
hapless victims whom our savage fellow soldiers were 
butchering, were sufficient to have melted into compassion the 
heart of a Turk or a Tartar. Tongue cannot tell nor pen unfold 
the horrors of that dismal night… Let Britain boast no more of 
her honour, her scince [sic] and civilization; but with shame hide 
her head in the dust; her fame is gone; Tapaan will witness 
against her. Having performed this ignoble exploit, the few 
prisoners that were spared being conducted to New-York by a 
guard of British soldiers, and the wounded sent off in waggons, 
we returned to Long-Island to be ready for another scene of 
British barbarity.1 
This account of what became known variously as the Baylor massacre or the 
Tappan massacre was written by John Robert Shaw, formerly a regular 
soldier in the British Army’s 33rd Regiment of Foot. The events he described 
became immediately infamous – on a cold October night in 1778 a force of 
British soldiers surrounded a regiment of Continental Army dragoons billeted 
near Tappan in New Jersey and, while they slept, launched a vicious bayonet 
attack. Accusations of massacre followed, and not only from Patriot sources. 
Shaw’s account is particularly interesting for several reasons. Unlike the 
large amounts of correspondence generated by the British Army’s officer 
corps, the writings of enlisted men from the period are relatively few and far 
between. Shaw’s view is even more unique given that later in the war he 
chose to desert, was captured and ended up fighting for the Patriots before 
ultimately settling in Kentucky. While considering that he wrote his account 
long after having settled in America, it does seem he is genuinely shocked 
and disgusted by the bloodshed he witnessed at Tappan. Nor was he the 
only one. British officers censured the troops involved in the incident, while 
one former Loyalist, Thomas Jones, damned the perpetrators in his historical 
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account of the Revolution in New York, writing that before the Patriots at 
Tappan could arm themselves ‘the whole corps (a few who concealed 
themselves excepted) were massacred in cold blood, and to the disgrace of 
Britons many of them were stabbed while upon their knees humbly imploring 
and submissively begging for mercy.’2 
This chapter’s primary focus is on the engagements at Paoli in 1777 and 
Tappan in 1778. In addressing their similarities it seeks to highlight the 
disparity in the operational abilities between British and Patriot forces in the 
mid-point of the war, why British forces became involved in heightening acts 
of battlefield aggression, and how massacres had a direct impact on tactics 
and morale in larger battles. The broad theme of this chapter, the concept of 
“regular-on-regular” violence, also brings into focus the numerous smaller- 
scale massacres of 1777 and 1778, such as Drake’s Farm, Little Egg Harbor 
and Crooked Billet. 
The massacre at Tappan in 1778 shocked even hardened campaigners like 
Robert Shaw, but it was far from the only incident of extreme battlefield 
violence that took place during the midpoint of the Revolutionary War. In 
particular, the years 1777 and 1778 were marked by a disproportionate 
number of massacres committed by regular soldiers in the Crown Forces. 
Senior commanders and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic worried that 
the level of violence being generated by the conflict was getting out of 
control. Other atrocities and violations of the eighteenth-century rules of war 
were also on the rise – the mistreatment of women, for example, was 
appearing with increasing frequency in the years 1776 and 1777. Francis 
Rawdon, a young Irish peer who distinguished himself in the northern 
campaigns and was later given a number of commands in the south, wrote a 
letter to his uncle in Britain which made light of multiple counts of rape by 
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The fair nymphs of this isle [Staten Island] are in wonderful 
tribulation, as the fresh meat our men have got here has made 
them as riotous as satyrs. A girl cannot step into the bushes to 
pluck a rose without running the most imminent risk of being 
ravished… a woman who having been forced by seven of our 
men, [came] to make a complaint to me “not of their usage,” 
she said; “No, thank God, she despised that,” but of their 
having taken an old prayer book… A girl on this island made a 
complaint the other day to Lord Percy of her being deflowered, 
as she said, by some grenadiers. Lord Percy asked her how 
she knew them to be grenadiers, as it happened in the dark. 
“Oh, good God,” cried she, “they could be nothing else, and if 
your Lordship will examine I am sure you will find it so.”3 
It has been speculated that the rise in aggression following 1776 was fuelled 
by the fact that ‘the British were frustrated by a series of narrow American 
victories that made the possibility of a short war impossible, and the soldiers 
released their anger on the local population.’4 Friends and family members of 
victims also frequently suffered during these assaults, and at times were 
made to bear witness to them. Rape and sexual assault perpetrated on 
colonial women by British soldiers, especially in the years mentioned, 
certainly ‘occurred in more than isolated instances,’ and was subsequently 
seized upon as part of by-now now well-established Patriot ‘atrocity 
narrative.’5 The general increase in aggression by Crown Forces, typified in 
engagements during campaigns like the forage war of 1777 and subsequent 
accounts of massacres at places like Drake’s Farm, seemed to confirm to 
participants at the time that the entire conflict was spiralling out of control.6 
The British Army, battle-hardened and jaded by over two years of colonial 
warfare, was now conducting ever-more aggressive operations where elite 
troops expressed confidence in their own abilities and a disdain towards their 
enemies by perpetrating ruthless attacks on them. Unable to answer 
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militarily, the Patriots instead pursued the same strategies they had in 1770 
and 1775 – highlighting British aggression and emphasising their role as 
victims of imperial brutality. In doing so they showed a far better grasp of the 
nature of the conflict than British commanders in the field or the king’s 
ministry in London. Ultimately, while this mid-phase of the conflict didn’t turn 
on acts of massacre as the opening of the war had at Lexington and the 
southern strategy would at Waxhaws, it was still heavily influenced by 
multiple incidents of massacre, all of which combined to notably mobilise 
Patriot opposition to the Crown. 
The Little War’s Irregularities 
 
The phase that had marked the Revolutionary War’s opening in 1775 was 
defined by confusion and outraged responses on both sides. By 1777, 
however, the landscape of the conflict had changed. The failure of the so- 
called olive branch petition and the breakdown in negotiations between the 
Howe brothers and Congress culminated in what was to be the largest battle 
of the war, on Long Island, in 1776. This was followed by the ousting of 
Washington and the Continental Army from New York, and their twin victories 
at Trenton and Princeton. Underlining such military activity was the signing of 
the Declaration of Independence, an act that left no doubt about the 
intentions of Congress or the fullness of their split from Great Britain. By the 
time Howe began his campaign to seize Philadelphia in mid-1777 the war 
had entered a new phase – one of frequent small-scale violence emphasised 
by the numerous skirmishes and minor military operations that punctuated 
the larger battles. 
The many irregularities perpetrated during this period were disproportionately 
committed by Crown Forces. While this marked an increase in bloodshed, it 
did not lead to immediate widespread Patriot reprisals, mainly because 
Patriots force in 1777 and 1778 typically struggled to conduct the sort of 
small-scale operations that frequently resulted in massacres. Initially unable 
to respond militarily, the Patriots instead channelled their efforts into 
highlighting and lambasting incidents of excessive force, a continuation of 
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earlier trends that helped offset battlefield setbacks and gave the 
revolutionary cause propaganda victories that ultimately translated into both 
political and military advantages. In short, ‘the application of violence that 
could be portrayed as excessive consistently backfired on the British.’7 
The small-scale British and Loyalist operations of 1777 and 1778 were 
usually conducted by the same units, in a cycle of heightening aggression 
that can be traced through the skirmishes of these two years. This excessive 
use of force by Crown Forces during this phase changed the dynamics of the 
war, driving participants to greater heights of hostility and physically affecting 
the outcomes of major engagements through tactical decisions influenced by 
past experiences and rhetoric surrounding massacres. This is corroborated 
by the fact that within the British Army ‘by late 1779, a majority of the officer 
corps had rejected the conciliatory policies of the government and the high 
command and were able to subvert them on a local level,’ pushing a more 
aggressive tactical agenda against enemies they viewed with disdain or even 
outright hatred. Though they were by now aware of the potent propaganda 
response that would follow extreme violence against the rebels, an 
increasing number of British officers had begun to flirt with the possibilities of 
the particular application of massacre.8 
September 1777 saw both the Continental Army and Crown Forces operating 
in Pennsylvania in less than ideal conditions. Washington was struggling to 
defend Philadelphia following defeat at Brandywine and an abortive 
engagement known as the Battle of the Clouds. Howe was hampered by bad 
roads, poor local knowledge and a lack of transports for his supplies. Afraid 
of being left exposed and trapped, Washington withdrew most of his forces 
across the Schuylkill River, leaving behind Brigadier Antony Wayne’s 
Continental Army division and a force of militia to hamper the British pursuit. 
They would soon fall victim to an attack that serves to emphasise the 
increasingly ruthless nature of Crown Forces in the colonies 
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The Attack at Paoli 
 
Wayne, lacking Washington’s prudent caution, established his headquarters 
near Paoli’s Tavern, just four miles from Howe’s camp. The British 
commander wasted no time in attacking, dispatching Major General Charles 
Grey and a picked force of light infantry supported by the 44th and 42nd Foot 
and the 16th Light Dragoons under the cover of darkness. Grey departed at 
ten in the evening and was followed by a support column consisting of the 
40th and 50th Foot an hour later. 
The difference between the Paoli operation and the British march to 
Lexington over two years previously was marked, and indicated the steep 
learning curve the army had experienced after the opening phase of the war. 
Major John André describes how all those inhabitants living along the route 
of the march were taken from their homes and escorted within the column, so 
that none of them could ride ahead and warn the Patriots. To help ensure the 
British did not get lost in the dark, a local blacksmith was used as a guide. 
Grey also ordered his men to remove the flints from their muskets, thus 
rendering the weapons inoperable as firearms and meaning no stray shots or 
accidental discharges would give the presence of his men away, as well as 
ensuring that their only recourse was the seventeen-inch steel bayonet 
carried by each soldier. This time there would be no disorganised, panicked 
firing by the regulars. Grey was knowingly heightening the aggression from 
his own men by forcing them to rely on close quarter killing to ensure their 
own survival, an act symptomatic of the growing number of British officers 
who believed that the rebellion deserved to be met with extreme violence.9 
Wayne received two warnings of an imminent attack the day, but did not 
consider the evidence strong enough to act upon. His efforts to withdraw 
when his videttes finally confirmed the presence of approaching British 
columns around 11.30 p.m. were belated. The British assaulted his main 
encampment just before 1 a.m., passing in three waves over the South 
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Valley hills and through the woodland bordering Wayne’s position. The 
scattering and killing of the six groups of piquets set by Wayne further alerted 
the Continentals – Wayne began to organise a full retreat westward, but the 
picket fences hemming the surrounding fields hampered the evacuation, and 
the situation only worsened when a disabled cannon blocked the road. 
Wayne sent the 1st Pennsylvanian Regiment towards the woods to stall the 
attack, but in the darkness they mistook their own piquets for the enemy and 
fired on them. Exposed by the discharges, they were assaulted by the first 
wave of Crown Forces, the light infantry, who drove on into the rest of the 
retreating column. The second wave, consisting of the 44th Foot and the light 
dragoons, was then followed by the third, made up of the Highlanders of the 
42nd Foot. The camp degenerated into chaos and the majority of Continental 
Army soldiers stampeded down the road to the White Horse tavern. The 
militia encamped there soon joined the panicked flight. In all 201 men were 
killed or wounded and 71 captured, while the British suffered less than a 
dozen casualties.10 
The Patriots wasted no time emphasising the brutality of the British attack. 
Regular appellations for Paoli included ‘the terms “massacre,” “midnight 
slaughter,” “bloody highlanders” and “British barbarity.”’11 Lieutenant Colonel 
Adam Hubley of the 10th Pennsylvanian regiment wrote that ‘I with my own 
Eyes, see them, cut and hack some of our Poor men to pieces after they had 
fallen in their hands and scarcely shew the least mercy to any.’12 Samuel Hay 
of the 7th Pennsylvanian declared that ‘the annals of the age cannot produce 
such another scene of butchery’ whilst a militiaman, William Hutchinson, 
reported that he had seen a Virginian who had been tortured by the British.13 
The man had: 
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Shared in the consequences of the massacre… more than a 
dozen soldiers had fixed bayonets and formed a cordon round 
him, and that every one of them in sport had indulged their 
brutal ferocity by stabbing him in different parts of his body and 
limbs… upon examining him there was found, as our captain 
afterwards announced to the men, forty-six distinct bayonet 
wounds in different parts of his body.14 
Such reports from the vanquished could perhaps be explained in part by the 
severity of the fighting involved. The panic of the sudden night-time assault 
coupled with the use of the bayonet would undoubtedly have left victims 
shocked and convinced they had been the subject of an atrocity. Trevelyan 
scoffed at the Patriot outrage, which he saw as nothing more than an angry 
response to having been militarily bested – ‘the affair has been called, most 
absurdly, the Massacre of Paoli. Men always attach the idea of cruelty to 
modes of warfare in which they themselves are not proficient.’15 Use of the 
bayonet, in this case to the exclusion of all else, was also believed to be a 
particularly barbaric tactic among the rebels. The weapon ‘held especial fear 
for Americans as it embodied the superior martial professionalism of the 
British army; American troops were much less accustomed to bayonet 
fighting.’16 The British, conversely, held the weapon in high esteem. 
Following the massacre of Baylor’s Continental light dragoons in 1778 one 
British officer ‘swaggered through the streets [of Philadelphia] with his 
bloodstained bayonet hanging from his back.’17 The fact that the regulars 
were ‘repeatedly ordered to view their bayonets as the weapon of choice 
against the rebels’ made an increase in the violence of Revolutionary War 
engagements inevitable, especially in smaller skirmishes where incidences of 
close combat appear to have been more likely.18 
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British responses to what happened at Paoli’s Tavern were generally more 
reserved than the shock exhibited by the Patriots. André wrote only that ‘the 
light infantry being ordered to form in front, rushed along the line putting to 
the bayonet all they came up with, and, overtaking the main herd of the 
fugitives, stabbed great numbers and pressed on their rear till it was thought 
prudent to order them to desist.’19 Lieutenant Richard Mansergh St. George 
did term at least part of the fighting a massacre, writing that ‘we… received a 
smart fire from another unfortunate picquet – as the first [was] instantly 
massacred.’20 
There is only one near-contemporary artistic rendition of Paoli, by Italian 
artist Xavier della Gatta. The painting is a good example of how perceptions 
about the battle were coloured, for at first glance it looks like a scene of 
chaos and slaughter, a far cry from the stilted images of warfare usually 
produced in the eighteenth century. The work is also imbued with a great 
deal of personal detail. On the left British cavalrymen of the 16th light 
dragoons charge rebel infantry, while their counterparts in the Continental 
cavalry withdraw, firing their pistols over their shoulders. In the centre 
Continental infantry provide a degree of organised resistance to green- 
coated Loyalist attackers. There were no independent Loyalist units listed on 
the British order of battle, but the day before the attack Ferguson’s corps of 
Loyalist riflemen were incorporated into a composite battalion of British light 
infantry companies, having previously suffered severe casualties during an 
ambush at Brandywine.21 The painting also features specific individuals 
present at the battle, such as Captain Wolfe of the 40th Foot and Lieutenant 
Hunter of the 52nd. That the artist was aware of these nuances implies 
access to first-hand knowledge and it makes the piece a promising one when 





19 John André, Diary of the American Revolution, 499. 
20 Richard St. George in Battle of Paoli: The Revolutionary War “Massacre” Near 
Philadelphia by Thomas J. McGuire (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000), 242. 












































It also, on the right side, unambiguously shows the clubbing and bayonetting 
of fleeing, defenceless or surrendering Patriots by British light infantrymen. 
The light troops had earned a reputation for combat effectiveness, along with 
the moniker the bloodhounds,’ for the way in which they harried their 
opposition. In his study of the impact of atrocities during the Revolution prior 
to writing Scars of Independence, Holger Hoock observes that ‘the hunting 
metaphor of canines trained to follow the scent of wounded animals 
escalated the othering vocabulary from the implicit comparison of the 
barbarian with the beastly to the animalistic metaphor.’24 Yet it was a moniker 
the light infantry embraced, in a further indication that a degree of hatred was 
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rapidly developing between certain opposing corps. Matthew H. Spring points 
out that ‘elite formations, intoxicated by a well-developed sense of martial 
superiority, have often been particularly liable to employ what might be 
interpreted as excessive force both in and out of combat,’ adding that ‘British 
light infantry gained particular notoriety for alleged brutality, especially in the 
northern campaigns.’25 Nor were they afraid of this notoriety. Some sported 
distinctive red feathers in their hats and caps in 1777, though whether they 
were already doing so by the time of Paoli, or adopted it following the battle, 
remains disputed. Most sources held that they ‘wear the red patch in 
commemoration of the Paoli affair,’ 26 either as a mark of pride in the 
viciousness of their actions or ‘to prevent any one not engaged in the action 
[at Paoli] from suffering on their account.’ 27 
British officers could, with some justification, scorn the idea of Paoli as a 
massacre by simply defending it as the work of aggressive, motivated 
soldiers against an inexperienced enemy. But while some doubtless 
expected – and disregarded – Patriot outrage via the usual channels of 
newspaper, pamphlet and broadside, Crown Forces were less prepared for 
the direct military response that Paoli generated. 
Heightened Aggression 
 
In the weeks following Paoli, British officers noted a new-found 
aggressiveness in their colonial opponents. St George wrote that ‘they 
threaten retaliation; vow that they will give no quarter to any of our 
battalion.’28 The threats of vengeance were soon to be realise. On October 4 
1777 the Patriots – including many survivors of Paoli – launched a surprise 
attack on Howe’s main British encampment at Germantown, near 
Philadelphia. The British, having taken the rebel capital, had become strung 
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out in their cantonments. Washington formulated a somewhat overly- 
complicate, multi-pronged dawn assault. The first British unit to be engaged 
were the light infantry. Martin Hunter was there once again, and recalled 
hearing the attacking Patriot’s desire for revenge; ‘we heard a loud cry of 
“have at the bloodhounds; revenge Wayne’s affair!”’29 
On the opposite side Adam Hubley, who had commanded his Pennsylvanian 
regiment at Paoli, recalled ‘it was a very remarkable circumstance that the 
same troops, who engag'd us on that night [at Paoli], also engag'd us in this 
battle, so that our behavior to them is still more justifiable, in short as in our 
division we neither give nor took quarters.’30 Wayne himself wrote that ‘our 
people remembering the action of the night of the 20… pushed on with their 
bayonets and took ample revenge for that night’s work. The rage and fury of 
the soldiers was not to be restrained for some time at least not until great 
numbers of the enemy fell by our bayonets.’31 
Massacres could act as a powerful military motivating factor, encouraging 
more aggressive behaviour on the battlefield and creating a cycle of 
antagonism and revenge killings. Such a mind-set, however, was not always 
conducive to victory, as Germantown proved. When the Patriots first 
appeared out of the morning mist, Howe thought he was facing a foraging 
party. The reality of the situation soon hit home, along with three columns of 
Continental infantry and one of militia. As the British scrambled to organise a 
defence Colonel Musgrave and his 40th Foot found themselves cut off inside 
the home of the Chew family, Cliveden House, a prominent stone building 
that lay along the route of the primary rebel thrust. Despite being hugely 
outnumbered, Musgrave and his men refused every offer of surrender. 
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Washington’s attacking vigour ran out, and rather than leave behind a 
holding force while pressing deeper into the British camp, he agreed with his 
artillery commander, Henry Knox, and focussed his force’s efforts on the 
house. Despite deploying an entire brigade and Knox’s artillery, the Patriots 
were unable to dislodge the 40th, a factor that contributed a great deal to the 
failure of the day’s attack. McGuire hypothesises that ‘the “no quarter” 
behaviour of the Pennsylvanians in the opening attack gave Musgrave’s 
troops the resolve to stand firm against overwhelming odds.’32 
The fraught atmosphere following Paoli changed the dynamics of 
Germantown. Besides the unambiguous desire for revenge among Wayne 
and his Pennsylvanians, multiple British sources from among those who had 
fought at Paoli reported unrest over the fact that they knew the Patriots had 
marked them out for retaliation. Lieutenant St. George, writing less than forty- 
eight hours before the attack at Germantown, discussed how ‘our present 
one [situation] is unpleasant; our left too open and unguarded. We expect 
reinforcements. There has been firing this night all around the sentries, which 
seems as if they endeavour to feel our situation. I am fatigued and must 
sleep… I wake once or twice, or more; my ear is susceptible to the least 
noise.’33 Lieutenant Hunter made a near-identical observation; ‘The 
Americans ever after Wayne’s Affair called us “The Bloodhounds.” I don’t 
think our battalion slept very soundly after that night for a long time.’34 He 
further confirms an attitude of fearful readiness at Germantown; ‘General 
Wayne commanded the advance, and fully expected to be revenged for the 
surprise we had given him. When the first shots were fired at our pickets, so 
much had we all Wayne’s affair in remembrance, that the battalion was out 
and under arms in a minute.’35 
Despite the light infantry’s apprehension, like the 40th Foot they appear to 
have resolved to fight all the harder rather than flee from potential retribution. 
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Though numbering just three hundred men they twice charged the Patriot 
column approaching from the mist, and only withdrew after suffering 
substantial casualties and finding themselves outflanked on both sides. 
Hunter related how ‘this was the first time we had retreated from the 
Americans, and it was with great difficulty we could get our men to obey our 
orders.’36 They were entirely aware of their status as both bloodthirsty and 
effective soldiers, and seem to have born a particular hatred of the rebels, a 
hatred that ‘did not bode well for the latter if they found themselves within 
reach of British bayonets in combat.’37 The purported response of one Patriot 
officer during the later Baylor incident is instructive; ‘one of the rebel officers, 
demanding the name of the corps which had attacked them, was answered 
“The British light infantry,” on which he exclaimed, “Then we shall all be cut 
off.”’38 The savage reputation the light infantry garnered appears to have 
preceded them. 
Both sides fought harder at Germantown because of the massacre at Paoli, 
to such an extent that it affected the overall outcome of the battle. The 
Patriots found exhortations to vengeance to be an effective motivational tool, 
covering over the stigma of defeat and inspiring more aggressive tactics, 
while the Crown Forces fought on believing that they were not going to be 
shown quarter. Given the dynamic now developing between both sides 
thanks to past claims of massacre, it is unsurprising that greater bloodshed 
was to come. 
British Brutality 
 
If the memory of Paoli lived on, it was not the only such engagement to occur 
in either 1777 or 1778 – both years marked a heightening of military violence, 
and it was Crown Forces that escalated the aggression the fastest. On May 1 
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Billet Tavern, Pennsylvania. The attackers numbered around eight hundred 
men, a mixed force of regulars and Provincial Loyalists. Due to an unwise 
lapse in patrols and the flight of their piquets, the Patriots were again caught 
badly off guard. The situation went from bad to worse when the retreating 
revolutionaries were snared in a pincer movement, during which the militia's 
commander, General John Lacey, reported that atrocities were committed: 
Some of the unfortunate, who fell into the merciless hands of 
the British, were most cruelly and inhumanely butchered. Some 
were set on fire with buckwheat straw; and others had their 
clothes burned on their backs. Some of the surviving sufferers 
say they saw the enemy set fire to the wounded while yet alive; 
who struggled to put it out but were too weak and expired under 
the torture. Others I saw, who, after being wounded with a ball, 
had received near a dozen wounds with cutlasses and 
bayonets. I can find as many witnesses to the proof of the 
cruelties as there were people on the spot; and that was no 
small number who came as spectators.39 
Interestingly, there are two slightly different versions of Lacey's account. In 
place of the above, the other is a somewhat more succinct declaration that 
several militiamen 'were inhumanly Butchard after they had Surrendered. 
The Close [clothes] of Some were Set on fire after wounded and Burnt to 
death.’40 Whether the longer version was a later embellishment (it only 
appears in an 1829 collection of primary sources) is not actually of great 
importance given that ultimately the same grim events are described in both. 
Washington took Lacey’s account seriously enough to order an inquiry into 
‘the most authentic testimony of the conduct of the British Troops toward the 
Militia under the comd of Brigr Genl Lacey,’ with the intention of forwarding 
any evidence of irregular conduct to General Howe.41 This ultimately resulted 
in four eyewitness accounts, recorded by Andrew Long, a Bucks County 
Justice of the Peace, in mid May 1778. The first testimony, delivered jointly 
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by two men, Samuel Henry and William Watts, mirrors Lacey’s account of the 
British setting fire to their enemies: 
We found the bodies of the dead used in a most inhuman & 
barbarous manner, the field in which some of the men fell was 
Buck Wheat Straw, which appeared to us they had taken & set 
fire to, and threw the men into, whether quite dead or not we 
cannot tell, but when found burnt to that degree that some of 
them could not be known. We viewed the Corps of most of the 
dead, & saw only two, as we remember, that had escaped the 
most cruel Barbarity that had ever been exercised by any 
civilised Nation; nay, Savage barbarity in its utmost exertion of 
cruelty could but equal it.42 
The second account, by a man named William Stayner, stated British troops 
had been boasting about the murder of Patriot prisoners upon their return to 
occupied Philadelphia: 
That several of the British Light Infantry informed him… that in 
the Engagement with Genl Lacey on the first of May inst., they 
Bayoneted some of Genl Laceys men, after they had 
surrendered Themselves Prisoners, others they threw into 
heaps of Buckwheat Straw, while alive, and burnt them to 
death.43 
Another local, Thomas Craven, on whose land much of the fighting appears 
to have taken place, reported how he had conversed with a British dragoon in 
the immediate aftermath of the skirmish: 
He was asked by a Trooper if he did not see some fires round 
the field, to which he said he did; the Trooper said they were 
men, & that their own Amunition set them on fire; after the 
British left the Ground he went again into the field, where he 
saw four or five men burnt to a shocking degree.44 
This account contrasts interestingly with the others, offering as it does an 
alternative cause for the burned bodies - volatile gunpowder, rather than 
British brutality. Needless to say, the fact that the explanation for the 
burnings comes from a British soldier renders it suspect. 
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None of the primary British and Loyalist accounts of Crooked Billet bother to 
mention any irregularities. One states that smaller parties of fleeing 
revolutionaries 'were killed,' but offers no damning elaboration. 45 The diary 
entries of various British officers make no mention of them having heard of 
any atrocities, interesting given the eagerness of some anti-war officers like 
Charles Stuart of the Brigade of Guards to make mention of any excessive 
violence used against the rebels.46 A Hessian officer, who was not an 
eyewitness, did mention that 'several grenadiers were so embittered that they 
burned nine rebels.'47 Aside from this however the only other account is the 
last of Andrew Long's deponents, Samuel Erwin who, upon investigating the 
battlefield after both sides had departed: 
Was much surprised to find one of the Militia men lying dead, 
his Clothes burning & near consumed, which had burnt the 
Body black; he thinks the man was set on fire before he was 
dead, from this circumstance his arms were standing nearly 
erect; he further sayeth, he saw three other Bodies in Thos. 
Cravens Field burnt in an inhuman manner.48 
Torture and massacres in minor skirmishes such as the one at Crooked Billet 
became almost the norm throughout 1777 and 1778. At Drake’s farm near 
New Brunswick, during the so-called New Jersey forage war, a British 
ambush led by Brigadier Sir William Erskine caught the 5th Virginian 
Regiment unawares. While the Virginians counterattacked, six of their 
wounded were cut off. One Connecticut regular told of how the British 
happened upon one of the injured Americans, Lieutenant Kelley; ‘they took 
his own Rifle & with the butt of it broke & Pounded his Skull to pieces… a 
Soldier that belong’d to my mess Andrew Cushman, a pleasant youth was 
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left among the wounded & with the rest was all murdered by repeated Stabs 
with the bayonet.’49 The account was corroborated by a Continental Army 
Sergeant, Thomas McCarty, who stated the men had been stabbed so many 
times they’d been made to look like sieves.50 The Virginia Gazette picked up 
on the killings, reporting that 'they [the British] treated some of our wounded, 
who had the misfortune to fall into their hands, with the most savage 
barbarity.'51 
Clearly stung by such reports the Patriot commander during the engagement, 
Brigadier General Adam Stephen, wrote a furious letter of complaint to Sir 
William Erskine. He declared that six Virginians 'were murdered, and their 
bodies mangled, and their brains beat out, by the troops of his Britannic 
Majesty.'52 He then went on to draw parallels with the Seven Years War, 
describing how even after the defeat of Braddock's column in 1755 the 
Native Americans 'could not be prevailed upon to butcher the wounded in the 
manner your troops have done.'53 He closed the letter with threats of 
retaliation, saying he was going 'to employ a body of ferocious savages’ to 
retaliate reminding Sir William of how in 1764 'Lieutenant Gordon... and eight 
more of the British soldiers, were roasted alive, and eaten up by the fierce 
savages' and stating unequivocally that 'British officers stand answerable to 
the world, and to posterity.'54 
Sir William's reply to such a ferocious confrontation was unsympathetic. He 
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'think any gentleman in the British service equal to it.'55 He then saw fit to turn 
the tables by lambasting the revolutionaries for their own lack of restraint, 
stating that 'it is not to be wondered at if our soldiers are a little exasperated, 
considering the many cruelties that have been of late committed on them and 
their officers, even unarmed.'56 This is likely a reference to a report delivered 
less than two months earlier by a member of the 17th Light Dragoons, 
Thomas Wileman, who had provided a sworn deposition that while he had 
been a prisoner of the Patriots at Lancaster he had heard of a house being 
set on fire; ‘a suspicion arising that it had been done by the British prisoners 
there, the rebel soldiers with bayonets killed eight and wounded 18 of 
them.’57 Howe wrote a letter of complaint over the incident to Washington. 
References were also made to the Patriot predilection for targeting officers, 
which was sometimes viewed as the equivalent to Patriot distaste when it 
came to actions featuring the bayonet. Indeed the rebel methods of fighting 
were frequently censured by British officers, who claimed that ‘firing from 
hidden emplacements, making feigned requests for quarter, picking off 
sentries, pickets, messengers, even officers… these were all tactics more 
worthy of frontier savages.’58 Both sides saw in their enemies a foe that was 
willing to stoop to what it considered barbarous levels, and this only led to 
further violence. 
British-perpetrated massacres continued throughout 1778. Ferocious 
surprise bayonet assaults became ‘a recurring nightmare for the Americans’ 
– on March 21 1778 a force spearheaded by the Queen’s Rangers, 
commanded by John Graves Simcoe, caught Patriot militia sleeping at the 
house of a Loyalist judge named William Hancock.59 Later histories stated 
that, after surrounding the house in the dark, the Loyalists stormed in with the 
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bayonet. The militia, despite ‘none offering resistance, were bayoneted in 
cold blood’ and ‘all within perished.’ 60 61 That the Loyalists disregarded who 
they were killing is beyond dispute, given that Hancock himself was 
accidentally killed despite his pacifistic Quaker and Loyalist sentiments. 
Simcoe wrote that there were twenty or thirty militiamen within the house ‘all 
of whom were killed’ and called the accidental death of Hancock one of ‘the 
real miseries of war.’62 
Simcoe’s account is at least partially incorrect – a British engineer, Archibald 
Robertson, recorded 16 killed and 11 prisoners from the attack.63 Likewise, a 
Patriot militia lieutenant who was present during the attack, Reuel Sayre, 
recorded his and others’ survival, writing that ‘all were killed, left for dead or 
taken prisoners but myself… I had one brother killed and one taken prisoner 
in this night affair.’64 While it is clear prisoners were taken, it also certain that 
the attacking Loyalists exhibited a killing frenzy. A later history of the Queen’s 
Rangers attempted to ameliorate their aggression by complaining that the 
attack on Hancock’s house: 
Was a lamentable occurrence and has enabled American 
writers to assert that these men were massacred, but it must be 
remembered that it was a night attack and that Simcoe’s 
Rangers, instead of this insignificant detachment, expected to 
meet a force of at least 700 or 800 men, and, of course, a 
desperate resistance was expected.65 
That a more violent policy was now being pursued by British officers is 
emphasised by the response to the Hancock massacre. A day later the 
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commander of the local Crown Forces, Colonel Charles Mawhood (of 
Germantown fame), issued a declaration stating that if the militia did not 
disband he would ‘attack all such of the Militia as remain in Arms, burn and 
destroy their houses and other property, and reduce them, their unfortunate 
Wives and Children, to Beggary and Distress.’66 Such a threat of 
unrestrained warfare only further incensed the Patriots. The commander of 
the local militia, Colonel Elijah Hand, compared Mawhood to ‘a barbarous 
Atilla.’67 The Patriot governor of New Jersey, William Livingston, also 
received a petition for reinforcements from the militia, who highlighted how 
the enemy: 
By the express Orders of Coll Mawhood the commanding 
Officer, bayonetted & butchered in the most inhuman manner a 
Number of the Militia, who have unfortunately fallen into their 
hands. That Coll Mawhood immediately after the Massacre, in 
open Letters sent to both Officers and Privates by a Flag had 
the Effrontery to insult us with a demand, that we should lay 
down our Arms.’68 
The petition was forwarded to Washington. 
The Attack at Tappan 
 
Worse was to come. On September 27 1778, almost exactly a year after 
Paoli, ‘No Flints’ Grey repeated his success against the 3rd Regiment of 
Continental light dragoons, encamped in farms and barns in the vicinity of 
Tappan, New Jersey. 69 Grey had been ordered by the new British 
commander in chief, Sir Henry Clinton, to provide a diversion for an assault 
on Patriot privateers operating out of Little Egg Harbour in southern New 
Jersey. Learning of the presence of several hundred militiamen encamped 
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near the Hackensack river and the Continental dragoons nearby at Tappan, 
Grey once more took his bloodhounds – the composite light infantry battalion 
– and some dragoons, along with the 33rd and 64th Foot and the grenadier 
battalion. Departing at 11 p.m., they came upon the Continentals between 1 
a.m. and 3 a.m., and caught them completely by surprise. Grey divided his 
light infantry into two wings of six companies. One wing successful captured 
the Continental piquets, leaving the other to infiltrate the village undetected. 
Again relying on their bayonets, the light infantry forced the home being used 
by the commander of the Continental cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Baylor and 
his three ranking subordinates. One officer was killed and two were mortally 
wounded, while Baylor was taken prisoner as he attempted to flee up the 
chimney of a large Dutch oven, suffering a bayonet wound that would 
eventually kill him a few years later. The British carried on into the 
surrounding barns and farms. Some Patriots, alerted by the commotion, 
resisted. Others fled. With daybreak, and the billets stormed, the light infantry 
carried on and routed the nearby militia. In all 15 of the 116-strong 
Continental Army detachment were killed, and 54 wounded or taken prisoner. 
As had happened at Paoli, the bloodshed at Tappan prompted a flurry of 
letters and a formal investigation by Patriot leaders. Described as ‘an 
unprecedented massacre’ even when compared with previous incidents, the 
Continental Congress requested that William Livingston ascertain exactly 
what happened on the night of 27 September. 70 Livingston tasked the 
Continental Army’s Major General Stirling with heading up the investigation, 
as he had done with his inquiry into Wayne’s conduct after Paoli. Stirling in 
turn asked a doctor and chaplain in one of his brigades who had arrived at 
Tappan soon after the skirmish ‘to collect every circumstance relative to the 
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as well as, more generally, to ‘collect all the evidence in his power of that 
barbarous affair.’72 
That evidence appeared quite clear. Baylor himself, writing to Washington, 
described the engagement as ‘the horrid massacre.’73 Stirling likewise used 
the charged word to refer to the incident in his report.74 Even more damning 
were the testimonies formally recorded by Griffith. Southward Cullency, of the 
3rd Regiment’s 1st Troop, who was listed as having suffered twelve wounds, 
told of how ‘he and all his men asked for quarter, which was refused; that the 
British Capt. Ball… asked his men, how many of the rebels were actually 
dead; and, on being told the number, he ordered all the rest to be knocked on 
the head.’ Thomas Benson, 2nd Troop, who was listed as also having twelve 
wounds, declared ‘he heard men in the barn, where he was, ask for quarter, 
which was returned with wounds and abusive language; that he did not ask 
for quarter himself, believing it in vain, as he heard the British soldiers reply 
to others, who begged it, that their captain had ordered them to stab all, and 
take no prisoners.’ Julian King and George Willis, both of 2nd Troop, having 
suffered sixteen and nine wounds respectively, stated that ‘British soldiers, 
on entering the barn where they were, sent to know of their officer what they 
were to do with the two prisoners, who return for answer, that they were to kill 
every one of them; that they begged for quarter, which was refused.’ Barlett 
Hawkins, 5th Troop, who bore three wounds, stated he heard that ‘he heard 
the British soldiers say, they could give no quarters, as it was contrary to their 
orders.’ On and on the depositions went, seventeen in all, each one 
describing how they and their fellow dragoons were either denied quarter, or 
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Such an investigation, forensic by eighteenth century standards and 
nominally backed by medical and judicial processes, represented the 
Patriot’s most effective way of dealing with small scale military defeats. 
Holger Hoock sees in such efforts a concerted attempt to damage Britain’s 
reputation both in the colonies and abroad, writing that the Patriot’s 
objectives were: 
To ground allegations of atrocity in empirical evidence: 
collected by official fiat; documented by expert witnesses such 
as medical personnel and other figures who claimed authority 
and authenticity; involving in the process Congressional 
committees, army commanders in the field and civilian officials 
on site; acquiring at least the semblance of legal procedure; 
and collated, published and distributed with Congressional 
imprimatur.76 
Such tactics had been utilised with success since the Boston massacre and 
the engagement at Lexington, with the accounts of militiamen, examined by 
doctors and sworn in by judges, establishing the anti-British narrative that so 
coloured the war’s opening. As happened following the Baylor incident, 
accounts were also often accompanied by a record of how many wounds the 
victim had suffered; ‘the precise counting of what appeared to be an 
extremely high number of wounds was to become a topos in the atrocity 
narrative: an excess of wounds indicated assailants bent on finishing off the 
wounded after they had been rendered incapable of resistance.’77 
Some expressed disbelief at the amount of wounds described. One British 
paper stated that; 
It will undoubtedly excite the admiration of whosoever 
considered the nature of the weapon, and the force which it 
derives, as well from the weight of the musket to which it is 
fixed, as from the manner in which it is used, and the strength 
of the operator, that these men were not only able to give their 
testimony at a considerable distance of time, but that no doubt 
seem then to have been entertained of their recovery.78 
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Regardless of the veracity of their claims, the Patriots continued to use the 
due process they had developed after Boston and the first phase of the war, 
carefully documenting their enemy’s barbarism. This was twinned with 
repeated public condemnation of British atrocities, effectively negated the 
impact of the numerous minor British military successes during the mid- 
phase of the conflict and helping to maintain the revolutionary cause through 
this difficult point of the war. 
Doctor Griffith’s final report on the Baylor incident fitted the Patriot narrative 
perfectly. He found the fact that Grey ‘ordered no quarter to be given 
appears, as well as by the inclosed testimony, from the report of many 
inhabitants who have heard the British officers speak of it… the charges were 
drawn from their firelocks & the flints taken out that the men might be 
constrained to use their bayonets only.’ He went on to state that ‘very few, or 
none, of the British officers entered the quarters of our troops on this 
occasion, that no stop might be put to the rage and barbarity of their 
bloodhounds.’ He concluded that ‘Congress was not misinformed respecting 
the savage cruelty attending the surprise of Colonel Baylor’s Regiment.’79 
British reports made no coordinated effort to answer the rebel outrage with 
their own empirical fact-finding, and indeed as we have seen, some accounts 
shared the horror of the victims. Robert Shaw of the 33rd Foot recalled how 
‘our savage fellow soldiers were butchering… some were seen having their 
arms cut off, and others with their bowels hanging out crying for mercy.’80 
Conversely Lieutenant Martin Hunter said only that during the engagement 
‘not a shot was fired, and the whole regiment of dragoons, except a few who 
were bayoneted, were taken prisoner.’81 The Loyalist New York periodical, 
Rivington’s Gazette, reported that there was resistance from the dragoons; 
‘sixteen privates were lodged, who, discharging ten or twelve pistols, and 
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striking at the troops sans effet with their broadswords, nine of them were 
instantly bayoneted, and seven received quarter.’82 André’s journal entry for 
the engagement was even more brief, stating only that of the Continentals 
‘the whole corps within six or eight men were killed or taken 
prisoners.’83 Another British officer not present at the engagement expressed 
the belief that the light infantry were at least partly guilty of excessive 
violence; ‘the 2d. battalion light infantry were thought to be active and bloody 
on this service, and it’s acknowledged on all hands they might have spared 
some who made no resistance.’84 In a statement that shows how casualties 
multiply with rumour, a Hessian officer not present during the attack claimed 
that ‘our troops attacked with bayonets and slaughtered all of them, so that 
only three were able to save themselves by flight.’85 Lieutenant Colonel 
Charles Stuart was again damning of his countrymen’s actions; ‘the credit 
that might have been due to the Corps that effected the surprise is entirely 
buried in the barbarity if their behaviour.’86 
British Aggression Unanswered 
 
While certainly aware of the dangers of excessive force when it came to 
public perception both in the colonies and in Britain, the British Army itself did 
very little to curb acts of extreme violence as the war progressed. Regular 
soldiers and low-to-mid ranking officers exhibited a particular hatred for 
American colonists, sometimes regardless of allegiances. British officers 
deliberately appealed to their men’s self-belief as elite soldiers and goaded 
them into action at opportune moments, but this could also lead to 
unrestrained and excessive violence. At Germantown Howe used his men’s 
belief in their own superior status to great effect; ‘seeing the [Light] battalion 
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retreating, all broken, he got into a passion and exclaimed – “for shame, light 
infantry! I never saw you retreat before; form! Form!”’ 87 The light infantry 
twice charged a superior attacking force even though ‘as it was near the end 
of the campaign, it [the battalion] was very weak’ and its officers struggled to 
get their men to withdraw despite almost being overrun. 88 In fact Lieutenant 
Hunter, narrating the light infantry’s actions, actually relished seeing his 
commanding officer almost scythed down by Patriot grapeshot after he had 
accused the bloodhounds of flight, stating ‘I think I never saw people enjoy a 
discharge of grape before; but we really felt pleased to see the enemy make 
such an appearance, and to hear the grape rattle about the commander-in- 
chief’s ears, after he had accused the battalion of having run away.’89 
It is not surprising that such a brash attitude should lead to a disregard for 
Patriot lives in combat situations, exemplified by the killings carried out during 
actions like the Baylor massacre. Crucially, not only did the light infantry 
quench their need for violence by bayonetting sleeping men, but they also 
seem to have been encouraged to do so by a number of their lieutenants and 
captains, sometimes even against their own better judgement. Nor were such 
actions the preserve of none but the army’s elite. As we shall see, the men of 
the 54th and 40th Foot, stung by a bloody engagement, did not restrain 
themselves after storming Fort Griswold in 1781, and appear to have been 
actively encouraged to kill trapped and surrendering Patriots by their officers. 
The British Army’s structure enabled an environment where battlefield 
brutality could go largely unchecked. While adherence to orders and the 
army’s system of command remained paramount in and out of combat, 
sanguinary acts on the battlefield by the midpoint of the war were less likely 
to be censured than overlooked or even encourage. The British military’s 
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esprit de corps was focussed on the regimental family, with soldiers expected 
to uphold and honour their regiment not only by retaining their discipline, but 
through acts of particular bravery – or viciousness – on the battlefield. 
Paternalistic and familial bonds are in evidence throughout. Officers 
displayed ‘fatherly pride in, and concern for the welfare of’ their enlisted men, 
while the grenadier battalions were known to refer to the light infantry as their 
‘children’, with the light infantry addressing the grenadiers as their ‘fathers.’90 
So strong was the bond, especially between the flank companies, that one 
officer was moved to tears describing the martial brotherhood in evidence 
between them when they mustered together in New Jersey following the 
battle of Trenton.91 
Such an attitude helped to forge a capable fighting force, but also 
accentuated the disregard regulars felt for rebel Americans and promoted 
acts of excessive violence that were left unpunished by officers who believed 
such bloodshed exemplified their men’s ardour for king and country. By 1780, 
a number of those officers held high rank in North America and were 
operationally decisive when it came to the success or failure of Britain’s 
southern strategy. Men such as Patrick Ferguson, Banastre Tarleton, Francis 
Rawdon and James Wemyss achieved localised successes in the Carolinas 
without understanding – or actively disregarding – the damage being done by 
the violence they inflicted. They helped to create a cauldron of conflict and 
strife in the south that was the exact opposite of the return to law and order 
that British strategists had hoped for. 
The complex operational and strategic problems posed to the British in the 
south in 1780 and 1781 were beyond the abilities of most British 
commanders on the ground to solve, and the massacres that resulted from 
their attempts to subdue the country further eroded Crown authority and the 
morale of the ever-shrinking number of Loyalists in the southern colonies. 
The seeds were such failure were sown in the northern colonies, however, 
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when during the mid-phase of the war British soldiers and officers found they 
could indulge in acts of extreme violence with little threat of censure from 
their own side. The public perception of British soldiers in North America 
suffered relentlessly during this period, and Patriot propaganda did not have 
to look far or fabricate a wholly unreasonable narrative to paint Crown Forces 
as the violent foot soldiers of a bloodthirsty tyrant. Simply put, ‘their army’s 
perceived or actual cruelty was their enemy’s best recruiting agent.’92 
Patriot Vengeance 
 
Word of the massacre at Tappan spread rapidly among the Patriots, and had 
a powerful impact on their views of the enemy. Continental Army Colonel 
Charles Pettit wrote that ‘I am told it was a kind of massacre as little or no 
resistance could be made.’93 Another Continental officer, Henry Laurens, 
wondered at the fact that; 
The unfortunate gentleman [Baylor] was off his guard, but does 
this error warrant the butchery which we are told the cruel 
English exercised upon himself and his party? If this shall be 
proved ought we to suffer their guilt to pass with impunity? 
When & in what manner should retaliation be made?94 
That the thoughts of Laurens should turn to vengeance, as many Patriots had 
after Paoli, is further evidence of the spiral of excessive violence that the war 
was falling into by 1778. Eighteen days after the Baylor incident, the 
operation which Grey’s attack had been designed to support went ahead, 
with British officer Patrick Ferguson leading a strike against Patriot privateers 
in New Jersey. The attack at Little Egg Habor saw the combined force of 
British regulars and Loyalist Provincials mount a successful surprise attack 
on an outpost manned by Patriots belonging to Pulaski’s Legion. The Legion 
had been betrayed by a deserter, Gustav Juliat, who informed them of the 
location of both the outpost and the main body of Pulaski’s men. Taking 
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advantage of the lax security around Ridgeway Farm (the house being used 
by the Legion’s fifty-strong detachment), Crown Forces surprised and 
stormed the building at around 4 a.m. Ferguson himself observed that ‘it 
being a night attack Little Quarter could be given, so there were only five 
prisoners.’95 This is corroborated by the fact that around fifty Patriots were 
killed or wounded, most with the bayonet. 
The Patriots had again been surprised and killed en-mass, again at night, 
and again by enemies relying on the bayonet. The Scots Magazine added a 
further bloodthirsty undertone to the attack, observing that ‘an account given 
by the deserters, that Pulaski [the Patriot commander] had issued public 
orders, forbidding his corps to grant any quarter to the British troops, afforded 
a new edge to the fury of the soldiers, and shut up their bosoms against 
every feeling of pity or remorse.’96 It claimed that ‘in consequence of which 
our people took only five prisoners, all the rest, with their lieutenant-colonel, 
were left on the spot, the business being done with the bayonet only.’97 
Regarding the subsequent Patriot anger at both Little Egg Harbor and the 
Baylor incident, the magazine added: 
This and the other expedition [against Baylor] afforded an 
opportunity for a renewal of those complaints which the 
Americans had so loudly and repeatedly made, of the 
inhumanities and cruelties exercised by some corps of the 
British troops, as well as their auxiliaries. A number of real or 
supposed facts were now particularly supplied by the surprise 
of Baylor’s regiment, which was represented as a cold-blooded 
massacre of naked men.98 
Regardless of such dismissive British commentary, the Patriots would finally 
get their opportunity for revenge on July 16 1779. General Anthony Wayne 
would again be at the forefront, this time leading the best infantry the 
Continental Army had to offer in an operation that was clearly modelled on 
the British successes of the previous two years. Wayne and his newly-formed 
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light infantry assaulted a British fortress at Stony Point, relying on a swift, 
surprise night-time attack that emphasised the use of the bayonet. During the 
fighting one British officer, Captain Campbell of the 71st Highlanders, was 
turned away by soldiers of the 17th Foot who informed him that the part of the 
fort he was headed to had been overrun, and that the Patriots there were not 
taking prisoners.99 Similarly a Patriot officer, Lieutenant Colonel William Hull, 
reported that his men ‘made free use of the bayonet… we were compelled to 
continue the dreadful slaughter, owing to the fierce and obstinate resistance 
of the enemy.’100 Another source noted the use of past massacres to 
motivate the attackers – ‘General Wayne tickled their ears with “Remember 
the Paola [Paoli] and the massacre of Lady Washington’s light horse at the 
Tapaan”… the grenadiers, in particular, of the 71st regiment made for a while 
a gallant defence.’101 One Patriot soldier, recalling the action, wrote that at 
Stony Point ‘the brave General Wayne retaliated upon the British for the 
massacre of his men.’102 Yet another of Wayne’s men stated that ‘after 
General Wayne got possession of the Fort that it was with difficulty that 
General Wayne could prevent the soldiers from massacring the prisoners.’103 
Furthermore, in a pension application statement overlooked by most later 
retellings of the engagement, one Patriot soldier wrote that ‘at this place 
Colonel Fleury undertook to cut the flag staff down with his sword. This 
deponent himself cut down the flag & gave it to Colonel Fleury – on the same 
staff they hung some tories.’104 In all the British claimed 20 dead, while other 
sources stated a figure as high as 63 killed and around 70 wounded. Total 
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casualties sustained at Paoli, especially given the larger Patriot force present 
at Paoli. 
The fact that nearly the greater part of the British garrison – five hundred men 
– were taken prisoner has frequently been cited as evidence that the Patriots, 
especially the Continental Army, avoided the massacres perpetrated by the 
British in the northern colonies. Recent authors such as Armstrong Starkey 
have argued that the Patriots at Stony Point demonstrated a ‘higher moral 
standard than their opponents,’ while biographers and aficionados of Anthony 
Wayne frequently cite the action as evidence that, besides being an active 
and aggressive commander, he was also humane in victory.105 The battle 
has become a cornerstone of a section of historiography that claims the 
Patriots were less excessive in general when it came to military violence, and 
that the war was one of aggression by the British and restraint on behalf of 
the rebelling colonists. This is precisely the sort of narrative Congress sought 
to build on the backs of embarrassing military defeats such as Paoli and the 
Baylor incident. Their efforts were successful even among their enemies. 
British Admiral Sir George Collier noted the generosity and clemency the 
Continentals had conducted themselves with at Stony Point, while General 
James Pattison claimed that he had heard of no cruelties committed by the 
victors, in spite of the later claims by the Patriots about bloody slaughter, 
bayonets and the hanging of Loyalists in the fort after its fall.106 
Even leaving out those aspects, Stony Point is insufficient as evidence that 
the Patriots practised greater restraint than the British or Loyalists. The 
primary reason there were fewer massacres committed by the Patriots from 
1777 to 1779 is because they had fewer opportunities to do so. A number of 
obvious factors united almost all incidents of massacre during this middle 
phase of the war – Paoli, the Baylor incident, Little Egg Harbor, Hancock’s 
bridge and Crooked Billet all occurred at night, were all surprise attacks, and 
were all conducted with an emphasis on close quarter combat. Such 
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operations are among the most difficult of any war-time undertaking. 
Disregarding their moral fallout, all of the above engagements were victories 
for the Crown Forces, a remarkable success rate. And while full force 
organisation varied, with the exception of Little Egg Harbor the edge of British 
and Loyalist attacks were all led by one of two units – the regular light 
infantry, or Simcoe’s Loyalist rangers. 
Works by authors like Don Hagist and Matthew H. Spring have shown that in 
1775 the British Army in North America was no more combat experienced 
than the Patriots, many of whom had greater first-hand experience from the 
Seven Years War. While that might mean that by 1777 both sides still 
possessed roughly the same degree of military competence, its use resulted 
in markedly different outcomes. In the British Army the ablest soldiers were 
often funnelled into the elite flank battalions – the light infantry and the 
grenadiers. While there was debate as to whether or not this starved the 
regular battalions of their best fighting men, it did mean that Howe and 
Clinton could rely on a number of crack battalions for vital operations. These 
units not only multiplied their capabilities by concentrating the best soldiers 
together, they also created an esprit de corps that was well documented by 
both their own side and the enemy. The light infantry generally showed no 
remorse for the massacres at Paoli and Tappan, in fact quite the opposite – 
the lyrics of one song dedicated to them boasted that ‘Wayne, or hapless 
Baylor knows how swift their vengeance glides.’107 
In the case of the Loyalists, the abilities of certain units can better be 
ascribed to the abilities their commanding officers. Regiments like the British 
Legion, the Queen’s Rangers and Ferguson’s rifle company were 
commanded by young and ambitious regular officers who moulded their units 
on the same aggressive fighting style as the light infantry. The perpetrators of 
massacres were therefore either the elite of the British Army or led by the 
most daring and capable regimental and brigade-level officers. 
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In 1777 and 1778 there was simply no Patriot equivalent to counter this. It is 
true that some units in the Continental Army earned a reputation 
effectiveness, such as the New Jersey brigade, described by Washington as 
‘one of the best in the army.’108 The Continental Army was also slow to 
harness its light infantry, relying on a seasonally raised corps that only 
increased in ability as it consciously adopted British light infantry doctrines, 
having learned their effectiveness at the point of a bayonet. Militia units did 
fulfil numerous skirmishing and irregular warfare roles but were infamously 
unreliable and, by their very nature as part-time combatants, never built the 
cohesive unit identity championed by the most capable regiments. 
This lack of combat units able to conduct special operations meant that, while 
battles like Germantown show that officers did use vengeance as a 
motivating factor on the battlefield, the Patriots simply did not have the ability 
to launch the repeatedly successful small to mid-scale strikes undertaken by 
Crown Forces in 1777 and 1778. It is at this point that Stony Point is usually 
held up as an example of the Patriots beating the British at their own game, 
and then being magnanimous in victory. But just how different was Stony 
Point from actions such as Paoli? The fact that British prisoners at the former 
numbered in their hundreds is due to the fact that they were trapped in the 
fort, whereas at Paoli hundreds of Patriots were able to flee into the night. 
André attests that the British started taking prisoners at Paoli after venting 
their initial bloodlust. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if the Patriots 
had been trapped at Paoli the way the British were at Stony Point, it would 
have resulting in hundreds of extra prisoners, rather than hundreds more 
bayoneted dead and wounded. Nor are the casualty ratios from either 
engagement vastly dissimilar - around 200 Patriot dead or wounded at Paoli 
from a force of 1,500, and between 90 and 130 British dead and wounded at 
Stony Point from a force of 750. Stony Point also did not lack accounts of 
extreme violence and the spectre of massacre, if Captain Campbell's or 
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Lieutenant Colonel Hull's accounts are to be believed. Stony Point saw less 
bloodshed than Paoli, but it was in marginal degrees not sufficient to give 
substance to the idea that the Patriots were exceptionally more restrained 
than their enemies. 
Despite espousing Stony Point as an example of mercy, Starkey is unable to 
account for the apparent leniency of the victors. He admits that Wayne 
himself was wounded early on, and so could not personally restrain his men 
in the thick of the action. He concludes that ‘the officers and NCOs must 
have intervened to stop the killing, but they left no record of their actions at 
the decisive moment.’109 Starkey does not seem to consider that he is 
admitting that the common virtuous citizen soldier espoused by Congress 
needed their officers and NCOs to stop them from shedding excessive 
amounts of blood. The truth is that in reality there was no peculiar leniency 
shown by either officers or men towards their captives. At both Paoli and 
Stony Point there was an initial bout of intensive bloodletting that then gave 
way to the standard eighteenth-century battlefield protocols of surrender. 
If Congress did not have the military means to avenge British massacres until 
at least 1779, it did succeed in emphasising the narrative of violence that 
won the propaganda war during the mid-phase of the conflict. Patriot printers 
‘promoted incessantly the idea that Americans waged war with humanity and 
justice’ while continuously highlighting and at times inflating the casualties 
inflicted by British operations.110 Massacres such as the one at Tappan 
‘became a pivotal document in the patriot atrocity narrative’ and helped 
emphasise the desperate nature of the struggle the rebels were engaged in, 
both to fellow colonists and oversees commentators.111 Nor were the British 
subjected only to angry letters from Patriot commanders, quasi-legalistic 
formal investigations and accounts printed in Whiggish periodicals. In 
October 1778, Congress specifically addressed the issue of the massacres 
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that had taken place over the two years, drafting a manifesto following the 
‘cumulative impact of Hancock’s Bridge, Crooked Billet, the so-called Paoli 
Massacre… and the Baylor Massacre, as well as an alleged British massacre 
at Little Egg Harbor.’112 The manifesto spoke of how Crown Forces had ‘laid 
waste the open country, burned the defenceless villages, and butchered the 
citizens of America.’ It then went further by declaring that ‘if our enemies 
presume to execute their threats, or persist in their present career of 
barbarity, we will take such exemplary vengeance, as shall deter others from 
a like conduct.’113 Similarly, both John Adams and Benjamin Franklin were 
both predicting retaliatory massacres in 1778 in response to perceived 
heightened British aggression.114 
Here then is the Patriot will for revenge following British atrocities, the desire 
echoed by Wayne and Hubley after Paoli, by Stephen after Crooked Billet 
and Laurens after Tappan. Massacres had continually raised the heat of the 
war during its second phase and progressively sharpened the Patriot 
response, and regardless of the restraint championed by many high-ranking 
commanders on both sides, on the frontier and in the south the Patriots 
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Chapter Four: Cherry Valley and Gnadenhutten 
 
Such a shocking sight my eyes never beheld before of savage 
and brutal barbarity; to see the husband mourning over his 
dead wife with four dead children lying by her side, mangled, 
scalpt, and some their heads, some their legs and arms cut off, 
some torn the flesh off their bones by their dogs - 12 of one 
family all killed and four of them burnt in his house.1 
So wrote Benjamin Warren, a captain in the Continental Army, concerning 
the aftermath of a Crown Forces raid on the frontier settlement of Cherry 
Valley on November 13 1778. The attack saw an estimated 14 Patriot 
soldiers and 30 settlers killed, and around the same number captured. In 
justifying the killings to a Patriot colonel a month later, a group of Seneca 
wrote that, ‘your rebels came to Oghwaga when we Indians were gone, and 
you burned our houses, which made us and our brothers, the Seneca 
Indians, angry, so that we destroyed men, women and children at Cherry 
Valley.’ They went on to warn darkly that ‘we, therefore, desire that you will 
let our brothers live in peace, lest you be worse dealt with, than your 
neighbours the Cherry Valley people was. You may think it’s a hard winter 
that will hinder us from coming to you. I have big shoes and can come in a 
few days to your place.’2 
Cherry Valley was the most infamous massacre committed by Crown Forces 
on the frontier. It was, however, also only one of many perpetrated by all 
sides during the course of the war. More so than any other theatre, the 
interior edges of the Thirteen Colonies saw widespread killing and maiming 
of the unarmed and the helpless, the destruction of property and possessions 
and the general use of violence on a huge and sustained scale. 
It can be described as a war within a war or, more accurately, a conflict with 
neither a clear beginning nor a clear end. The bloodshed that remained near- 
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continuous on the frontier between 1754 and 1815 was part of ‘a broader 
conflict, a six-decade struggle for dominion over eastern North America… a 
single, prolonged struggle among Native Americans, Europeans and 
colonists for control.’3 The years 1775 to 1783 should therefore be viewed 
only as a framework to discuss massacres on the frontier, with the violence 
perpetrated between Europeans and Natives both preceding and succeeding 
the specific years of the revolutionary struggle. 
With the deeper racial antagonisms between colonists and Native Americans 
touched upon in chapter one, this chapter will look at two massacre case 
studies in particular – Cherry Valley in 1778 and Gnaddenhutten in 1781. 
These give us a framework to view the development of the so-called “Indian 
War” on the frontier, how it at times seemed to operate in isolation from the 
fighting further east, and how on other occasions it affected it directly, further 
highlighting the military significance of massacres not just as isolated 
incidents, but as a continuing thread throughout the Revolutionary War. 
In his study of the role of violence in the founding of Britain’s American 
colonies, Patrick Griffen writes that; 
While muted or forgotten in other areas of America, violence 
defined the frontier War of Independence… Gruesome warfare, 
an “American” way of warfare, which included “savage” 
behaviour and torture rituals, with whites outstripping Indians in 
their ferocity, proved the rule and not the exception… the nature 
of the bloodshed and of the racial tensions associated with it 
became defining hallmarks of western processes.4 
While the idea of American exceptionalism in styles of warfare should not be 
overplayed, it is true that the colonies presented different challenges to 
eighteenth-century European or European-schooled commanders. The 
associated violence of the frontier, the previously-discussed rejection of 
concepts of white “civility” only accentuated this. What it created was a 
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separate but intersection sphere of conflict where acts of massacre and 
occasions of extreme violence received far less censure. Indeed, the raids, 
murders and skirmishes occurring from West Florida to Canada often did so 
in parallel with the wider Revolutionary War, rather than simply as a 
consequence of it. It should not be imagined therefore as simply another 
phase of the conflict, but as a separate dimension that intersected with the 
regular fighting further east, but was not dependent on its ebb and flow to 
define its level of violence. For example, there was a war being fought 
between the Shawnees, the Mingos and Lord Dunmore’s colony of Virginia 
just six months prior to Lexington and Concord – the period was ‘a time of 
mutual murder and pillage’ on the eve of revolutionary events in distant New 
England, one that was only the latest in a long list of conflicts up and down 
the frontier.5 Dunmore’s unofficial war was a reflection of the widespread 
killings occurring all throughout the west – the mobilisation of both sides 
around the attacks already taking place were a far more serious business to 
settlers there than the comparatively tame occurrences of the powder alarms 
in Massachusetts, and indicate the degree to which the conflict there was 
already separate and alive prior to colonial militiamen firing on British 
regulars. As Hinderacker and Mancall state, ‘from the perspective of the 
backcountry, the shots fired on the Ohio in 1774, not those at Concord six 
months later, constituted the beginning of the American Revolution.’6 
Starting an Indian War 
 
With bloodshed already occurring on the frontier, accusations of massacre 
soon spread throughout the colonies further east. A month before the British 
march on Lexington, at the settlement of Westminster in the New Hampshire 
Grants, colonial officials attacked a band of a hundred settlers protesting land 
claims in the disputed territory. Two were killed and eight wounded, leading 
to declarations of a massacre and a worsening of relationships between 
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imperial officers and colonists on the north-western frontier. Already 
stretched by the unrest across New England, Gage had no time to send 
troops to the hinterlands to enforce tenuous Crown authority, further 
contributing to the erosion of law and order that permitted the Patriot 
subversion of government.7 
To the south Dunmore’s War – set in motion by the dissatisfaction over the 
constant westward expansion of colonists into Native territory – had also 
been sparked into life by a specific act of massacre. On April 30 1774, at 
Yellow Creek in Ohio, a group of frontiersmen murdered the family of a 
Mingo chief, Logan. The Natives were lured in, shot and mutilated. The 
frontiersmen also ‘strung up the pregnant sister of the Mingo chief Logan by 
her wrists, sliced open her belly with a tomahawk, and impaled her unborn 
child on a stake.’8 The leader of the settlers who had committed the atrocity, 
Daniel Greathouse, was captured, tortured and murdered along with his wife 
by Natives seventeen years later.9 10 
Shocking though such murders were, they were far from unknown. On 
December 14 1763 a group of frontiersmen known as the Paxton Rangers 
attacked, massacred and scalped six peaceful Conestoga Natives in 
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. They killed 14 more on December 27, 
effectively wiping out the small tribe.11 The events were considered shocking 
even among some colonists, with Benjamin Franklin penning A Narrative of 
the Late Massacres, wherein he declared that ‘they [the Conestogas] would 
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of the Christian white Savages of Peckstang and Donegall!’12 Despite this, 
none of the perpetrators ever faced legal censure. 
Six months after the twin massacres, four Lenape Natives attacked a 
schoolhouse in Conococheague, Pennsylvania, murdering and scalping the 
schoolmaster and nine children. On the way to the killings the Natives had 
already murdered a pregnant woman, Susan King Cunningham. They 
‘bludgeoned the woman to death, scalped her, and then ripped open her 
abdomen, placing the lifeless fetus next to her body.’ The brutal murders 
prompted the Pennsylvania Assembly to reintroduce the payment of bounties 
in exchange for Native American scalps.13 
It was against this backdrop that the attentions of both the British and the 
Patriots became pinned in mid to late 1775. An Indian war, as it was known, 
was initially not in the interests of either side, and both sought to lessen the 
impact of Native involvement rather than bring them into the conflict. The 
British ‘limited their recruitment to avoid the negative publicity that enlisting 
Indians would generate’ while the Patriots avoided it ‘because they knew that 
they faced an insurmountable disadvantage in recruiting them.’14 On the 
frontier, however, official government policy of any shade rarely held sway for 
long. 
Ranking Patriots decided early on that spurning Native relations would reap 
more rewards than courting them. The Declaration of Independence ranks 
British alliances with Natives as one of the reasons for rebellion, stating that 
George III ‘has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the 
merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an 
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undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.’15 This in spite 
of the fact that during the period when the Declaration was being drafted one 
of the only tribes to have declared for either side, the Stockbridge, had 
aligned themselves with Congress. The Patriots also began seeding rumours 
of a British-sponsored campaign, claiming as early as mid-1775 that the 
Superintendent for Indian Affairs had instructed subordinates ‘to start an 
Indian war’ and that ‘some thirty-four families were reported massacred’ by 
the Cherokee.16 Such rumours weren’t only aimed towards at inciting the 
frontier, or even just revolution-minded colonists; the Patriots were aware that 
the idea of Natives being encouraged to ravage frontier settlements would be 
met with outrage by many in Britain as well. The Boston massacre and early 
responses to news about Lexington and Concord had shown that the British 
public could be susceptible to displays of colonial victimhood, both real and 
imagined. The atrocity narrative had a special place for stories concerning 
Natives. 
The outbreak of the revolutionary war left many Native Americans facing the 
lesser of two evils. While the British government had frequently failed to 
honour or enforce agreements with Native tribes, the constant, immediate 
threat was from the colonists, and hence Congress. The revolution thus 
began to fuel the violence that was already endemic across the frontier, 
changing social customs as it did so and forcing frontier settlers – often 
abandoned by the warring factions further east – to look to their own security. 
In doing so aggressors were able to claim justification for some of the 
shocking massacres of the entire war. 
The first major frontier campaign of the war flared in 1776 when the 
Cherokee, tired of surrendering their land in Tennessee, Kentucky and the 
Carolinas to the ever-encroaching colonists, refused to wait for promised 
British support (which, after defeat at Sullivan’s Island that year, was unlikely 
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to materialise anyway). They launched attacks on frontier settlements in 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. After one clash a 
Patriot soldier recalled in his journal ‘a most dreadful sight to behold – our 
fellow creatures massacred by the heathens’ and, in another incident, of 
‘seeing there what slaughter was made by our heathen enemies, by killing 
and scalping all they met with; this seemed terrifying, to see our fellow 
creatures lying dead and massacred in such as manner, as hindered us 
almost from interring or burying them.’ 17 Of particular note was the murder of 
the wealthy and influential Hite family – Jacob Hite was killed at his home in 
August 1776, while his children and wife were initially taken prisoner and 
then later murdered as well, acts that were ‘used by the Whigs to justify their 
attack on the Cherokees.’18 
Over the next three months four retaliatory militia expeditions ravaged 
Cherokee holdings. The Cherokee were one of the tribes furthest removed 
from centres of British control, and the lack of supplies and ammunition 
meant that they were unable to either effectively repulse the Patriot raids or 
withstand the famine that followed the destruction of so much of their harvest. 
The lack of material assistance to the Natives was in spite of the fact that the 
Cherokee’s activities on the frontier had kept thousands of militiamen from 
helping to repel the British campaign to seize Charleston.19 
The overwhelming response from southern militia, supported by the 
Continental Army, saw over fifty Native settlements torched, and knocked the 
Cherokee out of the war until the British shifted the primary focus of their 
campaigns to the Southern theatre in 1780. Native factions acting 
independently, and the British slow to support their allies – it was a foretaste 
of what was to come. 
 
 
17 Arthur Fairies, ‘Journal’ in 'Pension Application of Peter Clinton W9390 Frances B Clinton 
f56SC', Southern Campaign American Revolution Pension Statements, accessed online at 
http://revwarapps.org/ 30/05/2018. 
18 William T. Graves, Backcountry Revolutionary (Lugoff, SC: Southern Campaigns of the 
American Revolution Press, 2012), 290. 
19 Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for 
Unity, 1745 – 1815 (Baltimore: John Hoskins University Press, 1992), 53. 
138  
Near the Ohio River the following year a combined force of Wyandot, Mingo, 
Shawnee and Delaware attacked the Patriot garrison of Fort Henry. While the 
fort resisted, a nearby Patriot force commanded by Captain William Foreman 
were ambushed at the head of Grave Creek narrows. Of the forty-five men 
under Foreman’s command, twenty-one were killed and several wounded.20 
A Patriot soldier garrisoned at Pittsburgh recorded hearing news ‘of the 
massacre of Capt. Foreman and the greater portion of his command at grave 
creek narrows, ten miles below Wheeling.’21 Such reports were becoming 
increasingly commonplace. Thomas Witten, employed in a company ‘to 
perform frequent scouting expeditions as Indian spies, to defend the western 
frontier of Virginia… from the massacres of the Indians by whom the whole 
western border was then infested’ recalled how he ‘was an eye witness to 
some of the many instances of inhuman butchery and massacre committed 
upon the frontier families within range of his marches.’22 Other such scouts 
and spies told similar stories – self-described Indian spy Moses Husstead 
recorded how a Native band ‘on Hackers Creek massacred a few whites… 
through the course of this Summer the Indians made many incursions into 
the frontier settlements, committed many murders.’23 Another Patriot, 
Hezekiah Hess, spoke of how ‘a family on the head of the Tigert Valey [sic] 
were massacred by some stragling Indians’ and later of ‘a small party of 
Indians [who] made their appearance on Anthonies Creek… and massacred 
a part of two families, burnt their dwellings and out buildings, killed their 
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and Clear Station.25 The Indian war that both sides had initially feared was 
not only underway, but was now being embraced by some British officials on 
the frontier. 
In order to support Burgoyne’s planned campaign to isolate New England 
from the rest of the colonies, British agents such as Superintendent for Indian 
Affairs Henry Hamilton began arming and motivating Native tribes in the Ohio 
and Great Lakes regions. Thousands of Native soldiers initially supported the 
Crown expedition in 1777. Relations quickly became strained however, and 
unrest reached a head following the murder of a Loyalist woman, Jane 
McCrea, most probably at the hand of Wyandots who squabbled over the 
prize they were to receive for successfully delivering her to the British camp. 
Mindful of losing Native support, Burgoyne refused to punish those 
responsible for the killing. Not only did the massacre of McCrea lead to a 
cooling of relations between the Natives and the British, but it also provided a 
fresh propaganda coup for the Patriots. When Burgoyne complained about 
the treatment of the 1,000 Crown prisoners taken after the battle of 
Bennington – including the summary executions of Loyalists – General 
Gates’ reply made sure to reference McCrea’s murder: 
That the famous Lieutenant General Burgoyne… should hire 
the savages of America to scalp Europeans and the 
descendants of Europeans, nay more, that he should pay a 
price for each scalp so barbarously taken, is more than will be 
believed in England… Miss McCrae, a young lady lovely to the 
sight, of virtuous character and amiable disposition, engaged to 
be married to an officer of your army, was… carried into the 
woods, and there scalped and mangled in the most shocking 
manner.26 
The response was widely reprinted throughout the colonies and added yet 
more grist to the mill of Patriot propaganda. For Burgoyne it was only one 
among a slew of missteps and misfortunes; Burgoyne alienated both local 
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colonists and his Native American allies at every turn.27 The killings inflicted 
by the Natives also also helped to ensure that ‘hundreds of militiamen from 
northern New England and New York turned out to oppose the British 
advance.’28 By October 1777 Burgoyne and the remains of his army, trapped 
and alone in the frontier wilderness, had been forced to surrender, ultimately 
leading to French intervention and turning the tide of the war. 
Burgoyne’s defeat ended large-scale British campaigning in upstate New 
York. This left the door in the north-west open to the frontier warfare many on 
both sides had both feared and predicted. The Crown pursued a policy of 
coordinating Loyalists and allied Native Americans from the Province of 
Quebec, which had resisted a Patriot invasion in 1775. The British 
government, through agents like Hamilton, then expanded this campaign and 
sponsored its partisans to harass and attack Patriot-held settlements, 
particularly focussing on the fertile Mohawk Valley. Prominent Loyalist John 
Butler established a corps of volunteers known as Butler’s rangers to conduct 
raids, assisted primarily by the Seneca tribesmen led by Iroquois chiefs 
Cornplanter and Sayenqueraghta, as well as Mohawks commanded by 
Joseph Brant. 
Accusations of Massacre at Wyoming 
 
Besides a successful raid by Brant on the settlement of Cobleskill in May 
1778 – one that resulted in five men being burned alive and the mutilation 
and possible torture of others – the first military engagement on the northern 
frontier since Saratoga occurred in early July, after John Butler and his joint 
Native-Loyalist party pushed into the Wyoming Valley. 29 After convincing the 
Patriot militia garrisoning Fort Wintermute to surrender, Butler then laid an 
ambush for a larger force gathering at nearby Forty Fort. He had Wintermute 
torched to make the militia and the small Continental Army unit 
accompanying them believe the Crown troops were withdrawing, luring them 
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into attacking his exposed rangers. The rangers held their fire until the militia 
had been drawn to within a hundred yards, and Butler’s Natives had 
infiltrated their left flank via nearby marshland. When the ambush was sprung 
the militia panicked and attempted to flee. Of the 360 Patriots caught in the 
counter-attack no less than 302 were killed, including 34 officers and nearly 
all the Continentals. Butler reported to Colonel Bolton, British commander at 
Fort Niagara, that his men had taken 227 scalps and just five prisoners, 
adding ‘the Indians were so exasperated with their loss last year near Fort 
Stanwix that it was with the greatest difficulty I could save the lives of those 
few.3031 
Following the action Forty Fort surrendered. Butler retained control of his 
men, having the liquor in the fort destroyed before they could lay hands on it. 
Besides a few cases of plundering, none of the locals or the surrendering 
soldiers were harmed. Butler himself appears to have been pleased by the 
restraint shown by those under his command, writing ‘what gives me the 
sincerest satisfaction is that I can, with great truth, assure you that in the 
destruction of the settlement not a single person was hurt except such as 
were in arms, to these, in truth, the Indians gave no quarter.’32 Nor does his 
report seem to have been the case of a commanding officer wilfully 
overlooking his men’s excesses. A local wrote afterwards that ‘happily these 
fierce people, satisfied with the death of those who had opposed them in 
arms, treated the defenseless ones, the woman and children, with a degree 
of humanity almost hitherto unparalleled.’33 
If Butler and at least some of those living in the area felt that the Crown 
Forces had behaved with moderation, that was certainly not the view that 
spread beyond the Wyoming Valley in the days and weeks afterwards. 
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Despite the fact Butler ‘managed to protect surrendering survivors among 
militia as well as civilians’ the Patriots ‘cried massacre. They exaggerated the 
number of dead to four hundred and embellished lurid stories of atrocity.’34 
There were accusations that Butler had ordered non-combatants confined to 
their homes while the buildings were torched, and that a Native American 
woman with the expedition had ‘lined up 15 prisoners, each held by two 
warriors, around a great rock and then personally tomahawked each victim 
one by one.’35 Such stories are perhaps understandable given the valley’s 
inhabitants ‘grieving and destitute… could easily have embellished their own 
very real misfortunes with tales of even greater horror.’ 36 The narrative 
certainly fitted easily into preconceived colonial notions about Indian warfare. 
As well as helping vent the grief of the defeated it provided an opportunity for 
Patriot authorities to lambast the British for finding common cause with such 
perceived wickedness. Wyoming was described as a massacre or a battle 
‘depending on which side tells the tale,’ an aspect by now familiar for almost 
every contentious engagement during the war.37 Barbara Graymont, in her 
study of the Iroquois during the Revolution, points out – perhaps with a little 
too much simplicity but certainly the ring of truth – that ‘whites have always 
been prone to label any overwhelming Indian victory a massacre and to call 
any of their own battle triumphs over Indians a great victory.’38 
Such was the price in public perceptions that the British paid for allying 
themselves with the Native tribes. Nor did the accusations that the Wymoning 
Valley had been the scene of a massacre desist after the war. As we have 
seen with many other incidents, the action became part of the wider 
nineteenth century remembrance of the revolutionary struggle. Quoting 
Butler’s claim that his men had behaved well following the clash, one author 
in 1858 scathingly wondered ‘what became of those who were taken 
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prisoner? What became of the wounded… they were all massacred in cold 
blood, with the exception of two who lived to return.’39 Similarly, in 1809 
Scots poet Thomas Campbell, in his popular piece Gertrude of Wyoming, 
described Joseph Brandt as a monster, incorrectly believing he had been 
present at the engagement. He wrote of how he and ‘his howling desolating 
band’ had ‘left of all my tribe, Nor man, nor child, nor thing of living birth: No! 
not the dog, that watch'd my household hearth, Escap'd, that night of blood, 
upon our plains!’40 
While the idea of Wyoming as a massacre persisted – ‘accounts abounded of 
the wonton slayings, torture of captives, and sufferings of exposed women 
and children fleeing through the swamps.’41 Yet, though it remained a 
minority, not all nineteenth-century commentary supported the accusations of 
murder levelled at Butler or Brant. One work in 1893 made an observation on 
the nature of massacres in general, categorising the massed killing of military 
combatants as less damning than the massed killing of civilians: 
This tale of horror was eagerly circulated to throw odium upon 
the loyalists, and has been repeated with little variation down to 
the present day. Undoubtedly there was a “massacre” at 
Wyoming, but it was of strong men flying from a lost battle, not 
of prisoners or helpless women and children as they 
represented.42 
Once again, the accusations of massacre would have a profound and 
measurable impact on future military engagements – indeed, ‘the 
representation of the Wyoming Massacre would produce far more bloodshed 
than the attack itself.’43 As we have seen from their letter in December 1778, 
the Seneca took the claims that they had slaughtered civilians to heart, angry 
that they were the subjects of aspersions despite having shown restraint, as 
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well as the fact that Patriots captured at Forty Fort had later reneged on their 
parole and joined raiding parties in retaliatory attacks on Native settlements. 
Following the attack on Wyoming Butler’s rangers and Brant’s Natives 
successfully struck at settlements at German Flats, Shawnee Flats and 
Lackawanna. On all three occasions the civilian population was spared, a 
fact that ensured the attacks were ‘usually omitted from retellings’ and 
ignored by settlers ‘to cry up the “massacre” of Wyoming.’44 Stories of the 
exaggerated massacre helped fuel an expedition by Patriot Colonel Thomas 
Hartley, whose ‘pure raids against civilians’ killed both British-allied and 
neutral Natives with a view ‘to retake the fertile Wyoming Valley for the 
settlers.’45 The cycle of frustrations and retaliatory killings on the north- 
western frontier continued to escalate throughout the year, with the Iroquois 
becoming incensed that men they had earlier paroled ‘continued attacking 
and agitating against the Iroquois, often from the American stronghold of 
Cherry Valley.’ One early twentieth-century writer characterised it as a 
‘summer of terror’ when ‘society was clove asunder.’46 The bloodshed, 
destruction and displacement along the frontier came to focus on this 
particular area, ensuring that ‘Cherry Valley was a vortex of internecine 
violence by the fall of 1778.’47 
Massacre at Cherry Valley 
 
Cherry Valley was a strategically placed community on the headwaters of the 
Susquehanna River, sited in an geographic locale that made it difficult for 
Crown Forces to operate with impunity out of Fort Niagara. It has been 
described as ‘one of the finest settlements on the entire frontier and the 
principal settlement south of the Mohawk’ – the fertile land provided supplies 
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stronghold for the Patriots of upstate New York.48 Removing the protection 
the settlement offered and seizing its supplies became the objective of a joint 
British-Loyalist-Native raid in late 1778. Understanding the need to help 
sustain their allies particularly when Patriot retaliation threatened their ability 
to continue to wage war, British officials in Niagara sanctioned the attack with 
a view to easing the pressure mounting amongst the Iroquois. In order to 
take the settlement two companies of Loyalists commanded by John Butler’s 
son, Walter Butler, combined with Native Americans led by their own chiefs 
and Brant, and a company of British regulars from the 8th Foot. The Native 
contingent consisted again primarily of Senecas, but also included Mohawks 
under Brant, Cayugas, Onondagas, Delawares and Tuscaroras. Many of 
them had been involved in resisting the earlier raids of Thomas Hartley, and 
were primed for retaliation against an enemy they viewed as duplicitous and 
ruthless.49 
The operation began badly – command of the expedition was fraught. Butler 
and Brant quarrelled, Butler seemingly jealous of Brant’s ability to attract 
Loyalist recruits while his own rangers were lacking in manpower, while Brant 
appeared doubtful of Butler’s leadership qualities during his first solo 
command. Brant was on the brink of leaving, but was convinced to carry on 
by members of his own band. He did, however, lose control of ninety of his 
Loyalist volunteers, who deserted the expedition after Butler chose to 
threaten them over supplies. By the time they descended on the settlement 
the number of combatants involved in the raid likely sat around 640.50 
Having essentially surrendered control of his Native allies by making an 
enemy of Brant, Butler would be unable to dissuade the Seneca from the 
main reason they had joined the expedition – revenge. The multitude of 
issues that had exasperated the Seneca – the insults of Patriot officers who 
claimed they’d committed atrocities at Wyoming, those who’d broken their 
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parole and the burning of Native American villages, at least one of which was 
peaceful and not actively involved in the conflict – all combined to create the 
very real threat that the violence at Cherry Valley would escalate beyond 
control.51 The specific need to retaliate differentiated the Cherry Valley raid 
from those that had occurred earlier in the year, and ensured an increasingly 
familiar outcome regarding the treatment of civilians and surrendering 
soldiers. 
Cherry Valley was defended by a palisade fort held by a garrison of 
Continental Army regulars, but their commander, Colonel Ichabod Alden, had 
refused to act on reports that Crown Forces were planning an attack on his 
post. He continued to live with many of his officers in a house outside the fort, 
belonging to a family called the Wells. Having captured the Patriot piquets 
without raising the alarm the night before, the Loyalists began their attack 
early on 11 November, splitting their efforts between the fort and Alden’s 
billet. The Wells house was quickly overrun. Alden was killed while fleeing 
from the house to the fort, supposedly tomahawked by Brant himself. 
Including Alden, sixteen Continentals died in or near the Wells house. This 
time the Seneca who led the attack did not stop at enemy combatants, swiftly 
adding the entire Wells family, trapped inside their home, to the list of 
casualties despite their personal friendship with Brant. 
The other attack against the fort palisade failed to carry it, so instead the 
Seneca turned their aggression on the rest of the settlement, this time 
ignoring pleas from Butler and Brant to show restraint. Up to thirty-two non- 
combatants were killed, and the Loyalists were left protecting the Continental 
garrison in the fort. Nor were the casualties restricted to those with Whiggish 
sympathies. A number of defenceless Loyalists were also murdered, with 
Brant having to personally intervene on behalf of those he knew to be 
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The settlement outside of the fort was put to the torch. The horror for the 
inhabitants was not at an end though – at least seventy were carried off into 
captivity the next day. After efforts by Brant around forty were allowed to 
return a day later, most of them Loyalists. Others were less lucky – one 
elderly woman was tomahawked by her captors when she could not keep up 
with the group.53 
Accounts of the incident were universal regarding the nature of the attacks on 
non-combatants. Captain Benjamin Warren, as we have seen, stepped from 
the safety of the fort the day after the raiding party had withdrawn, and found 
himself in murderous desolation. Unlike Wyoming, where Brant had been the 
subject of much criticism from the Patriots despite not actually being present, 
this time it was Butler who received the greatest public censure. One 
commentator told of rumours of ‘between 30 & 40 Women & Children 
butchered in the most unheard of manner,’ and that Brant had disapprovingly 
told the ruthless Butler that ‘he would never have a hand in Massacring the 
Defenceless Inhabitants.’ The account closed by claiming that ‘had the British 
leaders or the British King been actuated by Sentiments of this sort the 
American War would not have been Stained with such unparalleled cruelty, 
nor the name of Briton so justly execrated throughout these States.’54 
Walter Butler himself could not deny that he had lost control and a massacre 
had taken place, though he also blamed the untruths spread about the earlier 
engagement at Wyoming. In a letter to the British commander of Fort Niagara 
he lamented that: 
Not withstanding my utmost precautions to save the women 
and children, I could not prevent some of them falling victim to 
the fury of the savages… The death of the women and children 
on this occasion may, I believe, be truly ascribed to the rebels 
having falsely accused the Indians of cruelty at Wyomen. This 
has much exasperated them, and they are still more incensed 
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their arms, soon after marched into their country intending to 
destroy their villages.55 
The incident was picked up by both Patriot commanders and colonial 
periodicals – one author has even gone so far as to claim that the failure of 
nearby Patriot forces to respond to rumours of the raid indicates that 
‘someone in authority surmised that another “massacre” like Wyoming would 
be good for propaganda purposes.’56 While such a degree of ruthlessness is 
surely unfounded, Patriot sources did, naturally, take up the opportunity to 
repeat the atrocity narrative, lent extra verve by the fact that this massacre 
was the work of Britain’s Native allies. General James Clinton of the 
Continental Army wrote a scathing letter directly to Walter Butler after 
detaining members of his family, stating that: 
The enormous murders committed at Wyoming and Cherry 
Valley would clearly have justified a retaliation; and that your 
mother did not fall a sacrifice to the resentment of the survivors 
of those families who were so barbarously massacre, is owing 
to the humane principles which the conduct of their enemies 
evinces a belief that they are utterly strangers to.57 
Clinton’s emphasis on restraint conforms to the by now well-established 
Patriot desire to carefully highlight both the brutality of Crown Forces and 
their own juxtaposed humanity. Patriot periodicals mirrored Clinton’s 
language. The New Jersey Gazette reported two weeks after the attack that 
‘the enemy killed, scalped, and most barbarously murdered, thirty-two 
inhabitants, chiefly women and children, also Colonel Alden… They 
committed the most inhuman barbarities on most of the dead… the 
lieutenant-colonel, all the officers and continental soldiers, were stripped and 
drove naked before them.’58 As it had done at Paoli and would do again at 
Waxhaws, the name of the engagement soon became synonymous with 
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massacre and the refusal to take prisoners; ‘Cherry Valley quarter’ was 
supposedly the cry of one of the Patriot-allied Oneida who killed and scalped 
Walter Butler himself in 1781.59 Both Wyoming and Cherry Valley were 
invoked by Patriot officials and officers to help promote the later Sullivan 
expedition, framing the campaign as ‘avenging the “massacres”’ and 
‘righteous retaliation for Wyoming and Cherry Valley.’60 Once again, a 
massacre had taken place that would continue to claim lives for years 
afterwards, and have an impact far greater than the numbers of either 
perpetrators or victims would suggest. 
Race and the Normalisation of Frontier Massacres 
 
While horror at the events of Cherry Valley resonated throughout the 
colonies, the frontier conflict witnessed numerous similar incidents 
overlooked by the popular press in the east. Bloodshed, the destruction of 
property and wide-scale displacement fed into the cycle of violence that both 
predated and outlived the revolution, helping to frame acts of massacre as 
the norm. Such activities were also fuelled in no small part by the Patriot 
atrocity narrative, that ran into overtime attempting to enhance and exploit  
the bloodshed, thus helping to perpetrate a cycle of violence. Thus ‘Patriot 
publicity helped create a milieu that made conditions ripe for atrocity.’61 
During the period, while active fighting (and its attendant diseases) claimed 
roughly one in every 1,000 colonists living east of the Appalachians, in places 
such as Kentucky in the west as many as one in every 70 settlers were 
killed.62 Events like the killings and retaliations in the Wyoming Valley 
resulted in the inhabitants of that locale having ‘lost more friends and kin than 
they could possibly bury.’63 
Massacres also helped decide who became engaged in the fighting, and thus 
the wider war. Colonists were encouraged to enlist by Congress in order to 
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defend their homes, and Patriot soldiers were encouraged to retaliate, 
influenced by ‘the fearsome stories of Indian massacres.’64 Individual 
atrocities likewise decided the loyalties of whole tribes. The murder of 
Shawnee chief Cornstalk at Fort Randolph by Patriot militiamen in late 1777, 
for example, ended the efforts of a part of the Shawnee tribe to remain 
neutral, and brought them in on the side of the British. Lenape chief White 
Eyes, whose people actually supported Congress, was also murdered in 
1778, with the Patriots claiming he had died from smallpox in an effort to 
appease their Lenape allies. Such killings ‘usually just provoked the 
survivors’ followers to swell the vicious cycle of death and destruction.’65 The 
racial components of the murders were also clear; all conflicts on the frontier 
held at the very least an undercurrent of racial hatred, and it would not be 
inaccurate to call the fighting before, during and after the revolution ‘a racial 
war without mercy.’66 
These racial and ethnic tones are not difficult to trace in the reprisals that 
exacerbated the extreme violence of the frontier. After Cherry Valley it was 
clear that ‘the type of Indian war the Whigs feared the most had become a 
reality.’67 The damage wreaked by Native and Crown forces had begun to 
affect Patriot operations further east, diverting attention from the Continental 
Army’s operations against the British around New York. ‘The Wyoming 
Massacre of 3 July 1778 and the Cherry Valley affair of 11 November created 
turmoil along the frontier and eventually evoked a response’ – the following 
year the Patriots conducted a series of systematic reprisals known as the 
Sullivan expedition. 68 Conceived of by Washington and organised by his 
staff, its objectives were, according to Washington himself: 
The total destruction and devastation of their settlements and 
the capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as 
possible. It will be essential to ruin their crops now in the 
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ground and prevent their planting more… But you will not by 
any means listen to [any] overture of peace before the total ruin 
of their settlements is effected.69 
Washington, of course, was no stranger to Indian warfare, having fought both 
against and alongside Natives numerous times during the Seven Years War. 
From June to September 1779 John Sullivan and his troops ravaged Iroquois 
settlements, torching over 40 villages and destroying large stocks of supplies 
required by the Natives during the winter months. Nor did the Patriots bother 
to differentiate a great deal between those tribes of the Iroquois that had 
aligned themselves with the British and those who had come down on their 
own side – several friendly settlements were destroyed, and the annihilation 
of supplies had as great an effect on their own Native American allies as it 
did on their foes. Ultimately the ravages of the Sullivan expedition ‘hardened 
Iroquois antagonism toward the US’ and served to bring groups like the 
Seneca and the Cayuga – targeted by Sullivan despite the neutral status of 
some of their villages – ‘further into alignment with the British.’70 In one 
particularly brutal incident two villages that had avoided allying to either side, 
at Coshicton and Lichtenau were burned, a chief named Red Eagle was 
murdered and all the males over the age of twelve were executed.71 
Race-based antagonisms also extended to the attitudes of white combatants 
towards one another. Those British and Loyalist soldiers who commanded or 
sponsored Native military activity earned particular ire from their colonial 
enemies. Loyalists and British officers and officials operating alongside 
Natives also used the greater freedom they enjoyed while serving on the 
frontier to perpetrate the massacre of their enemies. At Cherry Valley 
‘rangers were certainly active in the massacre’ and possibly killed more than 
the Natives they blamed for the bloodshed.72 Clinton’s letter to Butler 
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emphasises the barbarity of the Loyalists in comparison with their allies, with 
the Continental officer writing that: 
I should hope, for the sake of human nature and the honor of 
civilized nations, that the British officers had exerted 
themselves in restraining the barbarity of the savages. But it is 
difficult even for the most disinterest mind to believe it, as 
numerous instances of barbarity have been perpetrated where 
savages were not present – or, if they were, the British forces 
was not sufficient to restrain them, had there been a real desire 
to do so.73 
Another Patriot recalled how, in the wake of the battle of Oriskany in August 
1777, he was taken prisoner: 
A Lieutenant in the Indian department came up in company with 
several other tories, when said Mr. Grinnis by name, drew his 
tomahawk at this deponent, and with a deal of persuasion was 
hardly prevailed on to spare his life. He then plundered him… 
and other tories following his example, stripped him almost 
naked with a great many threats, while they were stripping and 
massacreing [sic] prisoners on every side… on being brought 
before Mr. Butler, Sen. [Walter Butler’s father] who demanded 
of him what he was fighting for; to which this deponent 
answered “he fought for the liberty that God and Nature gave 
him, and to defend himself and dearest connexions from the 
massacre of savages”… several prisoners were taken forward 
towards the enemy’s head-quarters with frequent scenes of 
horror and massacre, in which tories were as active as well as 
savages… That Lieut. Singleton, of Sir John Johnson’s 
regiment, being wounded, entreated the savages to kill the 
prisoners, which accordingly they did.74 
Indeed, conceiving of frontier Loyalists as more detestable than Natives 
became a common motif for Patriot writers throughout the war. One account 
claimed that ‘an Indian having refused to kill an infant as it lay smiling in the 
cradle, the more savage loyalist, rebuking the compassion of the red man, 
thrust it through with his bayonet.’75 Another story told of Brant returning a 
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captured child with a letter stating ‘I do not make war on women and children. 
I am sorry to say that I have those engaged with me in the service, who are 
more savage than the savages themselves.’76 The lyrics of a song published 
in the Pennsylvania Packet in 1780 capture the attitude of Patriots towards 
their American enemies, stating that Britain, ‘to take our lives and scalps 
away, the savage Indians keeps in pay, and Tories worse, by half, than 
they.’77 
For their own part, Loyalists were often happy to imitate Natives while on 
campaign. At the purported Wyoming massacre, for example, ‘many of the 
Europeans dressed as Natives.’78 Just prior to the attack at Cherry Valley 
Colonel Alden reported that he had captured ‘two of Brant's party, who ware 
Collecting Cattel at the Butternuts for Brant. Ware Clothed and painted Like 
Indians.’79 In 1781 Loyalist William Sommer admitted that during a raid ‘we 
were all painted and equipped like Indians as were all the Tories belonging to 
the party.’80 Such an act was far from uncommon – Brant’s ‘volunteers 
regularly dressed as Iroquois, donned war paint, and took up Iroquoian 
customs. The Americans, ever apt to exaggerate and sensationalize, 
consistently presented these Tories as bona fide Mohawks.’81 One Patriot 
militiaman recalled ‘Tory fiends & Indian massacre. - There were more 
indeed & more [indecipherable word] then danger & injury from the British 
Army by whom they were encouraged, sometimes assisted & always 
communicated with from those British forts.’82 While aping Native dress and 
customs handed a propaganda victory to the Patriots, at least some Loyalists 
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the ‘plausible deniability it lent their European commanders’ – Loyalists 
perpetrating massacres while dressed as Natives could be more easily 
dismissed as auxiliaries by British officers, beyond accountability and 
reproach.83 
Walter Butler harnesses the powers of deniability in a letter refuting 
accusations of massacre, writing first that ‘we deny any cruelties to have 
been committed at Wyoming, either by whites or Indians’ and then that ‘the 
inhabitants killed at Cherry Valley does not lay at my door – my conscience 
acquits.’ Aware of the Patriots’ capacity to publicise Crown brutality, he 
considered himself ‘under the disagreeable necessity to declare the charge 
unjust and void of truth, and which can only tend to deceive the world, though 
a favorite cry of the Congress on every occasion, whether in truth or not.’84 
Regardless of their efforts to shift the blame, British officers in command of 
Natives and Loyalist irregulars risked harsh treatment when they fell into the 
hands of the Patriots. Encouraging the massacre of white settlers could 
mean forfeiting the rights usually afford to European officers. This is most 
clearly apparent with the fate of Henry Hamilton, one of the war’s most 
prominent British Superintendents of Indian Affairs. Hamilton was installed at 
Detroit just after the revolutionary war had begun, and by 1777 was putting 
into practice the broader British policy to bring the Native tribes into the 
Crown Forces fold, arming them and providing officers to direct their efforts in 
the field. His role in coordinating Native attacks in Ohio and Kentucky earned 
him the moniker ‘hair-buy general’ among the rebels, following reports that he 
was paying Natives to bring in the scalps of frontier settlers.85 In 1778, as 
well as laying the groundwork for a grand alliance of pro-British northern and 
southern Native tribes, Hamilton personally led an expedition over 600 miles 
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to retake Fort Sackville at Vincennes, which had fallen to the Patriots earlier 
that year. 
Hamilton was then taken by surprise when another Patriot expedition, led by 
George Rogers Clark, returned to Vincennes in February of 1779. In order to 
seize Vincennes Clark employed the frontier brutality that was so familiar to 
both sides. Knowing that he would be unable to either storm the fort or starve 
its garrison into submission, Clark sought to intimidate Hamilton into 
surrender. Four Native prisoners were ‘tomahawked in full view of the 
townspeople and the fort,’ before being scalped and dumped into the nearby 
river. Clark then met with Hamilton to discuss terms while ‘covered in blood 
and sweat’86 and ‘boasted of his part in the massacre.’87 He exaggerated the 
size of his own force, claimed he could barely restrain his men from storming 
the fort, and made dark hints about Hamilton’s complicity in unleashing 
unrestrained Indian warfare on the frontier.88 
All of this proved too much for Hamilton, and he agreed to Clark’s demands. 
Doing so provided little relief for either him or his men. Contrary to the 
surrender agreement, a number of Hamilton’s soldiers were bound and he 
himself barely avoided several attempts by Clark’s associates to murder him. 
He spent over a year in miserable prison conditions in Williamsburg, 
Virginia.89 
The order of the Virginia Council of State that confined him provides a good 
indication of the consequences for those perceived to have incited Native 
massacres against American colonists. Among numerous other accusations 
against Hamilton it claimed he ‘gave standing rewards for scalps, but offered 
none for prisoners’ and recommended that he ‘be put into irons, confined in 
the dungeon of the publick jail, debarred the use of pen, ink, and paper, and 
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excluded all converse except with their keeper,’ a sentence that went against 
eighteenth-century codes of conduct regarding captured officers.90 
The council also used the opportunity to reinforce the longstanding belief that 
Britain’s representatives in the colonies had been acting with undue prejudice 
since the beginning of the war, stating that ‘the conduct of the British officers, 
civil and military, has in its general tenor, through the whole course of this 
war, been savage and unprecedented among civilized nations.’91 Such 
declarations echoed the sentiments being espoused by the atrocity narrative 
since the early days of the Boston shootings, and were in step with numerous 
previous comments about British barbarism, from Saratoga to Paoli. 
Whilst maintaining the image of the British as excessively cruel remained a 
priority, the reality by 1779 had changed slightly, as expressed by 
Washington privately in his correspondence with Thomas Jefferson. 
Speaking on the wider treatment of Patriot prisoners since General Clinton 
had assumed overall command of British operations in North America, 
Washington admitted ‘that there will be no necessity for a competition in 
cruelty with the enemy. Indeed it is but justice to observe, that of late, or 
rather since Sir Henry Clinton has had the command, the treatment of our 
prisoners has been more within the line of humanity, and in general very 
different from that which they experienced under his predecessors.’92 This 
represents a scaling back of the violent conduct of the British Army from the 
years 1777 and 1778, and shows an understanding of importance of the 




90 “Order of Virginia Council of State Placing Henry Hamilton and Others in Irons, 16 June 
1779,” Founders Online, National Archives, last modified November 26, 2017, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0097. [Original source: The 
Papers of James Madison, vol. 1, 16 March 1751  – 16 December 1779, ed. William T. 
Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962, 288– 
292.] 
91 Ibid. 
92 “To Thomas Jefferson from George Washington, 23 November 1779,” Founders 
Online, National Archives, last modified November 26, 2017, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-03-02-0217. [Original source: The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 3, 18 June 1779 – 30 September 1780, ed. Julian Boyd. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 198–199.] 
157  
Clinton, who once wrote to George Germain stating that ‘to gain the hearts 
and subdue the minds of America was in my opinion worthwhile.’93 
Regarding Hamilton’s specific treatment, Washington initially had no 
sympathy for him and believed his involvement in orchestrating Indian 
warfare warranted his imprisonment. Again writing to Jefferson, he stated 
that ‘I have no doubt of the propriety of the proceedings against Governor 
Hamilton… Their cruelties to our unhappy people who have fallen into their 
hands—and the measures they have pursued to excite the savages to acts of 
the most wanton barbarity—discriminate them from Common prisoners, and 
most fully authorise the treatment decreed in their case.’94 
One month later however, Washington changed his opinion on Hamilton’s 
treatment. He wrote to Jefferson saying that regardless of the fact that his 
confinement was ‘founded in principles of a just retaliation’ he had come to 
be of the opinion that ‘Mr Hamilton could not, according to the usage of War 
after his Capitulation, even in the manner it was made, be subjected to any 
uncommon severity.’ He went on to say that ‘Whether it may be expedient to 
continue him in his present confinement from motives of policy and to satisfy 
our people… it may be proper to publish all the Cruelties he has committed 
or abetted… that the World, holding his conduct in abhorrence, may feel and 
approve the justice of his fate. Indeed, whatever may be the line of conduct 
towards him, this may be adviseable.’95 
More interesting than Washington’s change of tack is the fact that he felt the 
need to address the opinions of ‘our people’ – regardless of Hamilton’s part 
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in stirring up Native American violence, the fact that he was hated on the 
frontier was something the upper echelons of the Patriot leadership wished to 
factor into their decision making. In Washington’s view leaving Hamilton in 
severe custody was acceptable provided the duplicity and cruelty the Patriots 
accused him of could be made public knowledge. 
Other realities also drove Washington’s thinking – on 29 August he received 
a letter from British General Frederick Haldimand that threatened retaliation 
against Patriot prisoners if Hamilton’s situation wasn’t ameliorated, and on 13 
September he wrote to Jefferson ‘respecting the measures which have been 
taken in the Case of Lieutenant Govener Hamilton and the enemys intentions 
of retaliation in Consequence. By this your Excellency will be able to Judge 
how far it may be expedient to relax in the present treatment of Mr 
Hamilton.’96 97 Ultimately, while Hamilton’s conditions were improved he 
continued to be viewed as someone who had ‘united the foes of liberty with 
the enemies of civilisation’ and whose close relationships with the Native 
tribes had subverted his privileges as a gentleman.98 
Racial antagonisms not only affected relations among Europeans and their 
descendants, but continued to fuel the cycle of bloodshed between whites 
and Natives. Such violence often only adopted military aspects as a veneer, 
and frequently resulted in killings that had little to no relation to the war 
objectives of either side. Never was this more apparent than with the 
massacre that occurred at the settlement of Gnadenhutten a little over two 
years after Hamilton’s capture – arguably the most appalling massed killing 
not only of the frontier war, but of the entire revolutionary conflict. 
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The Gnadenhutten Massacre 
 
The Christian Lenape who lived at Gnadenhutten had done their best until 
1782 to remain neutral and adhere to the pacifistic beliefs of their Moravian 
sect. The wider Delaware tribes had found themselves in a fatal position, 
trapped between the Patriot stronghold at Fort Pitt and Hamilton’s operational 
frontier headquarters at Fort Detroit. In response the Lenape had divided, 
with some supporting one side or the other while a third faction sought to 
avoid the conflict altogether. 
Attempts at neutrality didn’t save the Moravians. The frontier’s isolation from 
the directives of either side’s high commands allowed colonial settlers to 
pursue local vendettas, seize land and indulge racial prejudices. The 
outbreak of the revolutionary war elsewhere in the colonies simply 
accentuated the pre-existing pattern on the frontier and provided either a 
distraction or a sufficient degree of legitimacy for settlers to conduct attacks 
on Native Americans. By the end of the war ‘common settlers had come to 
reject ineffectual patronage and embrace the power that autonomy and 
violence conferred in a revolutionary crucible.’99 
Such attitudes aggravated Continental Army officers and regiments that were 
deployed to the frontier, who often had little to no direct experience of frontier 
warfare. Such were the difficulties faced by the Continental Army’s Daniel 
Brodhead, who commanded much of the frontier from Fort Pitt when the 
Gnadenhutten incident occurred. Despite growing up in a Pennsylvanian 
settlement that had withstood frequent Native attacks, Brodhead had 
experienced the war up until 1779 in the settled regions of the colonies, 
participating in the battle of Long Island and the Philadelphia campaign. He 
was promoted to commander of the Western Department, and while very 
active in attacking the settlements of Natives who had aligned themselves 
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pursue personal vendettas, particularly when they attacked neutral or even 
pro-Congress tribes. 
It was one such attack that resulted in the massacre at Gnadenhutten. In late 
1781 the pacifist Moravian Lenape were forced to relocate by Crown-allied 
Natives. They returned in February 1782 to harvest crops, but were set upon 
on March 7 by a force of Patriot militia who accused them of trading with the 
British. The militiamen held a mock trial and voted to kill the men, women and 
children they had seized. The Natives were informed of the decision and 
were allowed the night to prepare. The next day the men were separated 
from the women and children, and led to two separate houses. Inside the 
militia proceeded to murder the captives. In all nearly 100 people, including 
over thirty children, were killed and scalped.100 The only survivors were two 
children, one of whom escaped and lived despite having also been scalped. 
In his detailed study of the massacre, Rob Harper contextualises the militia’s 
violence around societal pressure and struggles for personal status rather 
than a basic, ill-defined concept of “Indian hating.” Previously the killings had 
been interpreted as the inevitable product of long-running frontier enmity 
between white settlers and Natives. Harper argues that, as with all 
massacres, the militiamen involved had motives beyond simple-minded 
animosity, and casting it as base hatred devalues both the importance of the 
event and at least some of the autonomy of its perpetrators. He attempts to 
‘extend the study of anti-Indian violence beyond the motives of perpetrators 
and a generalized notion of “Indian hating.”’101 In doing so he shows that the 
leader of the Washington County militia was ‘encouraging aggression against 
Indians… reasserted his authority as commander while diverting settler 
hostility away from himself and the government he served’ while the actual 
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militia officer leading the expedition feared his position was so tenuous that 
he left the Natives’ fate open to a vote among his men. In all the frontier 
militia’s ‘bullying approach to local democracy’ worked to give those with a 
desire for violence the means to inflict it without social censure. 102 103 
The blanket idea of Gnadenhutten as aggression without intentions also 
overlooks the possibility that a majority of the militia didn’t actually want to be 
involved in the massacre.104 Some left rather than follow through with it, and 
one told of a ‘Nathan Rollins & brother [who] had had a father & uncle killed 
took the lead in murdering the Indians, ...Nathan Rollins had tomahawked 
nineteen of the poor Moravians, & after it was over he sat down & cried, & 
said it was no satisfaction for the loss of his father & uncle after all.’105 
Regardless of how numerous the perpetrators were, the lack of anonymity in 
the ballot held to decide what to do with the Moravians meant that ‘the 
region’s intolerant, bullying political culture surely discouraged them from 
speaking out.’106 Because of this ‘a relatively small pro-massacre faction 
prevailed not because of the popularity of their proposal but because those 
who could have stopped them chose to look the other way.’107 In short, the 
nature of the militia’s organisation on the frontier helped remove the social 
barriers that otherwise might have inhibited massacre, and ensured that 
incidents like Gnadenhutten became a likely consequence of frontier fighting, 
rather than the shocking irregularities they should have been. 
There were no tangible military objectives behind the Gnadenhutten killings. 
The massacre acted as a pressure valve that eased personal tensions within 
the settler community involved in them. Race combined with the personal 
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difficulties being experienced by frontier leaders to subverted rational military 
activities in favour of feeding the cycle of violence that, without the racial 
component, might have been more easily broken or moderated, as it had 
been in the east by Henry Clinton in 1779. More clearly than any massacre in 
the settled parts of the colonies at least until 1780, events like Gnadenhutten 
exemplified Leveine’s hypothesis that ‘massacre is a function of grass-roots 
fears, anxieties or even violent impulses which find their focus.’ 108 Wherever 
Native Americans were involved in the war, moderation was almost always 
overtaken by those more violent desires because, simply put, ‘once Native 
Americans and whites came into conflict along the frontier, political 
considerations took second place to racial enmity.’109 In the east until 1780 
massacre made for an exception that often received censure. In the west it 
was overlooked as an activity that enabled the more aggressive members of 
frontier militias and local commanders to exercise their authority. 
Gnadenhutten received little in the way of censure among whites in the 
immediate aftermath of the killings. Though ‘some people on the eastern 
seaboard were appalled by the massacre’ – including Benjamin Franklin, who 
wrote of his ‘infinite Pain and Vexation’ on the matter whilst still laying the 
blame upon ‘a single Man in England, who happens to love Blood, and to 
hate Americans’ – those living on the frontier were generally altogether more 
comfortable when it came to the perpetration of massacres.110111 Indeed, in 
the sparse frontier communities that lived around the Sandusky region ‘the 
murders were generally and popularly approved of.’112 Almost all newspaper 
reports on Gnaddenhutten ‘imparted no moral judgement on the attackers 
whatsoever… like the murder of Cornstalk and other Indian allies throughout 
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the war, the din of reports in favour of taking swift action against British-allied 
Indians drowned out protests of Gnadenhutten.’113 Massacres like 
Gnadenhutten emphasised the active steps some Patriots took in ensuring 
the atrocity narrative as only a one way story, as they ‘condemned atrocities 
by the British and their Indian allies while turning blind eyes and deaf ears to 
any rumours of those committed by their own side.’114 
Conversely, for many Natives Gnadenhutten became a rallying cry in the 
same way that the Patriots had harnessed Cherry Valley. Parkinson writes 
that ‘blood continued to spill long after Cornwallis’s surrender. Gnadenhutten 
was primarily the reason why. Ohio Indians were furious at what had 
happened.’115 The last years of the revolution saw a resurgence in Native 
military activities, and ‘atrocities, frequent before the Gnadenhutten 
massacre, became commonplace thereafter.’116 As well as acting as a clear 
motivating factor among Native efforts to oppose the rebel colonists, ‘the 
massacre of Christian Indians in Ohio in 1782 made cumulative the feeling of 
the Delawares and Shawnese and other north-western Indians that 
Christianity was to be distrusted.’117 The slaughter of the Moravians had 
‘triggered an Indian revival, not only of the nativistic argument but also of that 
practice that had been suppressed by cooperation with the British: the ritual 
torture of prisoners.118 Those believed to have been involved in ‘the Moravian 
Indian holocaust’ were tortured and killed out of hand, often to the dismay of 
the British. Like other massacres further east, the killings at Gnadenhutten 
precipitated an onslaught of even greater bloodshed.119 
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Settlers came to know 1782 as the bloody year. A retaliatory wave of 
violence unleashed by Gnadenhutten swept across the frontier, resulting in a 
spate of engagements and killings that was totally out of step with the de- 
escalation of military operations occurring further east. One of the most 
prominent victims of the post-Gnadenhutten fervour was the Continental 
Army’s Colonel William Crawford. In 1782 Crawford, a wealthy and prominent 
Virginian, was persuaded to come out of retirement to lead a Patriot 
expedition into the Ohio country, specifically to force Native tribes such as  
the Wyandott away from the banks of the Sandusky river. The members of 
the expedition made no secret of their violent intentions towards the Natives, 
claiming they would completely exterminate the Wyandott.120 
Aware of Crawford’s plans, a joint force of Natives and British rangers met 
the Patriots on the Sandusky Plains. Held at bay and then surrounded, the 
rebel militia attempted to break out as darkness fell on 5 June. The militia’s 
discipline collapsed and ‘an “every man for himself” mentality seized the 
fleeing frontiersmen. Individual survival depended on getting ahead of others. 
Wounded compatriots, neighbours, and even friends were abandoned to 
distract the savages.’121 
Here then was the unravelling of the bullying, might-makes-right attitude 
explored by Harper’s study of the militia at Gnadenhutten. In the chaos 
Crawford himself, along with dozens of others, were captured. He and a 
number of the prisoners were taken to a Delaware village. A friend of 
Crawford’s wrote that memories of the Gnadenhutten massacre were the 
direct cause for his treatment – ‘it was said the Moravian Indians suffered 
greatly & which was supposed to have been the cause inflicted on him at the 
time of his death.’122 After his involvement in atrocities committed against the 
tribes had been described, Crawford was tortured – shot with blank rounds, 
his ears sliced off, and then had burning pieces of wood applied ‘to his naked 
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body, already burned black with the powder.’ He was forced to walk over 
burning coals, scalped, and ‘continued in all the extremities of pain for an 
hour and three quarters, or two hours longer, as near as I can judge.’ 
Eventually he died and was cremated. His fate was related by a fellow 
captive who managed to escape before his own execution. Other prisoners 
were also killed and their decapitated remains staked around the Shawnee 
town of Wapatomica.123 
Crawford’s fate resonated beyond the minor impact it had on the course of 
the war, and the story of his death became inflated by colonial outrage. A 
ballad entitled Crawford’s Defeat was written not long after the war. Though 
the lyrics varied depending on the version being performed, none held back 
on the details of torture, and most ended with declarations such as ‘let 
everyone rise to revenge Crawford’s blood; And likewise the blood of those 
men of renown, That were taken and burnt at the Sundusky towns.’ Its 
appearance in print in 1791 gives an indication of its uses, for it was 
published alongside another ballad – Saint Clair’s Defeat: A New Song. The 
subject of this latter tale was the destruction of a US Army expedition under 
General Arthur St. Clair by Natives during the Northwest Indian War, an 
event decried as a massacre and one which shocked the American public. 
The transference of the story of Crawford’s defeat from a frontier piece to a 
nationwide audience was because even years later it could still be used as ‘a 
piece of anti-British, anti-Indian propaganda’ at a time when it had once more 
become highly relevant. The 1791 story of Crawford’s death served the exact 
same purpose it had during the revolution, harnessing the anger settlers felt 
at perceived Native barbarism and keeping the racial flame hotly burning.124 
Indeed, the popularity of the subject of British-sponsored massacres by 
Native Americans remained high for decades after the end of the 
Revolutionary War. Purcell has written of how ‘memories of Revolutionary 
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War Indian-fighting… played a significant role in legitimizing aggression 
against the Shawnee and other native peoples throughout the 1780.’125 The 
outbreak of the War of 1812 in particular saw a new wave of aggression 
towards Native tribes. With Natives and redcoats once more fighting side-by- 
side against Americans, stories such as the 1813 report that ‘accused British 
military officers of being responsible for the massacres of American prisoners 
of war by Native Americans’ were very much in vogue – both Federalists and 
Republicans united to have 5,000 copies of the report printed.126 Even more 
relevant were the direct comparisons made with massacres perpetrated 
during the Revolutionary War. The New York newspaper the Ontario 
Messenger, for example, printed an article entitled ‘British Massacres’ that 
provided ‘documentary evidence relative to the Anglo-Indian massacres in 
the war of the revolution.’127 It is interesting to note that the massacres in 
question are from a hoax article written by Benjamin Franklin in 1782 and not 
properly identified as a complete forgery until 1854.128 Memories of the 
revolution’s massacres, especially its so-called Indian massacres helped to 
‘generate support for the war and encourage Federalists to renounce their 
Anglophilia.’129 
British officials understood the dangers involved in being aligned with Native 
tribes during the Revolutionary War, especially as the conflict worsened. 
Despite insincere efforts by some British Indian Department officers to 
discourage the killing of prisoners, the practice of ritualised torture followed 
by executions was firmly established among a number of tribes in the months 
after Gnadenhutten. Hamilton’s successor at Detroit, Arent De Peyster, 
encouraged white officers serving with the Natives to ‘endeavour to convince 
those Nations that by persisting in acts of retaliation they will in the end draw 
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mischief upon themselves and upon their posterity… but if they make war 
agreeable to the example set them by their father and brothers the English 
they will always find themselves supported against their enemy.’130 Fears 
about massacres being committed by their allies further hampered British 
relations with the Natives as the war progressed. The Governor of East 
Florida, Patrick Tonyn, exemplified this when he complained to Howe about 
Native raids and demanded that larger contingents of rangers be deployed 
alongside them, stating that ‘I could hardly have employed the Indians to lay 
waste Georgia, butchering indiscriminately men, women and children, which 
would have been the case had they acted by themselves.’131 This was from a 
British official who tended to enjoy a more positive relationship with the local 
tribes than most. Echoing similar difficulties, the Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs for the British in Nova Scotia, Michael Franklin, worried in 1780 that 
tribes would defect without more financial backing, claiming that he had been 
paying for tributes out of his own pocket but could no longer continue 
because he would ‘risk the ruin of my family.’132 
British officials went so far as to threaten the complete withdrawal of all 
military assistance should the executions that followed Gnadenhutten 
continue. De Peyster attempted to explain why killing captives not only 
roused the frontiersmen against the Crown but also denied him potentially 
valuable intelligence; ‘I am pleased when I see what you call live meat, 
because I can speak to it, and get information. Scalps serve to show that you 
have seen the enemy; but they are of no use to me. I cannot speak with 
them.’133 His entreaties were unsuccessful; the torture of prisoners, aimed 
primarily at those believed to have committed atrocities against Native 
peoples, ‘would persist throughout the 1780s and into the early 1790s.’134 By 
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1782 the support the Crown could offer its Native allies on the frontier was 
negligible anyway.135 Britain’s inability to truly mitigate frontier violence had 
diluted its efforts and turned many settler communities against the Crown, 
regardless of the retaliation of the militias. For some, massacre was already 
a way of life, ingrained in cultural memory. 
The very separate nature of the war and the powerful legacy of massacres in 
the west was further emphasised by the ongoing Native campaigning in the 
closing years of the war. While Yorktown crushed the efforts of Britain’s 
regulars in North America, loose confederations of northern and southern 
tribes struck with renewed vigour. The largely successful efforts to unite 
Native peoples against the rebelling colonies meant that the western theatre 
remained insulated from reversals elsewhere, and ‘from the final years of the 
Revolution through the critical engagements of 1794, the Indians of the north- 
west trained their guns with more consistency, more unity, and more 
consequence than did any other Indians in the history of the United  
States.’136 In doing so they also ‘settled old scores with appalling 
efficiency.’137 The successes in the latter years of the war were met with 
approval by the British, and with Crown commanders in Quebec and Detroit 
urging more raids – ‘ranger units stayed in the field, along with young 
Delawares, Shawnees, Iroquis, and Cherokees, blanketing the frontier.’138 In 
1780 the destruction of so many settlements in the north-west became  
known as the burning of the valleys, while in November 1781 a force of 
Loyalists and Natives lead by Loyalist Captain William Bates – known to his 
enemies as Bloody Bates – attacked Patriots at Gowan’s Fort, sometimes 
called Thompson’s Fort or Thompson’s Plantation. After the defenders had 
surrendered, the Crown soldiers ‘killed and horribly mutilated almost every 
man, woman, or child who had taken refuge within the stockade.’139 A British 
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strike in Kentucky further devastated the fledgling settlements there. In 1780 
it had been reported that a thousand families inhabited the new territory, but 
within a few years the number of people still living in Kentucky could be 
numbered in the few hundreds.140 
In November 1781 – after Yorktown – the Hurons and the Shawness were 
pleading with British commanders to provide them with troops and cannons 
for an ambitious attack on Fort Pitt, hoping to take the Patriot frontier 
fastness and ‘bury the bones of their friends that lay in piles around it.’141 
Brant also attempted to continue the war after the Treaty of Paris was 
announced, but eventually ceased when the British stopped supplying him. 
Similarly, Frederick Haldimand, the British governor of Quebec, wrote as late 
as February 1783 of: 
a speech and determination from the Six Nations Indians, so 
strongly expressive of their resentment of, and determination to 
retaliate the late barbarity committed by the Virginians, in the 
total destruction of a Shawnee settlement (Standing Stone 
village) and the indiscriminate massacres of all its inhabitants, 
that I think it my duty to the king’s service to communicate their 
resolutions to you, for the purpose of representing to General 
Washington the fatal consequences which must unavoidably 
follow the unwarranted advantage which has been taken of my 
restraining the light troops and Indians.142 
Haldimand also complained that he could not ‘passively look on and see their 
[the Iroquois] country ravaged, their women and children murdered for their 
attachment to the royal cause.’143 Another British officer, Allan McLean, 
posted at Niagara, commented on the difficulty of curtailing a fresh wave of 
violence among the local tribes, and his fears that the Patriots would take 
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So the bloodshed continued. At Blue Licks on August 19 1782, a Crown 
Forces raiding party routed the Kentucky militia. The Patriots called the battle 
a massacre. In retaliation George Rogers Clark had five Shawnee villages 
burned, while four years later a Shawnee chief, who hadn’t been present at 
the battle, was publicly murdered for ‘Blue Licks.’ The cycle of violence went 
on.145 
The fighting on the western frontier following Gnadenhutten showed that ‘the 
Indians of the Old Northwest held the initiative in 1782.’146 This was mirrored 
across the west. In the north the Iroquois had largely recovered from 
Sullivan’s campaign, while in the south the Chickamauga had broken with the 
wider Cherokee in order to continue the struggle with the colonists. While the 
British had failed to translate this broad reversal of fortunes to the wider war, 
it had left their Native allies in a position to continue to campaign indefinitely. 
And campaign they did, if the intensive violence up and down the frontier in 
the decade following the end of the revolution was anything to go by. Besides 
the more formal conflicts between the United States and the Indian nations, 
between 1783 and 1795 around 1,500 settlers were killed, wounded or 
seized in raids and retaliations. ‘Seldom did a week pass without some 
account of horror in the West’ being reprinted in the colonial press.147 From 
the butchering of the Russ family to the massacre of a dozen settlers at Big 
Bottom, Ohio, and the murder of Cherokee chieftains at Chilhowee in 
retaliation for the killing of the Kirk family, the 1780s and early 1790s saw 
little if any notable decrease in violence on the frontier. Nor did the spatial 
distance insulate the wider United States from what was happening on its 
borders – ‘massacres were widely reported in the East to the goriest detail,’ 
and the fully-fledge military campaigns of Harmer in 1790, Saint Claire in 
1791 and Wayne in 1793 kept the bloody state of the frontier firmly in the 
public consciousness.148 
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On the frontier, more so than anywhere else, massacre was commonplace. 
The fighting was characterised throughout ‘by brutality and atrocity on both 
sides… quarter was rarely given.’149 Where the killing of surrendering 
soldiers or the torture of prisoners generated angry letters and outraged 
newspaper articles, pamphlets, broadsides and declarations in the east, in 
the west the cold-blooded murder of women and children almost seemed to 
have an air of inevitability about it. Massacres like Gnadenhutten, while 
meeting a degree of negative commentary, ultimately could not avoid ‘the 
force of communal values endorsing these events.’150 Even at the start of the 
revolution, such atrocities were a given in a place where violence played a 
central role in lives that were too physically removed from the law and order 
of the interior. 
It is with good reason that North America’s Native population have often been 
described as the biggest losers of the Revolutionary War. Those Natives on 
the defeated side would be left entirely exposed to the retribution of the 
victors, while those who backed the winner had little hope of seeing the terms 
of their alliance honoured. Remaining neutral was an impossibility given the 
scale of the conflict, and incidents like Gnadenhutten showed that refusing to 
take sides simply made Native American tribes more vulnerable. The Indian 
wars that followed immediately on from the revolution further cemented the 
idea that Natives Americans were forever the natural enemy of the newly- 
formed United States. In the Revolutionary War's fledgling historiography 
Britain's use of Natives was a tangible example of their betrayal of the 
colonies. The savage aspects of the frontier conflict were laid eternally at the 
feet of the British government, and in the consciousness of the new United 
States the triumph of the Patriots became the invented triumph of decency 
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This fitted with the wider narrative that came with the conflict's sanitisation in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his book on the crisis the 
Revolutionary War created among Native communities, Colin G. Calloway 
noted that: 
In the emerging national memory of the Revolution, 
responsibility for the brutality and destruction of the 
Revolutionary War on the frontier lay squarely on the shoulders 
of the Indians and their British backers… After the war, lurid 
accounts tended to increase rather than diminish… Stories of 
Indian atrocities became implanted in the minds of an entire 
generation.151 
Stereotyping and invention shaped the nation's ideas regarding its 
revolutionary birth, and acted as the foundation for part of the war's 
justification. While many of the other atrocities committed during the war 
were marginalised by nineteenth century writers in their efforts to create a 
purer image of the country's contested birth, the massacres committed on the 
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Chapter Five: Waxhaws and Haw River 
 
Slaughter was commenced before Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton 
could remount another horse, the one with which he led his 
dragoons being overturned by the volley… The loss of officers 
and men was great on the part of the Americans, owing to the 
dragoons so effectually breaking the infantry, and to a report 
amongst the [Loyalist] cavalry, that they had lost their 
commanding officer, which stimulated the soldiers to a 
vindictive asperity not easily restrained.1 
Banastre Tarleton wrote the preceding passage in his 1788 history of the 
British campaigns in the Carolinas and Virginia. He was describing, in third 
person, his view of what became perhaps the most infamous massacre in 
North America since the Boston shootings – the annihilation of a column of 
Continental Army regulars near the border between North and South 
Carolina, in the Waxhaws area close to the settlement of Lancaster. 
That battle, brief and bloody, would set the tone for renewed British 
operations in the south between 1780 and 1781. It was the final major phase 
of the revolutionary war, and one defined, like the opening in 1775, by 
massacre. It was at this stage that the conflict morphed more clearly into a 
civil war than at any other point – communities, neighbours and family 
members turned against one another as the British presence allowed the 
venting of animosities that often predated the five years of revolutionary 
struggle. In his memoirs Patriot commander Henry Lee recalled that ‘in a civil 
war no citizen should expect or desire neutrality. Whoever attempts to place 
himself in that condition misunderstands human nature, and becomes 
entangled in toils always dangerous – often fatal.’2 And so it proved for 
thousands of the inhabitants of the southern colonies – people were 
murdered in their beds and on their doorsteps, kangaroo courts passed death 
sentences, houses were burned and property wrecked or stolen on a wider 
and more sustained level than at any other time in the conflict. Sometimes 
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the combatants were not even clearly aligned to one side or the other as ‘old 
feuds were settled under the banner of patriotism… British hopes for a 
peaceful occupation vanished in the smoke of burning barns and houses.’3 
The chaos that engulfed parts of the Carolinas during this third phase of the 
conflict was further exacerbated by British officers in the field who appeared 
to have little regard for the more conciliatory desires of the likes of 
Cornwallis, Clinton and Germain. Tarleton was only one of ‘a set of younger, 
ruthless British leaders of Loyalist forces in the south who would have a 
disproportionate impact on the ways the war was fought and perceived.’4 
Men like James Wemyss, Francis Rawdon and Patrick Ferguson, all young 
and ambitious men, seemed more concerned with punishing the rebels and 
furthering their own careers in the British Army than they were with bringing 
the American colonies back into the imperial fold. Tarleton summarised the 
general attitude of mid-ranking British officers in a letter to Cornwallis in 
1780; ‘If warfare allows me, I shall give these disturbers of the peace no 
quarter. If humanity obliges me to spare their lives, I shall convey them close 
prisoners to Camden. For confiscation must take place in their effects. I must 
discriminate with severity.’5 Unfortunately for the royal cause, discriminating 
with severity did nothing to earn the hearts and minds spoken of by Clinton to 
Germain, yet officers like Tarleton were the vital players in the southern 
campaigns of 1780 and 1781. They helped stir up a crescendo of violence 
that included a spate of massacres that ultimately pushed Cornwallis to his 
doomed Virginia campaign, and Yorktown. 
This chapter is primarily focussed on the massacres at Waxhaws in 1780 and 
Haw River in 1781. Both events again provide examples of the very tangible 
military impact of massacres upon the wider war. They also show the 
divergent effects massacres could have – in the case of Waxhaws, Patriot 
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resistance was bolstered by the outrage generated by the engagement, while 
Haw River helped to break the morale of Loyalists in North Carolina. Both 
massacres also act as a starting point for examining the degeneration of 
British efforts in the south, with an out-of-control cycle of violence ultimately 
undermining efforts of subdue the rebellion. The nature of the southern 
colonies as slave-holding societies is also established – similar to the frontier, 
whites were haunted by the possibility (though rarely realised) of massacre, 
albeit at the hands of their enslaved peoples rather than Native Americans. 
Such an environment added a febrile racial dynamic to the large-scale 
campaigning in the southern colonies in 1780 and 1781. 
Slavery and the Southern Spectre of Massacre 
 
By the second half of 1779 it was apparent that the British were losing the 
war. Defeat at Saratoga and the subsequent French and Spanish entry into 
the conflict turned what had been a test of British commitment to its imperial 
experiment in America into a global emergency. The colonial rebellion had 
survived the tribulations of the years 1776 to 1778 and emerged stronger. 
Howe’s inability to destroy the Continental Army or permanently defeat 
Washington had lead to his replacement by Sir Henry Clinton. Public support 
for the war in Britain, often lukewarm at best, was waning rapidly. 
The British government, in concert with its high command, decided on one 
last gamble. Germain and the king both believed that of all the North 
American colonies south of Quebec, those of Virginia, North and South 
Carolina, Georgia and the Floridas were the most disaffected towards 
Congress. British strategists acted on this belief to formulate what became 
known as the southern strategy. The plan was ostensibly simple – invade the 
Carolinas with a body of regulars, raise the royal standard, and then harness 
the Loyalist population that came forward once their Patriot oppressors had 
been cowed. Success centred upon the army’s ‘ability to defeat or contain 
Whig forces, to give the widest support possible to the counterrevolutionary 
activities of loyalist forces, and to protect the lives and property of loyal 
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citizens.’6 In reality the strategy proved to be highly flawed, and the obstacles 
to its completion insurmountable. There was no genuine, uniform loyalty 
amongst most of the southern colonial population, and the Crown Forces 
sent there became mired in a conflict that their presence only exacerbated.7 
As their initial target, the British would have struggled to pick a more stratified 
colony than the South Carolina in 1780. By the outbreak of the Revolutionary 
War, slavery defined the culture in both the Carolinas and in Virginia. In 
South Carolina especially the population had been majority enslaved since 
1708. During the Revolution it was the only colony where most of the 
inhabitants were African or of African descent, with the majority of the 
enslaved population located around the low country and coastal regions. The 
white population knew that their ‘ability to command the labour of their slaves 
was the essential source of their wealth,’ a fact that didn’t always appear to 
be at the forefront of British military planning. 8 Invading South Carolina thus 
resulted in a conflict that has best been described as ‘a complex triangular 
process involving two sets of white belligerents and at least twenty thousand 
– probably more – black slaves.’9 
 
The fact that British upper echelons didn’t seem to properly appreciate this 
element lead to a failure to consider white attitudes towards the prospect of 
slave rebellion and insurrection. In the south as a whole during the mid 
eighteenth century slaves constituted between 40 and 60 percent of the 
population.10 Colonists remained in constant fear over the prospect of revolts 
and the implied threat of massacre. While militias and the bearing of arms 
had long been associated with colonial antagonism towards Native 
Americans, in places such as the South Carolina low country the suppression 
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of uprisings among the slave population was a greater concern than the 
threat of incursion by tribes such as the Cherokee, and the hunting of 
runaways a far more common occupation that combat with Natives. Fears 
about slave rebellion – and the worsening oppression which they helped to 
create – had been realised in 1739 when a group of African-born slaves 
gathered near Stono River, South Carolina, broke into a storehouse, seized 
arms and ammunition and killed two storekeepers. They then marched south, 
presumably with the objective of reaching the then-Spanish colony in Florida, 
which offered freedom to escaped slaves in the hope of agitating revolt in the 
British colonies further north. Along the way they killed several dozen whites 
and freed more slaves, until eventually they were engaged by the South 
Carolina militia near the Edisto River. Despite fierce resistance the escapees 
were defeated and scattered. Most were executed and their body parts put 
on display, while some were sold back into slavery in the West Indies.11 
White outrage at such uprisings was universal. An account of the Stono 
rebellion, written as part of the larger official report on the failed British attack 
on Saint Augustine, claimed the escaped slaves had ‘massacred twenty- 
three whites after the most cruel and barbarous manner to be conceived.’12 It 
also captured the mood of a white planter class terrified at the prospect of the 
massacres they believed would be unleashed by slave revolts: 
On this occasion every breast was filled with concern. Evil 
brought home to us, within our very doors, awakened the 
attention of the most unthinking. Every one that had any 
relation any tie of nature; every one that had a life to lose, were 
in the most sensible manner shocked at such danger daily 
hanging over their heads.13 
Such panic lead to a worsening of the conditions faced by slaves thanks to 
the 1740 Negro Act, which among other articles forbade them from 
assembly, learning to read or growing their own food, and specified that 
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masters had to ensure a ratio of at least one white to every ten enslaved 
persons on their plantations. The period just prior to the revolution was even 
more fraught as far as white Southerners were concerned; Sylvia Frey’s 
studies have found that ‘during the two decades beginning in 1765, slave 
unrest was more intensive and widespread than in any previous period.’14 
The continual fear and occasional bouts of outright panic speak of the 
particular nature of southern society at the outbreak of the Revolutionary 
War. As should be expected, such a conflict didn’t just drastically affect the 
balance of the slave societies in the south – a great deal of the conflict was in 
fact fought through the prism of slave-holding concerns themselves, and that 
included the looming threat of massacre. 
This aspect was illustrated by events in November 1775. As Washington 
tightened the noose around British-held Boston, most Crown authority in the 
south had been confined to Royal Navy ships in harbours such as Charleston 
and Yorktown. The Virginia House of Burgesses declared that the royal 
governor of Virginia, the Earl of Dunmore, had resigned his post due to his 
flight from Williamsburg to HMS Fowley. In response Dunmore issued an 
incendiary proclamation that, besides announcing martial law and 
proclaiming all seditionists in the colony traitors to the British Crown, declared 
‘all indentured servants, Negroes, or others… free that are able and willing to 
bear arms.’15 The fact that it was this particular clause which resulted in the 
most outrage not only in Virginia but throughout the colonies indicates the 
primacy of slaveholding in southern colonial life and the terror that memories 
of revolts like Stono River induced – a terror that Dunmore was deliberately 
attempting to heighten. Dunmore ‘seized upon the idea of intimidating 
independence-minded white southerners with the threat of a slave rising 
without, however, actually inciting once’ – a tightrope he found impossible to 
walk.16 Like later British policy makers throughout the war, he proved tone- 
deaf to majority colonial sentiment and fatally underestimated the Patriot 
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propaganda machine, failing to appreciate that a short-term military gain 
could have far more debilitating long-term consequences. 
In December the Virginia Convention responded to Dunmore, stating that all 
runaway slaves who did not return to their masters within ten days would be 
hung, and also seeking to re-establish some sort of moral high ground by 
criticising Dunmore’s hypocrisy in only offering liberty to the slaves of 
rebelling masters, while he himself owned slaves that would not see freedom 
under his proclamation. Despite this, within a month hundreds of enslaved 
people had seized their freedom and made their way to the only two 
remaining enclaves of royal authority between Virginia and the Floridas – 
Tybee Island at Savannah and Sullivan’s Island outside Charleston. This 
further outraged whites in the South, most acutely the planter class to whom 
‘it may have seemed as if the empire had turned upside-down… now the 
forces of the king seemed a font of lawlessness and anarchy.’17 In his 
desperation to avert the loss of control by offering a limited emancipation, 
Dunmore had hardened the south’s most influential and powerful social strata 
against the British cause. 
With the conditions of enslaved peoples playing a prominent role in the 
escalation to open conflict in the south, it should be no surprise that they 
were also involved in the first military engagements of the war there. In 
November 1775 Patriots, disguised as Natives, attacked the fugitive slave 
camp on Sullivan’s island, killing some and recapturing others in an action 
that would certainly have been decried as a massacre were the roles 
reversed.18 Meanwhile at the battle of Great Bridge Crown Forces included 
Dunmore’s newly-raised Ethiopian Regiment, the largest force of escaped 
slaves to be engaged in combat during the war. Dunmore ‘used his black 
recruits to raid the Virginia coast, and his black soldiers aided hundreds of 
slaves to escape, sometimes assisting the evacuation of entire plantations.’19 
Fears of massacre by freed slaves and hatred towards the British authorities 
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responsible for freeing them ran rampant and helped to foment the rapid 
deterioration into unchecked violence. The Dunmore proclamation had 
‘united almost all of the shocked whites as Patriots determined to win 
independence from British rule.’20 
This was the situation that Crown Forces found themselves thrust into at the 
start of 1780 when they arrived by ship outside of Charleston. Britain’s 
hypocritical attitudes towards slavery had ended up ‘infuriating even Loyalist 
whites, intensifying white solidarity, and thus contributing to British defeats.’21 
Because of this there was no permanent Crown presence in either the 
Carolinas or Virginia prior to Clinton’s second invasion. 
The Waxhaws Massacre 
 
Despite this, the new British campaign was initially effective. Clinton 
succeeded in 1780 where he had failed in 1776, taking Charleston along with 
its 5,000-strong Continental Army garrison. This combined with Tarleton’s 
victories over the Patriot militia at Monck’s Corner and Lenud’s Ferry 
produced the near-complete destruction of organised Patriot forces in South 
Carolina. Following Charleston’s surrender the only resistance to British 
occupation was to be found in a Continental Army detachment that had been 
on its way to reinforce the town, commanded by Colonel Abraham Buford. 
Learning of Charleston’s fall, Buford began to retreat towards North Carolina. 
Cornwallis, under orders from Clinton, dispatched Tarleton to destroy the 
column. 
Tarleton force-marched his men across 104 miles of rough Carolina 
countryside in fifty-four hours to catch up with Buford, losing men and horses 
to fatigue along the way. When he realised he wasn’t going to escape, Buford 
turned at bay in the Waxhaws region, close to the North Carolina border. 
Tarleton demanded Buford’s surrender, which Buford refused. The British 
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then mounted a single charge through the lightly forested terrain. Buford 
unwisely ordered his men not to fire until the enemy cavalry were as close as 
ten yards away, a directive that ensured the horsemen of the British Legion 
and the 17th Light Dragoons reached the enemy almost entirely unscathed. 
The Patriot line collapsed upon contact, with only the left flank managing to 
hold out for any length of time. 
It would appear that the most important casualty of the single Patriot volley 
was Tarleton’s horse. The British Legion’s commander stated that ‘slaughter 
was commenced before Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton could remount another 
horse, the one with which he had led his dragoons being overturned by the 
volley.’22 The claim that he was unhorsed by the Continentals’ only volley 
and thus could not exercise restraint on his men could be taken as a 
convenient excuse, but does match his predilection for leading from the front. 
This exemplifies Tarleton’s foremost fault as a combat commander, namely 
his apparent need to become personally engaged in any action he was 
involved in. Fighting the pro-patriot Stockbridge Natives in August 1778, 
Simcoe described how Tarleton ‘had a narrow escape; in striking at one of 
the fugitives, he lost his balance and fell from his horse; luckily, the Indian 
had no bayonet, and his musket had been discharged.’23 Similarly, at 
Blackstocks Farm Tarleton finished the battle with his helmet shot away and 
multiple bullet holes in his coat, and in a skirmish just prior to the battle of 
Guildford Courthouse he lost two fingers to a Patriot musket ball – Tarleton, 
answering Colonel Lee’s questions about various prisoners he had taken, 
‘apologized for not writing himself, saying that he had received a ball in his 
right hand in our morning rencontre,’ and wrote to his brother in England 
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arguable more closely involved in personal combat than any other British 
officer of equivalent rank throughout the war, but while this certainly created 
a strong bond with the men of his Legion – who had started ‘viewing him as 
their champion’ – it left him unable to do much more than issue the initial 
order to charge.26 In smaller engagements like Monck’s Corner, Lenud’s 
Ferry and Fisherdam Ford such an order, properly timed, was usually all that 
was needed, but it left Tarleton ill-suited to any larger command, a fact laid 
bare at Cowpens. 
Fortunately for Tarleton, one charge was enough to break the Continentals at 
Waxhaws. It was at this point, as the Legion cavalry crashed home, that 
Buford belatedly decided to send forward a white flag. Accounts fail to agree 
either who carried it or what their fate was. Buford says only that ‘I sent a flag 
to the commanding officer to offer a surrender which was refused in a very 
rude manner.’27 Writing almost forty years after the battle, Buford’s adjutant, 
Henry Bowyer, claimed he’d been the one who carried the flag, and was 
about to parlay with Tarleton when the British officer’s horse was shot. ‘The 
exasperated colonel rose from the ground, and ordered the soldiers to 
dispatch him. They immediately gathered round, and several cuts were made 
at him, which he had the good fortune to parry and avoid.’ He went on to 
describe how he made good his escape, assisted by the fire of a nearby 
platoon of Continentals.28 Another eyewitness also writing decades after the 
battle, Patriot surgeon Robert Brownfield, identified another man as bearing 
the white flag, one Ensign Cruit, who he said ‘was instantly cut down,’ 
seemingly in defiance of Buford’s claim that the bearer of his white flag 
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that the Ensign Cruit – who we know to have been a part of Buford’s 
command – survived the battle.29 
In the most forensic study of the battle to date, Jim Piecuch argues that 
Buford probably did send forward a subordinate with a flag seeking terms, 
but that the bearer was unable to find Tarleton, who had been unhorsed at 
the beginning of the battle, and was quite possibly turned away by 
subordinate Legion officers who didn’t have the authority to accept a 
surrender.30 Regardless of the confusion surrounding the flag’s particulars, 
two points that would have an important bearing on what happened next 
remain clear – that Tarleton had been shot from his horse and was not in a 
position to exercise any sort of authority, and that in the scattered, confused 
fighting in woodland terrain, some elements of both sides were aware that 
the Continentals were formally surrendering, while others were not. Indeed 
the Moravians living in nearby Salem left behind a record of Patriot soldiers 
at the battle fighting on despite the surrender, an account that has been 
wholly overlooked by studies of the battle until now. Johann Michael Graff 
wrote in his diary that Patriot fugitives from the battle, passing through 
Salem, described how ‘they had been surrounded by the English, and laid 
down their arms, but as the English commander rode up one man seized a 
gun and shot at him, and then the massacre began.’31 This fresh description 
from a neutral source adds credence to the belief that not all Patriots 
genuinely surrendered when they had the opportunity. 
The recipe for bloodshed was clear, and numerous later Patriot sources 
testify towards a massacre. Bowyer writes that ‘a dreadful massacre of the 
detachment followed.’32 Brownfield describes: 
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A scene of indiscriminate carnage never surpassed by the 
ruthless atrocities of the most barbarous savages. The demand 
for quarters, seldom refused to a vanquished foe, was at once 
found to be in vain; – not a man was spared… they went over 
the ground plunging their bayonets into every one that exhibited 
any signs of life, and in some instances, where several had 
fallen one over the other, these monsters were seen to throw 
off on the point of the bayonet the uppermost, to come at those 
beneath.33 
While Bowyer and Brownfield were both writing many decades after the 
event and with full knowledge of the place the battle came to occupy in the 
pantheon of Revolutionary War massacres, Buford himself also related 
murderous intent among the victors in a report written just days after the 
battle, claiming ‘two third of the officers and soldiers that were form’d in 
battalion killed and wounded many of which were killed after they had lain 
down their arms.’34 
It is difficult to be certain of this statement’s accuracy given that we know 
Buford fled rapidly after the start of the battle, but a large number of pension 
claims by Patriot participants in the action do show a high number of grievous 
wounds. One reported ‘a bayonet ran in his breast, and his arm and head 
severely wounded by the sword,’ another ‘four wounds, one by a bayonet 
through his arm one in his head and right wrist both by a sword,’ while 
another ‘had been wounded in nine different places.’ 35 36 37 There are 
dozens of similar statements, many describing wounds that indicate the 
bloody work of the sword and the bayonet and which are reminiscent of the 
depositions collected after the Tappan massacre. While this alone is not an 
indication of a massacre – we have already seen Patriot aversion to the 
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bayonet, and willingness to demonise its use in the same way that British 
commentators sometimes bemoaned the rifle – it does provide further 
evidence that, for so short an engagement, between such relatively few 
combatants, the human cost in dead and wounded was shockingly high. Of 
the 420 members of Buford’s column that were engaged 113 were killed and 
150 wounded, a casualty ratio of over 60%, well in excess of most other 
engagements during the war. 38 In the absence of much contemporary 
commentary, such figures are damning. In short, ‘were it not for the tell-tale 
casualty ratio one might be inclined to view American propaganda about this 
episode in the same light as Paoli and Tappan.’39 
Piecuch argues that there were almost no Patriot sources specifically calling 
the battle a massacre in its immediate aftermath of the battle, citing a number 
of writers who had heard rumours of the engagement but said nothing 
regarding stories of undue bloodshed. Identifying that ‘the “massacre” 
question is at the heart of our understanding of Waxhaws,’ he cites two key 
reasons for describing it as such, reasons that could be applied to many 
cases of bloodshed throughout the war; firstly, that the battle ‘served as a 
cautionary tale of British ruthlessness and perfidy that could keep the 
wavering in the Revolutionary camp,’ and secondly, that it ‘provided a 
defence for Americans who carried out their own acts of wanton brutality and 
violent terror.’ 40 41 
Other authors have also hit out against the claims of massacre, despite the 
high Patriot casualties. In his encyclopaedia of the American Revolution, 
Mark M. Boatner III wrote that ‘the propaganda-inspired uproar about a 
“massacre” has obscured the brilliance of Tarleton’s pursuit and attack… 
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able to fight off a tired enemy he outnumbered two to one.’42 John S. 
Pancake, in his history of the war in the Carolinas, wrote that ‘reports that 
Tarleton’s men bayoneted the wounded are hardly consistent with the fact 
that the British paroled the wounded… the Patriots were naturally anxious to 
overlook the fact that the British, bone-weary from their forced march, had 
defeated a force that outnumbered them three to two.’43 Hoock, meanwhile, 
writes that ‘while the encounter was perhaps not the atrocity of historical 
legend, Patriots quickly dubbed it Buford’s Massacre. Their new battle cry… 
helped them explain, if not justify, future atrocities as revenge.’44 
While there are champions of Tarleton and his Legion in relatively recent 
historiography, conducting a forensic discussion of whether Waxhaws was or 
wasn’t a massacre perhaps runs the risk of missing the wider, more salient 
point backed up by authors such as Hoock or John Buchanan, who wrote 
that ‘whatever specifically happened at the Waxhaws on that tragic day of 29 
May 1780 is eclipsed by the perception of the Rebels far and wide that 
indeed a massacre of helpless men had occurred.’45 Patriot sources soon 
began using accounts of the battle as a rallying cry, and in doing so won a 
propaganda victory that could be described as definitive for the war in the 
south. Much like Boston in 1770, the value of stories of the massacre of 
Buford’s column outweighed the material impact of the event itself. In this 
case, the tale of John McClure is instructive. A young militiaman who was in 
the process of disbanding following the fall of Charleston, he called in with 
some friends at the house of one John Gaston, where: 
He and his friends received intelligence of the shocking 
massacre of Colonel Bradford’s [Buford’s] men, by Tarleton, 
two days previous… on the reception of this news, he (Captain 
McClure), and three of said Gaston’s sons, and Captain John 
Steek, I think, arose upon their feet and made this united and 
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solemn declaration: “that they would never submit not surrender 
to the enemies of their country; that Liberty or death, from that 
time forth, should be their motto!”46 
In his History of the United States of America, Bancroft claims that the 
Patriots ‘making no resistance, sued for quarter. None was granted… the 
tidings of this massacre carried through the southern forests mingled horror 
and anger.’47 While Bancroft’s account is an inaccurate repeat of older Patriot 
myths of the battle, his emphasis on the propaganda effect involved in the 
concept of massacre is key. More modern studies of the campaigns in the 
south have acknowledged Waxhaws as a decisive moment during Britain’s 
southern strategy, one that initially escaped British commanders: 
Accounts of the Waxhaws Massacre reverberated through the 
backcountry with talk of “Bloody Ban” Tarleton and British 
barbarism. In terms of strategic communications and the loss of 
the “hearts and minds” of the populace, the Waxhaws affair’s 
ramifications had not been recognized by Crown authorities.48 
It wasn’t long before Patriots in the south coined the phrases Tarleton’s 
quarter and Buford’s play to invoke the killing of prisoners and a desire for 
vengeance, mirroring the Paoli’s quarter and remember Paoli cries that had 
precipitated Patriot attacks at Germantown and Stony Point, or the shout of 
Cherry Valley quarter that preceded Walter Butler’s death. The Whig press 
also took up the cry with its usual alacrity. In July 1780 the Maryland Journal, 
and Baltimore Advertiser published what it claimed to be an account of a 
Continental Captain, Adam Wallace, who was killed after his surrender. The 
British and Loyalists ensured that ‘instead of meeting with that reception 
which the feelings of humanity dictates, or that clemency which our 
conquered foes have ever received at our hands, no quarters were given.’49 
Within a few months Waxhaws ‘became symbolic of British barbarity’ and the 
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battle, along with ‘the depredations committed by British regulars and loyalist 
militia units’ fully harnessed the violence ‘that had been bred by years of 
Indian wars and one year of bitter partisan fighting.’ 50 51 Yet again, a specific 
act of massacre – appearing on paper as nothing more than a minor military 
operation cementing British control of South Carolina – would motivate 
combatants, provide justification for future acts of violence and act as a major 
contributing factor in the near-total degeneration of Britain’s southern 
strategy. 
The Cycle of Violence 
 
British hopes that retaking much of the South Carolina low country would 
curb the local Patriots were not to be realised. Instead, following word of 
Waxhaws, fighting flared between Patriot militia and their emboldened 
Loyalist enemies. Barely a month and a half after the fall of Charleston there 
had already been ‘fifteen clashes between Tories and Whigs involving forces 
ranging from thirty to forty on each side to over a thousand.’52 The arrival of 
British regulars, rather than galvanise a loyal populace, simply created an 
opportunity for peoples who had been enemies for years to legitimise their 
violence against one another. ‘Old animosities from the days of the Regulator 
Movement often fuelled intense fighting,’ while an earlier, abortive Loyalist 
rising in 1776 had also left many neighbours with grudges to settle. As the 
author of a later biography of Continental Army general Nathanael Greene 
put it, ‘there was hardly a plantation which had not been the scene of some 
bitter conflict or brutal massacre; hardly a family that had not been the victim 
of some barbarous outrage.’53 
The looming spectre of slavery in the south also fed the rapid deterioration of 
order in the Carolinas. Regardless of the British leadership’s ambivalence 
and hypocrisy towards the struggles of enslaved peoples, not to mention the 
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disgust of wealthier Loyalists, the partisans supporting the royalist cause also 
seem to have had few reservations about fighting alongside black escapees. 
While no black regiments were recruited by Patriot forces in the South, 
inhabitants complained of the racially mixed troops of banditti and raiders 
who harried those with Patriot sentiments.54 The situation was little different 
in the north, with escaped slaves such as ‘Colonel’ Cornelius Tye even 
commanding partisan groups with dispensation from British officers.55 The 
nature of this triangular conflict meant that ‘backcountry people chose sides 
based as much on their economic interests as their ideological positions’ and 
bands of militiamen on both sides could at times barely be differentiated from 
groups of outlaws or bands of vengeance-bent vigilantes.56 Such men 
included the likes of Colonel Hugh Ervin, formerly of Marion’s partisans, who 
deserted in order pursue a career of home burning, and Whig partisan 
Maurice Murphy, who ‘became a virtual outlaw’ before shooting his own 
uncle when he denounced him.57 On the opposite side, if in name only, were 
the likes of Samuel Brown, who quickly became known as ‘Plundering Sam’ 
following half-hearted declarations of allegiance to King George and a 
massed looting of Laurens County, that eventually saw him shot and killed by 
a local resident.58 Similar was Colonel Daniel McGirth, a Georgia Loyalist 
whose men went on a murderous plundering spree in South Carolina, ‘killing 
every man he met who had not sworn allegiance to the King.’59 McGirth’s 
depredations were so indiscriminatory that the British governor of Georgia, 
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noted the outlaw’s ‘robbing, murdering and distressing.’ He subsequently put 
a bounty of fifty pounds his head.60 
It seemed as though the frontier had bled over into the interior. Violence, 
once the exception in the more settled areas of the southern colonies, rapidly 
became the norm as the British pushed out from their new base in 
Charleston. While Cornwallis was sensitive to his orders to pacify the south 
and create a holding force of loyal militias and Provincials – a recent study by 
Gregory J. W. Urwin has shown the lengths Cornwallis went to curtail looting 
by his army during the southern campaigns – his subordinates too often 
proved to have other priorities. While the British high command made plans 
involving the integration of Loyalist and British control, officers and soldiers 
on the ground frequently thought little of attacking the property and persons 
of those they deemed rebels. Adding pre-existing animosity to the partisan 
warfare in the south ‘and the continual petite guerre that made up much of 
the fighting in America, generated pressures that inclined soldiers to take 
revenge, or relieve frustrations, on innocent civilians.’61 This in turn ensured 
that ‘British depredations made enemies out of American moderates who had 
not yet embraced the revolution, alienated numerous Loyalists, and filled 
many Rebels with a desperate resolution to continue the fight.’62 
The massacre which took place at Piney Bottom Creek and the retaliatory 
murders that followed provides a telling snapshot of the relentless violence 
that dominated the south in the final phase of the war. In April 1781 a force of 
Patriot militia commanded by Colonel Thomas Wade decided that it was time 
to disband.63 After encamping for the night at Piney Bottom beyond the Cape 
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Fear river, several militiamen visited local residences and stole a number of 
items, an act which alerted nearby Loyalists to their presence. They gathered 
and surprised the camp, killing six men along with a surrendering boy, a 
broadsword splitting his head ‘so that one half of it fell on one shoulder and 
the other half on the other shoulder.’64 Wade and his subordinate, Captain 
Culp, escaped and managed to return home, where they collected a band 
bent on revenge. 
They made first for the residence of one Daniel Patterson, who they whipped 
until he divulged the names of those responsible for the killings at Piney 
Bottom. The Patriot band then visited a number of homes the following day, 
rounding up prisoners. One captured group tried to make their escape, and 
were subsequently chased down and killed: 
Alexander McLeod was first taken out… the men on horseback 
shot McLeod, putting three musket balls into him, and he fell 
dead on the spot. John Clarke, after having been shot, ran into 
the house and died immediately. Duncan Currie, in an effort to 
escape, had just got over a high fence… but was shot down on 
the outside. Daniel McMillan came into the house begging for 
his life, with blood streaming from his side, his hunting shirt on 
fire, where he had been shot in the shoulder, his wrist cut and 
broken by a sword, his arm shattered and torn by a musket ball, 
two or three balls having passed through his body; but revenge 
was not yet satisfied, and another ball through his breast near 
the left shoulder, soon put an end to his sufferings. Allan 
McSweene… ran about a quarter of a mile before they overtook 
him, and shot him down, putting several balls into his body, and 
then, having fallen on his face, they split his head open to the 
nose.65 
Not satiated, the Patriot band carried on seizing prisoners, robbing, and 
burning property. Stimmed for a while by the belief that one of their captives 
was infected with smallpox, they never-the-less ‘continued their raids into 
present Hoke County, where more Tories were found and shot.’ 66 Nor were 
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Loyalists the only victims, for one Patriot militiaman, Archibald McBride, ‘was 
found in company with a man who had been at the Piney Bottom [Peter 
Blue], and without any inquiry, or waiting for explanation, they recklessly shot 
him down.’67 
Following the murder of McBride and Blue the Patriots disbanded, yet still the 
cycle of bloodshed was not complete. The Turner family pursued Captain 
Culp, ‘followed him to his own house, called him out at night, and accused 
him of whipping one of their brothers… he was immediately shot down in his 
own yard.’68 
The killings at Piney Bottom and the further rampage that followed provide an 
example of the violence that perforated the south in 1780 and 1781 and 
helps to highlight the general nature of massacre during the last years of the 
revolution. While large-scale, well-documented clashes between regular 
soldiers, like Paoli or Waxhaws, made literal headlines and gained 
propaganda traction, the regular experience of smaller acts of extreme 
violence was closer to the norm for many combatants. Piney Bottom appears 
to have gone largely unnoticed by anyone outside the Cape Fear region, and 
memory of it having taken place at all barely survived into the nineteenth 
century. Yet the killings included many of the motifs we recognise from more 
infamous massacres, including the murder of an innocent and a rallying cry 
for vengeance that lead to further death and devastation. Armies did not shift 
on account of it, and the press did not retell it to angry readers, yet it and 
other acts like it perpetrated the cycle. It was massacres like Piney Bottom, 
taken in sum, that led General Greene to despair about the very depopulation 
of the country he was trying to liberate. 
Colonel Wade was soon under arms again with his men, as ferocious fighting 
swept through North Carolina – engagements were fought between Loyalist 
and Patriot militias at Elizabethtown, McPhaul’s Mill, Kirk’s Farm, Crane 
Creek, Raft Swamp, Rockfish Creek and a plethora of other places. 
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Sometimes these clashes were between a few dozen combatants, while at 
other times there were well over a thousand men engaged. Often the only 
surviving evidence of such fights are short mentions in pension statements 
given in the 1820s and 1830s, or fragments of oral history recorded by 
visiting nineteenth-century antiquarians. While the massacres inflicted during 
this civil war almost always occurred out of sight of regular British officers 
and ranking Crown officials, many of Cornwallis’s immediate subordinates 
actively sought to fan the flames, regardless of the desire of senior 
commanders and ministers to curtail the chaos. 
Major James Wemyss was one such activist in the proliferation of violence in 
the south, a British soldier who earned particular notoriety among the Patriots 
for the burning of numerous properties along the Pee Dee River between 
Kingstree and Cheraw in 1780. He was immortalised in southern folk legend 
alongside the likes of Tarleton as a savage who torched homesteads and 
arbitrarily murdered civilians. On the latter count Wemyss’ story has certainly 
become exaggerated – though he did engage in a profligate burning spree, 
there is only evidence of one man having been executed.69 Though the 
targeting of civilians was certainly a murkier issue during this period of the 
revolution than is sometimes given credit for (the blurred line between a 
militiaman and a civilian, and indeed a paroled militiaman and one who had 
taken up arms once again was something exploited by both sides), Crown 
Forces vented their rage throughout 1780 and 1781 with the destruction of 
large amounts of southern property. Commenting on Wemyss and his 
campaign, Patriot William Dobein James recalled how: 
The country through which Wemyss had marched, for seventy 
miles in length, and at places for fifteen miles in width, exhibited 
one continued scene of desolation. On most of the plantations 
every house was burnt to the ground, the negroes were carried 
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wantonly killed, and all provisions, which could be come at, 
destroyed.70 
While James gives a general indication of the destruction wreaked by British 
forces, the story of the Frierson family is instructive as a personal account. 
Recorded for a local history of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, it 
gives us not only a snapshot of Revolutionary War lore in the nineteenth 
century, but also provides us with an example of the violence meted out to 
non-combatants: 
A party of Wemyss’s men came to the house of Mr. John 
Frierson… the officer in command threatened Mrs. Frierson, in 
the most profane and insulting language, that unless she 
revealed the place of her husband’s concealment he would 
burn her up in the house. She was accordingly forced in, 
leading her little son, four years old, who yet lives to tell the tale 
of horror. The house was fired on the roof, and sentinels were 
placed at each door to prevent her exit. The roof was soon in 
flames… it was not until the intense heat of the burning 
mansion forced the sentinels from the doors that she was 
suffered to escape. The bee-hives were knocked to pieces, and 
the honey poured on the ground in mere wantonness; pigs, 
poultry, and every living thing that could be caught, were thrown 
into the flames and burned to death.71 
There was particular antagonism in some army circles for what the likes of 
Wemyss termed Presbyterian sedition shops. A Loyalist officer, Anthony 
Allaire, during his captivity with the Patriot militia of the Carolinas, described 
in his diary how ‘we heard a Presbyterian sermon, truly adapted to their 
principles and the times: or, rather, stuffed as full of Republicanism as their 
camp is of horse thieves.’72 British officers noted that Presbyterian 
congregations often appeared particularly sympathetic to the rebellion, 
especially among the Ulster-Scots communities on the frontier, and rapidly 
began ‘associating religious dissent and nonconformity with rebellion.’73 
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Wemyss seems to have had a particular hatred of Presbyterianism in the 
colonies, burning a church at Indiantown on August 27 1780, to the outrage 
of those living nearby. 
As the fighting in the Carolinas flared along the routes of British and Loyalist 
expeditions, thousands of enslaved people continued to make bids for 
freedom. ‘Tories, privateers, and banditti, often allied with fugitive slaves,’ 
took advantage of the chaos to facilitate escape attempts, and ‘British raiders 
took particular delight in freeing the slaves of the great Patriots,’ as they did 
with a number of Washington’s and Jefferson’s enslaved peoples in Virginia 
in 1781. Clinton’s 1779 Philipsburg Proclamation, often overlooked in 
significance in favour of Dunmore’s Proclamation, formally extended the 
scope of that first ruling and ratified it as the official, considered policy of the 
British Crown and government – now the slaves of rebelling masters 
throughout the colonies were guaranteed freedom, whether or not they 
chose to enlist in the Crown Forces. Much like Dunmore’s efforts, the 
Philipsburg Proclamation resulted from a ‘dialectical relationship of slave 
resistance and the British strategy of racial manipulation.’74 It was intended 
to undermine Patriot efforts and provide the British with a means of easy 
manual labour, but ‘many slaves interpreted it as an emancipation 
measure,’75 a fact that infuriated whites on both sides of the conflict. During 
the war a total of nearly one in five slaves ‘left their homes, fleeing American 
slavery in search of British liberty.’76 Patriot propagandists consequently 
continued to highlight what they viewed as the total degeneration of law and 
order, utilising much of the same rhetoric they had employed against the 
British over the use of Native American allies. As Robert G. Parkinson put it, 
‘colonists had always been uneasy about Indian attacks and slave uprisings. 
That some Indians and enslaved Africans had seemingly sided with the 
tyrant king confirmed their worst fears.’77 
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The chaos unleashed by the arrival of Crown Forces and the bloodshed at 
Waxhaws produced dire consequences for the British and their Loyalist 
allies. As the autumn of 1780 turned to winter, Cornwallis dispatched Major 
Patrick Ferguson into the Carolina backcountry. Appointed to the rank of 
Inspector of Militia in May of that year, Ferguson’s orders were to provide a 
rallying point for Loyalists in the interior, raising and organising them into a 
force that could hold the backcountry when the regulars moved on and 
restore some degree of order to a colony stirred up by word of massacre. 
The Failure of British Command in the South 
 
Ferguson, who had himself commanded the Crown Forces in the massacre 
at Little Egg Harbor in 1778, was emblematic of a particular breed of mid- 
ranking British officer Cornwallis came to rely on in the vital final phase of the 
war. Like Tarleton or André, he was noted for not just gallantry and civility 
when dealing with his peers, but also ambition and self-assurance that could 
turn to arrogance. Such characteristics are readily visible in his dealings with 
the inhabitants of the Carolina backcountry. Upon reaching the British 
outpost at Ninety Six he stated that ‘we come not to make war upon women 
and children, but to give them money and relieve their distresses.’78 A more 
sneering tone soon entered his declarations when he addressed the 
inhabitants of North Carolina upon learning of the approach of the Patriot 
Overmountain Men; ‘if you choose to be degraded forever and ever by a set 
of mongrels, say so at once, and let your women turn their backs upon you, 
and look out for real men to protect them.’79 Ferguson had already stated his 
personal belief that ‘the homes and property of all Continental civil and 
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the impoverishment of Loyalists as eligible for plunder,’ and was happy to 
unleash his men on anyone he considered disloyal to the king.80 
Such attitudes ran rife through the regimental-level British Army officers who 
in the south frequently commanded their own detachments and outposts. 
Tarleton and Wemyss’s misdemeanours have already been documented. 
Francis Rawdon, already mentioned for his mocking attitude towards claims 
of rape while stationed in New York, had also acquired an unsavoury 
reputation among the Patriots, along with a few of his allies. A Hessian 
lieutenant wrote in 1779 that ‘the English soldiers, especially those of Lord 
Rawdon’s Corps, perpetrate daily the grossest highway-robberies and even 
kill,’ while Rawdon himself wrote following the battle of Harlem Heights that 
‘we should (whenever we get further into the country) give free liberty to the 
soldiers to ravage at will, that these infatuated wretches may feel what a 
calamity war is.’ 81 82 
Rawdon was part of the clique of British officers – again, almost all of them at 
vital mid-ranking levels – who believed that the colonial revolt would be 
defeated with harsh treatment rather than clemency. They took a view that 
‘leniency only left hapless loyalists in thrall to Bible-thumping, canting traitors’ 
and that the only solution was ‘making all-out war on the Americans.’83 Such 
policies, they argued, had worked in Scotland and Ireland, thereby ignoring 
the great many differences between those areas of conflict and the Thirteen 
Colonies. 
Age was another factor that united most of the men who found themselves 
with important independent tasks during the southern campaign, and should 
not be overlooked when considering the profile of the officers making vital 
decisions during that period of the war. Tarleton and Rawdon were both 26 in 
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1780, James Wemyss was 32 and Ferguson was 36, all young for eighteenth 
century British Army officers receiving such vital commands. Their relative 
lack of experience was reflected by their modest rank on the regular 
establishment. In 1780 Ferguson, Tarleton and Wemyss were all majors in 
the British Army and Rawdon a lieutenant colonel, yet both Tarleton and 
Ferguson commanded a small army at Cowpens and King’s Mountain 
respectively, while after Cornwallis invaded Virginia Rawdon found himself de 
facto commander of all Crown Forces in both Carolinas. The increasingly 
desperate circumstances faced by the British in the south – not least of which 
was a chronic shortage of manpower given the vast territory that needed to 
be policed – had thrust these officers into roles that would play a vital part in 
deciding the course of the war. None showed any particular belief in Clinton’s 
stated desire to win the hearts and subdue the minds of the colonists, 
preferring instead to focus on short-term military victories and personal 
advancement. This was an attitude which ‘squandered public good will 
through actual or perceived egregious actions that, while perhaps militarily 
necessary, violated popularly held concepts of the civilized conduct of war.’84 
It fed the cycle of violence in the south, and was a key element in fatally 
undermining Cornwallis’s position. 
It should be pointed out, given the unflattering portrait painted of these British 
officers, that the caricature of the likes of Tarleton in later popular southern 
mythology is certainly excessive. There is no solid evidence to suggest that 
he, for example, had the graves of slain Patriots desecrated or ordered 
foetuses to be cut from pregnant women’s wombs. As Sylvia Frey writes 
regarding the fighting in the south, ‘atrocities perpetrated against women and 
children by British forces were individual acts and not acts of policy… indeed, 
the British military command denounced such actions as reprehensible and 
instituted measures designed to prevent them.’85 On one occasion Tarleton 
wrote to Cornwallis apologising for his men’s irregularities, stating ‘the 
officers have kept me in ignorance or steps should have been taken 
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immediately to suppress it.’86 On another Tarleton halted his troops while on 
the march in Virginia ‘for the convenient inspection of the inhabitants, and to 
facilitate the discovery of the villains who had committed atrocious outrages 
the preceding evening. A sergeant and private dragoon were pointed out, 
and accused of rape and robbery: They were conducted to Halifax, where 
they were condemned to death.’87 
It does seem difficult to believe that all such infractions were dealt with in a 
similar fashion. For Crown Forces manpower was scarce, and executions 
corroboratively rare. It is worth pointing out that in the above incident 
Cornwallis himself interceded on the locals’ behalf, and Tarleton noted what 
probably constituted at least part of the reason for the executions, as a 
staged example – ‘the immediate infliction of the sentence exhibited to the 
army and manifested to the country the discipline and justice of the British 
general.’88 An equally common response among British officers would be 
Rawdon’s when, in 1780, he pardoned a sergeant and corporal of his 
Volunteers of Ireland due to be demoted and flogged, ‘causing General 
Pattison to admonish him for what he thought was too-lax discipline.’89 
Indeed Rawdon had lost an earlier posting as Clinton’s aide de camp in part 
because he refused to accept criticism of his Volunteers. 
Men like Tarleton, Ferguson and Rawdon rarely acted in a manner 
considered unbecoming of a gentleman in the eighteenth century. It was as 
much their adherence to gentlemanly conduct that made them popular 
among the closed ranks of the British Army’s officer class as it was their 
military ability. Their personal civility, however, did not disbar any of them 
from acts of brutality against their king’s enemies. Rawdon’s blithe quips to 
his uncle about the abuse of women wouldn’t have caused any sort of stir 
among Britain’s gentrified class, and when Tarleton hung captured parole 
breakers or burned Patriot militiamen’s homesteads he wasn’t acting outside 
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of the rules of war as they were understood by most Europeans in the 
eighteenth century. The fact that their peers would have found little untoward 
in their actions, however, certainly did not exonerate them in the eyes of the 
Patriots or the many colonists who experienced deprivation at their hands. 
Ferguson, Tarleton, Rawdon and Wemyss, all generally held to be gallant 
officers by their army peers, were all still ‘advocates of brutal repression’ 
when it came to the war in the South.90 They were also indispensable to 
Cornwallis. Even if he had wished to chastise them (and there is little 
evidence that he had the stomach to), Cornwallis could not afford a falling out 
with the likes of Tarleton – the commander of his light cavalry – or Ferguson 
– the commander of much of his militia. 
 
Antagonisms towards the colonists, a frequent lack of discipline and an 
unwillingness to adhere to the wider British war policy ensured that Ferguson 
soon found himself in a hornet’s nest in the South Carolina backcountry. 
Events earlier in 1780 – Waxhaws and the rumours of massacre, Henry 
Clinton’s revocation of Charleston’s terms of surrender (he now demanded 
that all paroled Whigs take up arms for the Crown if called upon to do so), 
and British attacks on private property had all combined through the summer 
to stir up the backcountry inhabitants against the Crown Forces occupation, 
especially among the Presbyterians of the frontier.91 
King’s Mountain 
 
Ferguson also failed to fully appreciate the cultural differences in the interior 
of the Carolinas, especially when compared to the lifestyles of the low county 
planters who had been largely subdued by the fall of Charleston. Migration 
patterns had combined with local geography to leave the societies of the 
Carolinas even more heavily stratified than most North American colonies in 
1775. Throughout the eighteenth century the wealthy planter class, most 
heavily concentrated in the low country of South Carolina and along the 
coastal regions, had become increasingly distinct from the back-country and 
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the frontier settlements that sprung up along – and over – the Appalachians. 
According to the studies of John Spencer Bassett, the low country gentry of 
this period ‘took little interest in the frontier inhabitants except to tax them.’92 
Economic depression in the coastal regions in the late 1750s and early 
1760s caused the amount of debt in the colony to skyrocket – in 1755 in 
Orange County there were seven debt cases recorded by magistrates, while 
in 1765 there were 111.93 This combined with the rise of a powerful and 
influential middling class of lawyers and merchants to create a surge of 
dissatisfaction in the interior region. In the late 1760s various groups were 
formed to ‘regulate and reform government abuse,’ groups that eventually 
coalesced into a ‘farmers reform movement’ that called themselves the 
Regulators. 94 In 1768, partly inspired by news of the Saint George’s Fields 
massacre in London earlier that year, they broke up the provincial court at 
Hillsborough, and over the next few years harassed provincial government 
officials, withheld taxes and disrupted court cases.95 In 1771 they amassed in 
an effort to intimidate the royal governor of South Carolina, William Tryon. In 
response Tryon raised the militia, attacked the Regulator forces at Great 
Alamance Creek and soundly defeated them. 
Historians have debated the exact nature of the regulator movement – some, 
like Bassett or William S. Powell, have seen it as a regional struggle between 
the interior and the coastal regions, others like Elisha Douglass and Marvin L. 
Michael Kay as a wealth and class-based conflict between powerful planters 
and poor frontiersmen.96 More modern studies, such as those of James 
Whittenburg or Majoleine Kars, have identified the part played by a newly 
arrived middle class of lawmen and traders that managed to antagonise both 
the common people whose money they relied on and the planter class they 
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displaced in the towns and settlements of the piedmont area. More pertinent 
to the British campaigns of 1780 and 1781 is the nature of the backcountry 
settler’s mentality, coalescing for decades prior to the Regulator movement 
and given violent animation by any perceived attempt by governing forces – 
colonial or British – to impose authority upon them. A culture of unrest and 
violence was emphasised that by the time the British seized Charleston 
‘much of the South, and especially the backcountry regions of North and 
South Carolina, had been in the grip of violence for almost two decades.’97 It 
was against this mind-set that British officers like Ferguson, with arrogant 
declarations and the burning of homesteads, set themselves. 
Patriot militia bands gathered to oppose Ferguson’s Loyalist muster, their 
numbers supplemented by groups of so-called Overmountain Men, settlers 
from beyond the Appalachian Mountains experienced in wilderness lifestyle 
and frontier warfare. Learning that large numbers of militiamen were 
mustering at Sycamore Sholes with the intent of attacking his force, 
Ferguson began to withdraw towards British-held Charlotte. He did so at a 
glacial pace however, seemingly less afraid of the rebels than he was of 
losing the independent command he so yearned for by having to re-join 
Cornwallis. His hubris saw him initially prevaricate for three days before 
pausing with only a day’s journey remaining to encamp at a site known as 
King’s Mountain. Eager to catch him, the Patriot militia marched through the 
night, and engaged Ferguson’s Loyalists on October 7 1780. 
A fluid command and control structure and expertise in bush fighting allowed 
the Patriots to quickly surround and pick away at the Loyalist positions. 
Whenever Crown Forces mounted a bayonet charge to drive off the Patriots, 
they would simply withdraw before them, then return when the Loyalists 
pulled back to their starting points. After an hour Ferguson’s command began 
to deteriorate. The Loyalists were pushed back to their encampment, where 
groups started to surrender. Ferguson himself was killed. His second in 
command, Abraham DePeyster, sent out a white flag asking for terms. 
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Said terms were not immediately received, in part because the Overmountain 
Men ‘saw an opponent’s surrender as simply an opportunity to shoot more 
and easier targets… it took heroic efforts by [Patriot colonels] Campbell, 
Shelby and Sevier, at risk to their own lives, to halt the massacre.’98 One 
militiaman, incorrectly believing his father to have been killed, ‘kept up firing 
upon the huddled Tories, until admonished to cease, when he excitedly cried 
out… “the damned rascals have killed my father, and I’ll keep loading and 
shooting till I kill every son of a bitch of them.”’99 
Other accounts corroborate the fact that the Patriots continued to fire on the 
Loyalists after they had surrendered. Militia colonel Isaac Shelby wrote that ‘it 
was some time before a complete cessation of firing, on our part, could be 
effected,’ while militiaman Andrew Evins later recounted how another Patriot 
officer stopped him firing at the surrendering Loyalists, ‘at the time of the 
surrender, for when I went to fire at the Enemy, Campbell threw up my gun 
and said, “Evins, for God’s sake don’t shoot – it is murder to kill them now, for 
they have raised the flag.’ 100 101 Robert Draper also recorded a later incident 
when the Patriots were fired on by a Loyalist foraging party unaware of the 
engagement. The militia, perhaps believing the shots to have come from 
Tarleton’s expected relief force, or even from the Loyalist prisoners 
themselves, opened fire on those captives they’d corralled at the top of the 
mountain.102 
Given the decentralised nature of Patriot command during the battle, the 
steep slopes and heavy woodland of King’s Mountain itself, not to mention 
the exhausted state of the militia who had force marched through the night, it 
does seem natural to expect that some militiamen continued to fire on their 
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opponents after they had attempted to surrender. The claims made by some 
that ‘the slaughter continued until the Americans were weary of killing’ 
certainly seems like exaggeration, as evidenced by the taking of close to 
seven hundred prisoners.103 That being said, at least one modern author has 
drawn direct parallels between King’s Mountain and Waxhaws, writing that 
‘many Patriots shouting “Tarleton’s Quarter” assaulted and butchered 
unarmed and surrendering Loyalists in a mirror image of the Waxhaws 
Massacre until Lieutenant Colonel Campbell reasserted control.’104 And if 
some Patriots did indeed set about slaughtering their enemies as they tried to 
surrender, the treatment that Loyalist prisoners endured in the days and 
weeks after the actual engagement was equally reprehensive. 
The Patriots were acutely aware of the dangers of falling victim to their own 
success – while the victory was a crucial one, it left them just a day from the 
British outpost at Charlotte, with the imaged threat of Tarleton bearing down 
on them and the spectre of retaliatory massacre. They also, in their rush to 
catch Ferguson, had left themselves short on supplies. As the Patriots 
returned to the backcountry they paused at the home of the Biggerstaff family 
near Gilbert Town, a week after the battle, and began executing prisoners. 
Thirty-six Loyalists were singled out and forced to submit to a court-martial 
that found them guilty of various crimes, from breaking parole or defecting 
from the Patriot cause, to ‘breaking open houses, killing men, and turning the 
women and children out of doors, and burning the houses.’105 Nine men, 
described by one militiaman as ‘some of the most audacious and murderous 
Tories’ were strung up that evening.106 In his diary Loyalist prisoner Anthony 
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country… who unfortunately fell a sacrifice to their infamous mock jury.’107 
After the first nine deaths the rest were reprieved, in some accounts at the 
urging of the local Biggerstaff family, in others by Colonel Shelby, possibly 
because of fear over retribution from Tarleton should he catch the retreating 
militia.108 
The next day the column moved off at five in the morning and continued 
marching all day through the rain. At this point supplies were running low, 
and according to Allaire none of the prisoners had eaten either bread or meat 
for two days. Some prisoners attempted to escape, but were recaptured and 
executed. 109 Several British accounts assert that the Patriot militia were 
under orders to open fire on the prisoners in the event of Tarleton catching 
up with them.110111 Colonel Campbell, writing in his general orders to the 
militia forces on October 11, did ‘request the officers of all ranks in the army 
to endeavour to restrain the disorderly manner of slaughtering and disturbing 
the prisoners,’ and was left lambasting ‘the plundering parties who issue out 
from the camp, and indiscriminately rob both Whig and Tory, leaving our 
friends, I believe, in a worse situation than the enemy would have done.’112 
Loyalist accounts provided a more damning verdict of the events hinted at in 
Campbell’s orders. Allaire recorded that during the march ‘several of the 
[Loyalist] militia that were worn out with fatigue, and not being able to keep 
up, were cut down, and trodden to death in the mire.’113 Writing in a separate 
account, he stated that ‘the rebel officers would often go in amongst the 
prisoners, draw their swords, cut down and wound those whom their wicked 
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and savage minds prompted.’114 Another diary kept by Loyalist captain 
Alexander Chesney corroborates Allaire’s experiences, describing how as 
they marched the Patriots went about ‘cutting and striking us by the road in a 
savage manner.’115 
The hatred exhibited by the Overmountain Men was certainly not contrary to 
the spirit of the war in the Carolinas in 1780. With such a rapid degeneration 
into violence, however, it is worthwhile remembering that outside of the 
frontier such a state of affairs had not been the norm. The men from across 
the Appalachians brought the violence they practiced – and expected to have 
practiced upon them – into the settled part of the colony proper, where it 
found accord with the chaos resulting from British occupation and fears 
heightened by the imaginings of slave revolts and bloodthirsty massacres. 
Occasionally a commentator from outside the deadly web of animosities and 
reprisals that had sprung up in the south would highlight a sense of shock at 
the war’s progress there. Such an account can be found in the writings of 
Mercy Warren, a keen New England Whig before and during the conflict, who 
in her History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American 
Revolution described the execution of Loyalist prisoners as ‘imposed by 
order of some of those fierce and uncivilised chieftains, who had spent most 
of their lives in the mountains and forests, amidst the slaughter of wild 
animals, which was necessary to their daily subsistence.’116 
The sense of disdain exhibited towards the violent, ‘savage’ practices of the 
frontiersmen was partly ameliorated in the next breath, for Warren went on to 
add that ‘all compassionate sensations might be totally deadened by the 
example of the British, who seemed to estimate the life of a man, on the 
same grade with that of the animal of the forest.’ Such a view seems to be a 
fair approximation of the attitude of many advocates of both sides not directly 
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involved in the fighting in the south – in their view unpleasant things were 
happening, but when the enemy committed massacres like Waxhaws they 
were merely to be expected. Such ambivalence did nothing to lessen the 
cycle of bloodshed. 
The massacre at King’s Mountain had a resounding effect on the war in the 
south. Cornwallis was forced to abandon much of the progress he had made 
over the summer of 1780, and stall plans to invade North Carolina. More 
importantly, the defeat had eliminated the core of the Loyalist militia raised in 
South Carolina, and ensured that others who may have been supportive 
towards the royal cause would now think twice before coming forward. In a 
letter to Clinton dated December 3 1780, Cornwallis complained that the 
Loyalist militia of Ninety Six ‘was so totally dispirited by the defeat of 
Ferguson, that of the whole district we could with difficulty assemble one 
hundred; and even those, I am convinced, could not have made the smallest 
resistance if they had been attacked.’117 Cornwallis also wrote angrily to the 
Major General William Smallwood, then the ranking Continental Army officer 
in the Carolinas following Gates’ debacle at the battle of Camden. He 
complained about the hanging of the Loyalists after King’s Mountain, stating 
that ‘the cruelty exercised on the prisoners taken under Major Ferguson is 
shocking to humanity; and the hanging of poor old Colonel Mills… was an act 
of most savage barbarity,’ before adding that it ‘must oblige me, in justice to 
the suffering Loyalists, to retaliate on the unfortunate persons now in my 
power.’118 While Cornwallis restrained himself from summary executions, 
such letters followed a now-familiar pattern between opposing commanders 
following massacres, and did nothing to alleviate the violence now running 
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The death of Ferguson and the destruction of his militia exposed the failings 
of British strategic military planning. While there were certainly Loyalists 
vehemently opposed to the rebellion in the colonies, fear of reprisals and the 
cycle of violence and intimidation kept men from the royal standards. 
Loyalists in Britain had simply not been able to organise effective 
governmental lobbies, with exiled governors and men of standing suddenly 
finding themselves far from the centres of power they had once enjoyed.119 In 
the bloody environment of South Carolina in late 1780, Loyalists feared 
massacre as much as the Patriots had earlier that year. Such fears greatly 
hampered the Crown’s plans, leaving Cornwallis without the base of support 
he had hoped existed in the southern colonies. Despite efforts to reassure 
the king’s subjects that royal authority – and the protection that it supposedly 
guaranteed – was being restored, Loyalists soon found that their fears over 
fresh massacres to be well founded. 
The Haw River Massacre 
 
By early 1781, the situation faced by the British in the south showed little sign 
of stabilising. In January Tarleton, overconfident as ever, suffered a total 
defeat at the hands of Daniel Morgan in an area known as Hannah’s 
Cowpens. As the battle ended and the Crown Forces line collapsed, 
Highlanders of the 71st Foot continued to fight in spite of the fact that victory 
was now clearly beyond their grasp. One of their officers later stated that 
their reluctance to surrender stemmed from their own orders, given they had 
been told ‘to give no quarter’ and did not expect to receive any back.120 In his 
modern study of the battle, Lawrence Babits noted that Patriot officers ‘tried 
to prevent a massacre’ following the 71st’s surrender, given the Highlanders 
had already been carrying out their orders that day, bayonetting Patriot 
wounded left behind during their advance.121 One Continental officer told of 
how the 71st’s grenadier commander, Captain Duncanson, told him ‘they had 
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orders to give no quarter, and they did not expect any; and as my men were 
coming up, he was afraid they would use him ill.’122 Another commentator 
repeating a pension account delivered to him by one of William Washington’s 
cavalrymen noted that, as they charged, Patriot dragoons cried out ‘as their 
watchword, “Buford’s play,” referring to the odious massacre perpetrated on 
the detachment commanded by that officer.’123 
Despite the past reference to massacre, the 71st did not suffer retribution at 
Cowpens, though an anonymous account in a Patriot periodical expressed a 
hint of disappointment at the lack of vengeance. The paper related how the 
Highlanders, on their knees, had claimed ‘“it has not been our fault, we have 
skivered [skewered] so many; we were obliged to obey our officers, and they 
commanded us to take no prisoners, except a few Continentals.” We wish, it 
was replied, that this had been known a little sooner; but we do not destroy 
even our enemies in cold blood, especially when they are so much in our 
power.’124 Indeed, in the opening of his letter to Greene describing his victory, 
Morgan noted that ‘although the Progress of this [Tarleton’s] Corps was 
marked with Burnings and Devastations & although' they have waged the 
most cruel Warfare, not a man was killed wounded or even insulted after he 
surrendered.’125 The Patriots had successfully restrained themselves in the 
face of a vicious enemy, but in the south such acts of mercy were more 
infrequent that at any other point during the war. As part of Sumter’s abortive 
militia attack on the Crown Forces outpost at Rocky Mount, a Continental 
Army dragoon officer, Major William Davie, launched a successful assault on 
a force of unsuspecting Loyalists encamped outside the nearby defences at 
Hanging Rock. Davie admitted that ‘on meeting again the fire of the infantry 
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they [the Loyalists] all rushed against the angle of the fence where they were 
surrounded by the dragoons who had entered the field and literally cut to 
pieces: as this was done under the eye of the whole British camp no 
prisoners could be safely taken which may apologize for the slaughter that 
took place on this occasion.’126 Detailing his service in his pension claim in 
1820, Patriot soldier William King recounted having been at ‘the massacre at 
the hanging rock,’ and other Patriot accounts attest to it as a massacre.127 
Again, while it may have made military sense to take no prisoners given the 
circumstances, there can be no doubt that those Loyalists who survived the 
massacre, or those who witnessed the killings from the fort, would have 
come to hate their fellow Americans more fiercely. 
By February 1781 the limitations of Britain’s overarching southern strategy 
were fully apparent. Following Cowpens, Cornwallis attempted to catch and 
engage Greene’s army, seeking to replicate the same sort of pitched battle 
that had all-but annihilated Gates’s army at Camden. Greene was too wary to 
be drawn, however, and conducted a strategic retreat towards Virginia, 
aiming for the Dan River. He reached it first, on February 14, and was able to 
cross to safety. Cornwallis, his army exhausted and without supplies, called 
off the pursuit and withdrew to his new headquarters at Hillsborough. Both 
sides spent the next week resting their army, gathering supplies and tending 
to the sick and wounded. 
Cornwallis once again issued a proclamation calling for Loyalists in North 
Carolina to rally to the royal cause, assisted by the printing press brought 
with the army by the accompanying former royal governor of the colony, 
Josiah Martin. The results were typically lukewarm. During the British Army’s 
time in Hillsborough hundreds rode into camp and declared their loyalty to 
the king, then left again without providing any sort of material support. 
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Tarleton blamed their reluctance on fear of reprisal; ‘they acknowledged the 
continentals were chased out of the province; but they declared, they soon 
expected them to return, and the dread of violence and persecution 
prevented their taking a decided part with a cause which yet appeared 
dangerous.’128 They were ‘desirous of peace, but averse to every exertion 
that might tend to procure it.’129 Cornwallis made the same observation a 
month and a half later, writing bitterly to Clinton that after issuing another 
proclamation following his bloody victory at Guilford Courthouse ‘many of the 
inhabitants rode into camp, shook me by the hand, said they were glad to 
see us, and to hear that we had beaten Greene, and then rode home again.’ 
130 He repeated the same frustrations to Lord Germain, leaving little doubt 
about the shortcomings of the British ministry’s southern strategy in a letter 
that stated: 
The principal reasons for undertaking the Winter’s campaign 
were the difficulty of a defensive War in South Carolina, & the 
hopes that our friends in North Carolina, who were said to be 
very numerous, would make good their promises of assembling 
& taking an Active part with us. Our experience has shown that 
their numbers are not so great as had been represented, and 
that their friendship was only passive, for we have received little 
assistance from them since our arrival in the province.131 
The years of violence in the south had left its mark. Both sides had suffered 
intimidation, home-burnings, assault and murder at the hands of their 
neighbours. General Greene himself wrote despairingly that: 
The animosity between the Whigs and Tories of this State 
renders their situation truly deplorable… some thousands have 
fallen in this way in this quarter, and the evil rages with more 
violence than ever. If a stop cannot be put to these massacres, 
the country will be depopulated in a few months more.132 
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The Loyalist experience in particular had been endured without any form of 
support or protection from the Crown that now demanded their assistance 
and obedience. This resulted in a disinclination to aid the British once they 
finally arrived, for fear that as soon as the royal army inevitably marched on, 
those who had courted them would face retribution from both neighbours and 
the Patriot authorities. Other factors likely reinforced this. After the war, 
Clinton suggested that the Carolinians had been put off by the ‘melancholy 
scene of his lordship’s camp,’ dissuaded as much by the visibly grim 
condition of the royal army as by the threat of Patriot violence.133 It is also 
likely that plenty of the well-wishers who visited Cornwallis so briefly simply 
wished to assuage the most recent conqueror, and in reality wanted nothing 
more than to be left alone by both sides. 
Regardless of personal reasons, the key point of Britain’s strategy – raising 
southern Loyalists against the Patriots – was now clearly exposed as a 
fantasy. The reality faced by the Crown Forces was that they were alone and 
adrift, deep in hostile territory. In spite of this, one group did heed 
Cornwallis’s rallying cry at Hillsborough. Doctor John Pyle, a prominent North 
Carolina Loyalist who had already fought for the British in the failed rising of 
1776, was able to assemble around three hundred men in response to the 
Crown's summons. Hearing of their intention to join with him, Cornwallis 
dispatched a detachment under Tarleton to bring them in safely. Despite 
learning that Continental forces under Colonel Henry Lee were in the vicinity, 
the Loyalists failed to heed Tarleton's requests that they hurry, and according 
to his later account they had 'thought fit to pay visits to their kindred and 
acquaintance before they repaired to the British camp: Inspired by whiskey 
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Such aspersions are perhaps unfair to Pyle, and designed to conceal the 
primary mistake made by both Cornwallis and Tarleton - failure to assign a 
specific place for the Loyalists to link up with their escort. Certainly Pyle's 
forces were not just drunkenly roaming the countryside. They dispersed or 
outright defeated a number of smaller Patriot militia groups, including one 
Captain Joseph Hackney who, in a pension claim in 1832, described how 
'himself and the whole of his company were made prisoners by a body of 
Tories under the command of Colonel Pyle.'135 
Regardless of question over the professionalism of Pyle's brief command, the 
failure of the Loyalists to link with Tarleton was to prove fatal. Greene had 
dispatched Lee's Continental cavalry back across the Dan to harass the 
British and Loyalists, and they had joined up with local Patriot militia. 
Learning of both Tarleton and Pyle's presence, Lee resolved to attack 
Tarleton, realising that the uniforms of his own troopers were similar to those 
of Tarleton's after Loyalists in the area mistook him for more reinforcements 
sent from Hillsborough. 
As they closed in on Tarleton, the Continental vanguard happened upon two 
Loyalist militiamen from Pyle's column. Thinking the Patriots were Tarleton's 
British Legion, they led Lee to Pyle's main body, by that time assembled 
close to the Haw river. Lee, believed by most of the Loyalists to be Tarleton 
himself, ordered Pyle's men to make way at the side of the road while his 
dragoons passed by. 
What happened next remains the subject of some controversy and, as with 
Waxhaws, a fully satisfactory understanding will probably never be had. 
There are only a few certainties; that the Patriots drew close to the Loyalists 
before attacking them, and that in the space of about ten minutes the majority 






135 Joseph Hackney in NC Patriots 1775 - 1783: Their Own Words, Volume 2 - the Provincial 
and State Troops (Part 2), ed. J. D. Lewis (Little River, SC: J. D. Lewis, 2012), 336. 
214  
The prime cause for debate rests on whether the Patriot assault was initially 
planned by Lee, or whether the fighting started unexpectedly when one party 
or the other realised the men before them were not allies. Immediately after 
the battle, Lee himself wrote that 'the [Continental] Legion cavalry passed 
them [the Loyalists] agreeable to order, as if British troops. I did this, that no 
time might be lost in reaching Col. Tarleton.'136 While his desire to overlook 
attacking the militia in favour of a chance to strike at the greater prize 
represented by Tarleton is plausible, it contradicts the actions and motives 
described in his later memories. Writing in 1812, he claimed he 'had 
concluded to make known to the colonel [Pyle] his real character as soon as 
he should confront him, with a solemn assurance of his and his associates' 
perfect exemption from injury, with the choice of returning to their homes, 
or… uniting with the defenders of their common country.'137 In both accounts 
he claims the situation only degenerated into violence when Loyalists spotted 
his own militia concealed nearby and opened fire. 
Regardless of whether or not Lee intended to pass the Loyalists by or 
capture them, it seems the majority of his own men were not privy to any 
scheme involving deception. Andrew Pickens, commanding the Patriot militia 
ordered to outflank the Loyalists, wrote in his own after-action report to 
Greene that the locals 'rejoiced, imagining we were a fresh party of British… 
under the same deception they [Pyle's column] suffered Colonel Lee's horse 
to pass equal with their front. Our men were in some measure under the 
same mistake, but soon found out.'138 Another Patriot, Joseph Graham, on 
several occasions directly refuted Lee's claim that the Loyalists began the 
engagement after noticing the nearby Patriot militia. In a letter to Archibald D. 
Murphy he writes that ‘Lee states that at Pyles’ defeat, the action was 
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commenced by the firing of the Tories on the Militia, in his rear… If, however, 
he had inquired of Capt. Eggleston, he would have informed him 
otherwise.’139 In another account he once again corrects Lee and comments 
on the confusion evident on both sides: 
Lee states… that Pyles' men, on seeing the militia, in the rear 
of his Cavalry, recognised and fired on them. The true 
statement is this… Graham riding along side of Capt. Eggleston 
who commanded the rear of Lee's horse, remarked to him, 
"That company is Tories - what is the reason they have their 
arms?" Capt. Eggleston addressing a good looking man at the 
end of the line, supposed to be an officer, inquired, "To whom 
do you belong?" The man promptly answered, "A friend to his 
Majesty." Whereupon Capt. Eggleston struck him over the 
head. The militia looking on, and waiting for orders, on this 
example being set, rushed on them like lightning and cut 
away.140 
What confusion there was among the Patriots was even more pronounced 
among the Loyalists as the killing began. As they were rode down most 
appear to have believed a mistake was being made, and sought to ward off 
their attackers by repeating their loyalty to King George. The incident clearly 
had a powerful and confusing effect on those who experienced it. Even after 
it was over, Joseph Graham related that one captured Loyalist said to Lee 
'"Mr. Tarleton, you have this day killed a parcel of as good subjects as ever 
his Majesty had." Lee… interrupted him saying: "you d-d rascal if you call me 
Tarleton I will take off your head. I will undeceive you, we are the Americans 
and not the British. I am Lee of the American Legion and not Tarleton." The 
poor fellow appeared chop-fallen.'141 Similarly, the first the real Tarleton knew 
of the massacre was when 'several wounded loyalists entered the British 
camp, and complained to Tarleton of the cruelty of his dragoons. Though the 
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accusation was erroneous, their sufferings were evident, and the cause from 
whence they proceeded was soon afterwards discovered.’142 
Other accounts mix the confusion with what seems to have been a 
determined assault by Lee. A Patriot militiaman, Moses Hall, recalled in his 
pension claim that the Loyalists 'uttered salutations of a friendly kind 
believing us to be British. Col. Lee knew what this was about and so did 
Major Dixon. But I recollect that my Captain Hall perceiving they were Tories 
and thinking that Col. Lee did not know it… called to Col. Lee across the 
Tories line and told him "Col. Lee they are every blood of them Tories."' 
According to the account, Lee signalled the misunderstanding Hall to 
continue riding, until the Loyalist line was totally covered, at which point 'the 
bugle sounded to attack and the slaughter began.'143 A pension record by 
militiaman Thomas Boyd also implies that the attack was conducted 
deliberately; 'facing to Pyles line, amidst shouts of long live King George from 
both parties, our troops drawing their swords attacked the Tories and cut 
them down… a great slaughter was made of the Tories whilst they were 
crying out that they were friends of King George.'144 Another pension 
statement, by one Samuel Eakin, gives an even more chilling indication that 
the attack was both ordered, and slaughter was part of at least one Patriot 
officer’s plan; 'a total rout and slaughter of the Enemy took place about four 
hundred out of the five hundred he thinks were killed on orders being to give 
them Blueford's [Buford's] play.'145 Here we see the consequences of the 
brutality at Waxhaws, and the desire to repay massacre for massacre. The 
killing of fleeing or surrendering men was, at least to some present, 
permissible because of past atrocities. The killing of prisoners was 
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emphasised by Cornwallis himself in a letter to Germain dated March 17 
1781, where he mentions that Pyle’s corps ‘allowed themselves to be 
surrounded, and a number of them were most inhumanly butchered, when 
begging for quarters, without making the least resistance.’146 
The murder of surrendering men is particularly noteworthy, and represents a 
perhaps overlooked difference between the incidents at Waxhaws and Haw 
River. While no accounts suggest that the killing of Patriot prisoners 
continued after the immediate fighting at Waxhaws was over, several 
accounts of the fate of Pyle's Loyalists speak of prisoners being murdered a 
good while after the engagement had ended, in much the same way that 
prisoners were killed in the days following the engagement at King’s 
Mountain. In a footnote of his account Joseph Graham added that 'to our 
discredit it must be stated, that when the Indians [Catawaba Natives allied to 
Lee's force] came up, they were suffered to kill seven or eight wounded 
men.'147 Another account of a different killing can be found in the pension 
statement of Moses Hall: 
The evening after our Battle with the Tories we having a 
considerable number of prisoners I recollect a scene which 
made a lasting impression upon my mind. I was invi [sic, 
invited?] by some of my comrades to go and see some of the 
prisoners. We went to where six were standing together. Some 
discussion taking place, I heard some of our men cry out 
"remember Bluford" and the prisoners were immediately hewed 
to pieces with broad swords. At first I bore the scene without 
any emotion, but, upon a moments reflection I felt such horror 
as I never did before nor have since, and returning to my 
quarters and throwing myself upon my blanket I contemplated 
the cruelties of war until overcome and unmanned by a 
distressing gloom from which I was not relieved until 
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Again the phrase ‘remember Buford’ is noteworthy. Waxhaws and the 
escalation of violence throughout 1780 had a very tangible effect on 
combatants in later engagements. Had high-ranking British command 
elements come down on the mid to low-ranking officers who permitted 
personal vendettas or the wasting of territory, perhaps the situation in the 
south would not have deteriorated to the extent that it did. For the men who 
did the killing in Moses Hall’s statement, it is difficult to image any 
acceptance of defeat, any possibility of permitting an ongoing British 
presence in the colonies. From the perspectives of such men the British and 
Loyalists were now viewed as just as diabolical as the frontier Natives. The 
south’s crucible of violence had ‘enabled a different type of aggressive, less 
rule-bound commander to emerge – and, by leading American Loyalists 
against their own neighbours, to lastingly alienate local populations.’149 Crown 
Forces had thus doomed their campaign from the start and ensured that ‘the 
toleration of violence against civilians created considerable distrust of the 
British among backcountry residents.’150 
The loss of any moral superiority through the perpetration of massacres is 
further highlighted by Hall, whose narrative shows just how violence infected 
thoughts and actions during the war. After the killing of the Loyalist prisoners, 
Lee’s Patriots passed through an area that had recently been used by the 
British Legion as an encampment. There Hall found: 
A youth about sixteen who having come out to view the 
British… they had run him through with a bayonet. The sight of 
this unoffending boy butchered rather than be encumbered… 
on the march, I assume, relieved me of my distress and 
feelings for the slaughter of the Tories and I desired nothing so 
much as the opportunity of participating in their destruction.151 
Neither Lee nor Pickens made any particular note of the scale of the killing of 
Pyle’s men in their reports to Greene, with Lee coming the closest in his later 
 
 
149 Hoock, Scars of Independence, 313. 
150 Walker, The Battles of Kings Mountain and Cowpens, 60. 
151 Moses Hall, 'Pension application of Moses Hall W10105 f100NC 8/26/09' Southern 
Campaign American Revolution Pension Statements, accessed online at 
http://revwarapps.org/ 11/01/2018. 
219  
memoirs with a brief line about the fight being 'bloody on one side only.'152 
American historians writing in the nineteenth century heavily favoured Lee's 
claims, whether his initial one about wishing to simply bypass the Loyalists or 
his latter one stating that he intended to disarm Pyle's men without violence. 
William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of 
Nathanael Greene holds that 'it is obvious that no present mischief was 
meant to the loyalists and but for their unfortunate fire upon the rear of the 
cavalry, they would either have been made prisoner, or passed 
unmolested.'153 Writing in 1858, Henry B. Dawson stated that Lee's 'design 
was to pass in front of the enemy line, and place it under the control of his 
own force, when he proposed to make known his true character.'154 Most of 
these accounts follow the narrative of the Loyalists discovering the nearby 
militia and firing on them, triggering a general engagement. 
In the decades following the massacre local memory altered perceptions of 
events, as it did with so many other minor clashes during the Revolutionary 
War. Oral traditions among the residents of Orange County (which became 
Alamance County in 1849) disputed the exact location of the encounter and 
added embellishments, such as increasing the number of tory militia or 
having Pyle himself being run through (he was not). Commentators also 
leaned heavily on histories like as Lossing’s Pictorial Field Book of the 
Revolution, and the mistakes in such works combined to mean that the reality 
of events ‘begins to become socially constructed through folklore and 
legend.’155 Interestingly however, while nineteenth century accounts usually 
work to absolve Lee of personal responsibility, they rarely shirk claims of a 
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'terrible carnage.'156 Johnson's account is sensitive to the bloodshed, and 
speaks at length of how: 
This was a day of tears and lamentations to that 
neighbourhood… the soul sickens at such an instance of 
unresisted slaughter, and it has called down the severest 
animadversions upon the conduct of the American party. It is 
enough to be said of it, that there cannot be found such another 
instance of military execution inflicted by the American arms in 
the whole history of the revolution.157 
That being said, he restates Lee's innocence and also highlights, probably 
quite fairly, the difficult nature of any such encounter - had the cavalry not 
immediately rushed in they may have been decimated by a volley from the 
Loyalists. Regardless of personal blame, there is no doubt that Pyle’s 
command was devastated and, as at Waxhaws, the proportion of prisoners 
taken to men engaged was far lower than usual – a modern study has 
estimated that of the 200 men under Pyle’s command, 93 were killed, 32 
wounded and only 30 taken prisoner.158 Here then was another example of 
the value of what Carpenter calls ‘Patriot strategic communications’: 
While the ruthlessness of Lee’s legionnaires at Pyle’s Massacre 
was and still is viewed as a clever use of operational deception 
leading to a valuable psychological victory, the actions of 
Tarleton’s troops at Waxhaws was and is still portrayed as 
wanton brutality and senseless slaughter. Such is the value of 
propaganda to the side that most successfully employs it.159 
The number of engagements with similarly bloody ratios in the south again 
shows us that the concept of massacre depended upon whether or not one 
side or the other specifically used the word. At an engagement at 
Hammond’s Store, for example, Patriot cavalry under William Washington 
attacked a force of Loyalists who instantly broke before them. In an after- 
action letter to Nathanael Greene, Washington’s then-commander, Daniel 
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Prisoners,’ without any casualties being sustained in return.160 One Patriot 
present during the battle recalled a grim story about its aftermath: 
We took a great many prisoners and killed a few… in 
Washington’s corps there was a boy of fourteen or fifteen, a 
mere lad, who in crossing Tiger River was ducked by a blunder 
of his horse… he got very mad, and swore that, boy or no boy, 
he would kill a man that day or die. He accomplished the 
former. I remember very well being highly amused at the little 
fellow charging round a crib after a tory, slashing away with his 
puny arm, till he brought him down.161 
Further south similarly bloody events were playing out. During the siege of 
Augusta Loyalists attempted to evacuate Fort Grierson, which had become 
untenable in the face of Patriot advances. The Patriots fell on the fleeing 
Loyalists. One officer recalled ‘Capt. Alexander shooting Grason [Grierson, 
the Loyalist commander] for his villainous conduct in the country.’162 Lee’s 
memoirs and subsequent retellings describe the killing of prisoners: 
The militia of Georgia, under colonel [Elijah] Clarke, were so 
exasperated by the cruelties mutually inflicted… that they were 
disposed to sacrifice every man taken… Poor Grierson and 
several others had been killed after surrender… In no part of 
the South was the war conducted with such asperity as it was in 
this quarter. It often sunk into barbarity.163 
The massacre of Grierson and his men had a strong effect on the defenders 
of Augusta. Lee wrote that ‘already the humanity of the besieging corps had 
been dreadfully outraged by the slaughter of colonel Grierson, and some of 
his associates’ – when the garrison did surrender, he recalls providing a 
personal guard for its Loyalist commander, Thomas Brown, to avoid 
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barbarity of the fighting, he wrote that ‘in this quarter a war of extermination 
became the order of the day.’164 
The comment was not without merit. Just before the attack on Augusta, 
Patriot captains Paddy Carr and Isaac Shelby attacked a force of Georgia 
Loyalists mustering under the command of Major Philip Dill. Carr in particular 
was a known ‘Tory hunter’ who had supposedly killed a hundred Loyalists 
personally and who eventually ‘met his death at the hands of some 
descendants of the Tories whom he had offended.’165 Carr and Shelby 
attacked the Loyalists at Brier Creek ‘where they route Dill completely, killing 
a number of his adherents’ before later striking a second Loyalist group and 
‘slaughtered them indiscriminately without any killed or wounded on our [the 
Patriot] side.’166 These were only the latest deaths in Carr’s career, added to 
a tally of men killed after laying down arms – ‘prisoners were executed. 
Loyalists learned that a “Georgia parole” meant death.’167 
 
The number of casualties and the killing of prisoners at engagement’s like 
Hammond’s Store, Fort Grierson and elsewhere were little removed from 
engagements like Waxhaws, but there were no Loyalist survivors well-placed 
to cry massacre in the aftermath. And while Waxhaws included prominent 
commanders such as Tarleton and Buford and marked a decisive end to the 
Charleston campaign, the killings at places like Briar Creek and Hammond’s 
Store became just another footnote in the fighting in the south. Though 
engagements like Hammond’s Store fulfil the criteria of massacre, it remains 
a little-known affair to this day, while the activities of the likes of Carr are so 
obscure that they are sometimes lost in the midst of the folklore that 
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Sometimes dismissed by historians because of the small numbers of 
combatants involved, massacres like Haw River, King’s Mountain and the 
numerous smaller routs like Hammond’s Store and Fort Grierson had a 
decisive impact on British operations in the south. 
 
 
Such massacres had themselves been fuelled by Waxhaws, ‘thus enraged 
passions and cries of Rebels on many a southern battlefield of “Tarleton’s 
Quarters” and “Remember Buford!” as they retaliated against helpless Tory 
militiamen and executed them, most notably at Hammond’s Store and Pyle’s 
massacre.’168 The effect of this brutalising campaign broke the will of many 
Loyalists and encouraged those with wavering loyalties to try to avoid the 
struggle. As Carpenter acknowledges: 
The real damage to the royal cause was psychological. With 
the destruction of North Carolina Loyalist forces at Ramsour’s 
Mill, King’s Mountain, and now Pyle’s Massacre, one can 
understand the reluctance of locals to support the army… 
Conversely, local Patriots had reason to become more active 
and support the rebellion.169 
Into Virginia 
 
Major defeats such as King’s Mountain, Cowpens and Pyle’s massacre all 
combined with the continual violence to fatally undermine British attempts to 
restore Crown authority. The frequency of massacres added to pyrrhic 
victories like Guilford Courthouse ultimately helped to pushed Cornwallis into 
launching an initially unauthorised invasion of Virginia in May 1781, thus 
triggering the final engagements of the war’s most decisive phase. He raided 
through the colony while playing cat-and-mouse with local Patriot forces 
commanded by Lafayette. The following description by Jefferson could have 
been written by a great number of plantation owners and propertied colonists 
in either the Carolinas or Virginia between 1780 and 1781, and gives a good 
sense of the scale of destruction wreaked by the British campaign: 
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[Cornwallis] destroyed all my growing crops of corn and 
tobacco, he burned all my barns, containing the same articles 
of last year, having first taken what corn he wanted; he used, as 
was to be expected, all my stock of cattle, sheep, and hogs, for 
the sustenance of his army, and carried off all the horses 
capable of service; of those too young for service he cut the 
throats; he burned all the fences on the plantation, so as to 
leave it an absolute waste. He carried off about thirty slaves.170 
Ironically given the popular view of Tarleton, one of Jefferson’s letters also 
praised the British officer for showing restraint towards his mansion at 
Monticello during a raid designed to capture him. 
Unable to bring Lafayette to battle, Cornwallis was eventually ordered to 
Yorktown by Clinton. By this point the depredations of Crown Forces had 
contributed to the escape of tens of thousands of enslaved peoples. Tarleton 
wrote that ‘all the negroes, men, women, and children, upon the approach of 
any detachment of the King’s troops, thought themselves absolved from all 
respect to their American masters, and entirely released from servitude: 
Influenced by this idea, they quitted the plantations, and followed the 
army.’171 In Tarleton’s mind, likely influenced by his anti-abolitionist 
prejudices, this ‘proved detrimental to the King’s troops, and occasioned 
continual dispute about property of this description.’172 Ultimately ‘between 
four thousand and five thousand bedraggled blacks of all ages followed 
General Cornwallis’s army across Virginia’ to Yorktown. 173 
The arrival of Washington and the commencement of the Continental Army’s 
siege spelled disaster not only for Crown Forces, but for these thousands of 
escapees who had liberated themselves. A little over two weeks into the 
siege Cornwallis decided on a course of action that was as cruel as it was 
militarily expedient. Unable to ration enough food for the embattled garrison, 
and worried about the spread of diseases such as smallpox, he had the 
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thousands of camp followers that looked to him for safety turned out into the 
no man’s land between the Yorktown defences and Washington’s lines. 
Hessian officer Johann Ewald wrote in his diary on October 14 1781: 
 
I would just as soon forget to record a cruel happening. On the 
same day of the enemy assault, we drove back to the enemy all 
of our black friends, whom we had taken along to despoil the 
countryside. We had used them to good advantage and set 
them free, and now, with fear and trembling, they had to face 
the reward of their cruel masters.174 
More so than at any other time during the war, a large part of the Patriot 
forces at Yorktown – perhaps as many as a quarter of those who fought 
during the siege – were black.175 Despite this, few of those turned away by 
Cornwallis could expect anything approaching decent treatment. Most of 
those who did not perish from exposure or smallpox were re-enslaved. The 
blacks employed militarily by the British received the same fate. Jill Lepore 
describes how ‘the 2000 black soldiers under Cornwallis’s command who 
had survived the siege… trudged through swamps and forests in the hopes 
of reaching a British warship… they suffered from exhaustion; they suffered 
from hunger; they suffered from disease. Of thirty people who escaped 
Thomas Jefferson’s Monticello, fifteen died of smallpox.’176 
Ultimately it has been estimated that between ‘eighty thousand to one 
hundred thousand black slaves’177 seized their freedom over the course of 
the Revolutionary War, with a figure of about 20,000 successfully joining the 
exodus at the conflict’s end. It has been described as ‘the largest 
emancipation in American history before Abraham Lincoln signed the 
Emancipation Proclamation.’178 In defiance of the tens of thousands of bids 
for freedom, white slave owners, including George Washington, spent 
months following Yorktown’s surrender recapturing the formerly enslaved 
peoples scattered along the Virginia coast, and as late as 1786 people calling 
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themselves ‘the King of England’s soldiers’ who ‘had been trained to arms by 
the British during the siege of Savannah’ were militarily resisting re- 
enslavement near the Savannah river.179 
Their fate was a sorry indictment of British efforts in the south, which had 
ultimately come apart due to a lack of clear operational objectives, a failure to 
appreciate the nature of the societies they were engaging with and, perhaps 
most decisive of all, a desire among mid-ranking officers to either actively 
punish the colonists or overlook the actions of those seeking to do so. The 
Patriot atrocity narrative had been given free reign following Waxhaws, and 
ultimately the British were unable to find either a military or political answer to 
acts of massacre. 
The Bloody Scout 
 
The war in the south in 1780 and 1781 bore many similarities to the conflict 
waged along the colonial frontier. Fighting was frequent and small-scale – in 
South Carolina alone, for example, there were over three hundred recorded 
skirmishes and battles fought over the two years of major British occupation, 
usually involving between a few dozen and a few hundred men.180 This is 
without including the murder of individuals or families by one side or the 
other. 
As on the frontier, command and control was usually heavily decentralised. 
Bands of militia and volunteers were led by those with the greatest popularity 
or social ranking in their local community, and ‘units were fluid in their 
composition as men came and went according to their own self-interests, 
unencumbered by the rigors of traditional military discipline.’181 The 
consequences of such a system have already been witnessed in the 
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perpetration of frontier massacres such as Gnadenhutten. Bloodshed 
between neighbours was also a frequent motif during fighting – it has been 
suggested that the previously mentioned practice of Loyalists adopting Native 
dress and warpaint was to disguise them from their neighbours and reduce 
the danger of retaliation for massacres and atrocities. In the south however 
such measures weren’t taken, and vengeance for violent acts perpetuated 
the destructive cycle that hampered British efforts at restoring Crown control 
in the colonies. 
The south’s similarity to the American frontier in the third phase of the war is 
further emphasised by how divorced much of the fighting was from the 
central war efforts of either side. While the fortunes of the campaigns of the 
Cherokee or the Iroquois rose and fell seemingly in near-isolation from the 
efforts of the likes of Howe, Clinton and Cornwallis further east, so the efforts 
of Loyalist commanders in the south frequently seemed divorced from 
Cornwallis’s campaigns throughout the Carolinas and Virginia. And just as 
the fall of Yorktown had little impact on the efforts of Natives and Loyalists 
fighting on the frontier, so it failed to impact the so-called Tory War that by 
that point was raging in both Carolinas. The independent nature of this 
struggle is most clearly displayed by the “Bloody Scout” that was conducted 
by Loyalist Major William Cunningham in November 1781. 
Cunningham originally served in the Continental Army, but was flogged and 
discharged for insubordination. After returning home to South Carolina and 
discovering his disabled brother had been beaten to death by a prominent 
local Patriot, he enlisted in a Loyalist regiment, surviving the battle of King’s 
Mountain. Following a clash with Thomas Sumter’s Patriots he mounted a 
campaign through the Carolina backcountry in late 1781. 
In November that year he and his Loyalist band managed to catch and 
surround a force of Patriot militia at Cloud’s Creek in Ninety-Six District. 182 
After brief resistance the Patriots attempted to surrender, however, 
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Cunningham ‘at a meeting of his officers, advised and ordered the massacre 
of the whole party… One man, Bartley Bledsoe, was spared as a 
compensation shown to Henry Etheredge a few months before. All the others 
were butchered.’183 While the later pensions claims of other survivors show 
that not all but one of the Patriot force were killed, their accounts make it 
clear that ‘nearly all his [Patriot Captain Sterling Turner’s] men were killed’ 
and that ‘Cunningham and his party in November 1781 attack [sic] and 
murdered Captain Turner and his company.’ 184 185 From a party of ‘about 
thirty in number’ all but a few ‘were slaughtered as they stood.’186 
Cunningham’s rampage was just beginning. Southern folklore insists that he 
went on to hunt down and kill his former Patriot captain, John Caldwell, 
though the aunt of a Patriot Colonel, Martha Campbell, claimed to be present 
‘at the time the Loyalists killed Capt. Caldwell and that Major William 
Cunningham was not present but came up shortly afterwards and blamed his 
men very much for killing Capt. Caldwell.’187 
Whether or not Cunningham did kill Caldwell, he next struck at another 
unsuspecting Patriot force commanded by Colonel Joseph Hayes encamped 
at Edgehill Station (sometimes called Hayes’ Station). After being cornered in 
a small block house, the Patriots attempted to surrender: 
Cunningham immediately hanged Hayes and another man… 
the pole broke, and Cuningham [sic], drawing his sword, slew 
the half-strangled men with his own hand. This he justified 
himself in doing, because of alleged cruelties by Hayes to 
women and children… Being told of the presence of one Cook, 
who, it was charged, had with Ritchie and Moore whipped his 
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brother to death, Cuningham ordered him out from the rest and 
slew him with his sword… And all who had rendered 
themselves obnoxious in any way to the Tories were slain 
without mercy. Only two of the party fell in the action; fourteen 
were deliberately cut to pieces after their surrender.188 
Though most contemporary accounts don’t give the bloody specifics about 
Cunningham that appear in later retellings, they agree that Hayes ‘was taken 
prisoner by a party of Tories who were commanded by one Cunningham and 
hung’ and that ‘Hayes was the Colonel in Command and was murdered at 
Hayes’ Station’ by ‘Tories under William Cunningham.’ 189 190 Writing in 1784 
to the governor of South Carolina, judge Aedanus Burke related the 
prevailing contemporary account of Hayes’ Station: 
The Americans had no sooner marched out & laid down their 
Arms, but the British seized Colo. Hayes, & with the 
Capitulation in his hand, pleading the terms of it & begging for 
Mercy, they hanged him to the limb of a tree & then fired a 
Bullet thro’ him. Captn. Williams the second in Command, was 
treated in the same manner. After which Cunningham, with his 
Own hands slew some of the prisoners & desired his men to 
follow him example. A most cruel slaughter of the prisoners 
ensued; nineteen of them were butchered.191 
Sources again debate the actual number of those killed – usually fourteen or 
nineteen – but it is clear that Cunningham had once again set about killing 
defenceless men. After the massacre at Hayes Station he continued to 
persecute and kill local Patriots, until a large force of militia led by Andrew 
Pickens was mobilised to stop him. Cunningham’s band broke apart and 
escaped to Charleston. 
The Bloody Scout showed the desire of certain Loyalists to continue to strike 
at their Patriot neighbours in the south long after the British Army had moved 
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on and been defeated. This desire – and the massacres spawned by it – had 
grown apart from any specifics war aims imagined by the ministry in London. 
Raids like the Bloody Scout perpetuated the cycle of massacres that the 
return of British forces had unleashed. As on the frontier, it was a war that 
raged independent of the main campaigns of generals like Washington and 
Cornwallis, but unlike on the frontier, it had direct consequences for both 
commanders in question. The lawless bloodshed in the south had ultimately 
proven ungovernable for the British. 
Massacres were vital in shaping how the war was fought in the south more 
than anywhere else. The killings of Waxhaws, King’s Mountain and Haw 
River combined with the numerous, less publicised atrocities like Piney 
Bottom, Briar’s Creek and Hayes’ Station and many more to turn the tide of 
the war in the south, ensuring that Britain’s final large-scale military gamble 
ended in failure. The violent civil conflict that some British officers chose to 
indulge rather than curtail caused the degeneration of an already fraught 
society, with bloodshed reaching heights that were never matched for such a 
sustained period elsewhere during the conflict. During Cornwallis’s 
campaigns he fought only two major pitched battles, at Camden and Guilford 
Courthouse, and both engagements involved no more than around 6,100 and 
6,700 combatants respectively. During the northern campaigns battles such 
as Long Island, Brandywine, Germantown and Monmouth saw between 
20,000 and 30,000 troops engaged, yet despite this battlefield casualties in 
the south in 1780 and 1781 still accounted for ‘nearly one-fifth of all battlefield 
deaths of the entire American war, and nearly one-third of all battlefield 
wounded.’192 The sustained violence generated by near-constant small-scale 
skirmishes, ambushes and massacres reaped a fearsome body count, one 
that bled Britain’s efforts to halt the rebellion dry. 
British policy makers consistently stopped short of advocating a campaign of 
explicit repression against the colonists, and the result was a strategy that 
was out of step, not designed deliberately to brutalise the Carolinas, but 
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unable and unwilling to check officers who felt harsher measures were 
warranted. The British ministry lamented its inability to control actions on the 
ground ever more bitterly towards the end of the war. The reluctance of high- 
ranking officers to serve in North America at the outbreak of the conflict now 
seemed prescient. Lord George Germain wrote that: 
The great mischief 'complained of in the prosecution of this war 
is that relaxation of discipline which disgraces the army and had 
alienated the affections of the inhabitants from the Royal cause. 
Plunder has been the object, and in the pursuit of it no 
distinction has been made between the well and the ill affected. 
This grievance cries aloud for redress.193 
Germain’s further writings betray regret at Britain’s war policy, and the 
slender hope that fear of military governance and distrust towards France 
would eventually lead rebelling Americans back into a harmonious 
relationship with Great Britain. Ultimately the indiscipline of the British Army 
had damaged such hopes beyond repair. From the opening engagements of 
Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill, the regular soldiery had showed 
antipathy and frequent distain towards the colonists. Such a ‘lack of respect 
for Americans as soldiers could easily have been paralleled by lack of 
respect for American civilians and their property,’ an issue that had boiled 
over on several occasions as the war progressed. 194 
Massacres distilled the nature of the final phase of the war in the southern 
colonies - confused, vicious, fratricidal, creating a spiral of violence that the 
higher echelon commands of both sides could not hope to control. Such 
engagements showed passive Loyalists that the British government could not 
protect them, and that the safety offered by the British Army was wholly 
conditional on their physical presence, a presence that would inevitably be 
removed one way or another. In the army’s absence violence swept like 
wildfire, leading to massacres that further eroded the Crown’s control. 
Fighting at King’s Mountain and the massacre of Pyle’s men tore the heart 
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from the Loyalist militia and broke the already wavering spirit of those whole 
had survived and endured after the failed Loyalist efforts of 1776. The ‘news 
of [Pyle’s] massacre… chilled Cornwallis’s efforts to recruit Loyalist militia’ 
and essentially guaranteed the failure of the most integral element of Britain’s 
southern strategy – the belief that the colonists would rally to the royal 
standard and help re-establish a functioning British presence in North 
America outside of Canada, New York and the Floridas.’195 Massacres during 
the southern campaign, perpetrated by both sides, ended this hope and 















































Conclusion: Fort Griswold 
 
There was hard fighting, and shocking slaughter, and much 
blood spilt… Our ground was drenched with human gore; our 
wounded and dying could not have any attendance, while each 
man was almost hopeless of his own preservation.1 
On September 6 1781, as the Connecticut town of New London burned, 
across the Thames River Crown Forces were storming the defensive works 
at Fort Griswold. Built earlier in the war to protect privateers operating out of 
New London, Griswold was well-constructed but had been left undermanned 
and undersupplied. In September it became a target for a Crown raid 
designed to take New London and divert Washington’s attention away from 
Cornwallis’s stricken army in Virginia. 
While the expedition’s commander, Benedict Arnold, seized supplies in the 
town and then put it to the torch (claiming the latter act as an accident), a 
detachment consisting primarily of the regulars of the 40th and 54th 
Regiments of Foot under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Edmund Eyre 
landed on the eastern bank of the river Thames and proceeded to Fort 
Griswold, where a scratch force of militia under Lieutenant Colonel William 
Ledyard had been assembled. Eyre summoned the fort to surrender twice, 
the second time threatening no quarter should he be forced to storm the 
defences. Ledyard refused both sets of terms. 
The British launched a frontal attack; ‘in a solid column… they rushed 
furiously and simultaneously to the assault of the southwest bastion and the 
opposite sides.’2 Grapeshot initially stymied the charge, but the regulars 
pressed on with a two-pronged offensive, one led by Eyre and the other by 
his subordinate, Major William Montgomery. During the attack a militia 
sergeant, Stephen Hempstead, related how ‘a shot cut the halyards of the 
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flag [flying over the fort], and it fell to the ground, but was instantly remounted 
on a pike pole. This accident proved fatal to us, as the enemy, supposed it 
had been stuck by its defenders.’3 The British, believing that they had been 
lured in by the garrison feigning surrender, redoubled the attack. Eyre was 
soon wounded and his column faltered, but Montgomery’s succeeded in 
gaining a redoubt to the east of the fort and then storming the ditch and 
palisade beyond. Montgomery was himself killed in hand-to-hand fighting as 
the regulars sought to take the artillery embrasures and hack apart the 
palisade. The attack continued, and the men of the 40th Foot were able to 
capture one of the fort’s gates and haul it open for Eyre’s column, that had 
been stalled outside. 
Rufus Avery, one of the young militia defenders, later wrote that ‘we might 
suppose the loss of their commanders might have dismayed them, but they 
had proceeded so far, and the excitement and determination on slaughter 
was so great, they could not be prevented.’4 Once the gates were hauled 
open he described how ‘the enemy had every chance to wound and kill every 
man.’5 He stated that Ledyard offered his surrendered, however: 
The enemy had a fair opportunity to massacre us… after we 
have fought and bled, and availed nothing, to yield to be 
massacred by the boasting enemy, “tries men’s hearts!” Our 
ground was drenched with human gore… Now I saw the enemy 
mount the parapets like so many madmen, all at once 
seemingly. They swung their hats around, and then discharged 
their guns into the fort, and those who had not fallen by ball, 
they began to massacre with sword and bayonet.6 
He went on to describe how Ledyard was murdered by the British officer he 
was surrendering to, and how the regulars ‘killed and wounded every man 
they possibly could… one mad looking fellow put his bayonet to my side, 
swearing “by Jesus he would skipper me!” I looked him earnestly in the face 
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into me… I think no scene ever exceeded this for continued and barbarous 
massacre after surrender.’7 
Hempstead echoed Avery’s account, writing later that ‘never was a scene of 
more brutal wanton carnage witnessed… the bayonet was “freely used,” 
even on those who were helplessly wounded and in the agonies of death. I 
recollect Capt. William Seymour, a volunteer from Hartford, had thirteen 
bayonet wounds.’ He stated that prior to the British forces breaking into the 
fort the defenders had suffered six killed and eighteen wounded, but that the 
final tally following the massacre was eighty-five killed and forty-five 
wounded.8 
Command and Control and the Perpetration of Massacre 
 
The bloodshed only ceased when the British realised that by continuing to 
fire into men trying to surrender so close to the fort’s magazine they were 
risking an explosion that would kill them all. Avery went so far as to state that 
an accidental detonation ‘must, before this, have been the case, had not the 
ground and every thing been wet with human blood.’9 Interestingly, Avery 
describes the British firing as being conducted in platoons – ‘they discharged 
three platoons as I crossed before them at this time’10 Earlier in his narrative, 
describing the attack on the fort, he also references the British using platoon 
firing – ‘then they started for the fort, a part of them in platoons, discharging 
their guns.’11 Hempstead corroborates this claim, adding that during the 
massacre after the fort had fallen ‘the enemy were still firing on us in 
platoons.’12 
The point of interest here is less that the British continued to shoot their 
surrendering victims, and more that they did so using platoon volleys. Such a 
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method of delivering fire was difficult at the best of times, and far more so 
during the chaos of battle, let alone the aftermath of a storming action where 
the most senior officers had been killed or wounded. Even with officers still 
commanding and with less carnage all around, it was common for platoon 
firing in the eighteenth century to quickly break down, as happened at 
Dettingen in 1743.13 Furthermore, platooning was a tactic rarely employed 
by the British in North American during the Revolutionary War. Such fire 
discipline was best used against opposing regulars in close formation in the 
open field, a set of circumstances that British soldiers rarely encountered 
during the revolution. From the very beginning, in actions such as Lexington, 
Concord and the closing stages of Bunker Hill, British infantry preferred one 
or two full volleys followed by bayonet assaults to route Patriots from their 
positions, and ‘when British infantry did become involved in sustained 
firefights, it is most likely that fire control devolved entirely to the officers 
commanding companies… if these officers and their sergeants did not 
closely supervise the loading and levelling of weapons, the men probably did 
not execute these actions well.’14 
Given the documented difficulties in platoon firing the fact that it was 
employed to gun down surrendering Patriots at Fort Griswold heavily implies 
that a number of the regulars there had maintained their discipline and were 
still under orders from their junior officers and NCOs. This also means that 
said officers were responsible for ordering their men to fire on the fort’s 
defeated defenders, an act of cold-blooded execution. Given accounts 
mention both these platoon volleys and more random bayonetings (both 
Avery and Hempstead describe being stabbed while surrendering by British 
soldiers roving through the fort) it makes sense that some regulars were 
running amok while others continued to remain under orders. The fact that 
one group of British soldiers had stormed the walls while the other had been 
let in through the gate would seem to account for this, with Avery stating that 
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he saw the regulars who had been outside the gate ‘marching into the fort 
and formed into a solid column.’15 Therefore, while the disorganised portion 
of the assault that had stormed the walls went wild with the bayonet, this 
section remained formed up and appear to have been ordered by officers 
and NCOs to discharge volleys into surrendering men. 
The Loyalist New York periodical, Rivington’s Gazette, makes no mention of 
such cold-blooded killing, but instead published an account of the fort’s 
storming which emphasised the garrison’s supposed striking of the colours 
and then return to arms to explain away any accounts of a massacre: 
When the troops got into the ditch the rebels struck the flag and 
ceased firing, until they pulled out some of the stakes and 
mounted on the range, when the rebels began to play their 
guns from the bastions, and attempted to defend their ramparts, 
but the valor of our troops prevailed, and the rebels fled to the 
casemates of the fortress, and some of them fired through the 
loop-holes; but the doors being burst open they were compelled 
to beg mercy, which being the darling attribute of Britons even 
to a fault, they spared the catiffs.16 
Benedict Arnold’s official report to Sir Henry Clinton also makes no mention 
of a massacre, stating only that the fort was stormed by the regulars ‘with 
fixed bayonets through the embrasures, where they were opposed with great 
obstinacy by the garrison with long spears [probably naval boarding pikes].’17 
The massacre at Fort Griswold stemmed from three primary factors. Firstly, 
the storming cost the British regulars dear, and saw the deaths of several 
prominent officers. Secondly, as we have seen throughout the war the 
regulars already possessed a strong antipathy towards the Patriots, 
especially the militia. Both regiments involved in the attack, the 40th and 54th 
Foot, were experienced outfits who had seen service during the brutal 
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northern campaigns of 1776 – 1778. Thirdly, the accidental striking of the 
fort’s colours seems to have deluded some of the attackers into thinking the 
enemy had feigned surrender and continued the fight, a trick the Patriots had 
employed before and a fact that seemed to be confirmed when the defenders 
of one of the fort’s bastions continued to resist after the rest of the fort had 
surrendered. All of this contributed to a massacre of Griswold’s defenders 
after they were overrun, but the reports of platoon firing by the regulars into 
surrendering men appears to indicate that they were still acting under the 
order of some officers and all not running rampant, implying said officers 
were deliberately snubbing the Patriot surrender. This conforms to the 
previous actions of company-level British officers in incidents such as the 
Baylor massacre, where they actively encouraged their men to kill 
surrendering Patriots. 
As with Waxhaws and a host of other bloody encounters, the action at Fort 
Griswold and the torching of New London had a direct, tangible effect on 
Revolutionary War combatants, and was used as a rally cry by Patriot forces 
in the final phase of the war. At Yorktown ‘the cry of the Americans as they 
mounted to the assault was, “remember New London.”’18 Later histories 
asserted that ‘Lafayette, with the sanction of Washington, ordered the 
assailants to “remember Fort Griswold,” where some of their country had 
been inhumanly butchered a few months before.’19 The attackers intended to 
‘put every man of the redoubt to death,’ 20 a threat they didn’t carry through 
with – ‘the continental soldiers could not or would not execute the command 
on prisoners who begged their lives on their knees.’ 21 As massacres 
continued on the peripheries of the conflict, at the stroke of the decisive 
engagement of the war, mercy prevailed. 
 
 
18 George Washington Parke Custis, Recollections and Private Memoirs of Washington (New 
York, Derby and Jackson, 1860), 241. 
19 Benson J. Lossing, The American Historical Record, Volume 3 (Philadelphia, John E. 
Potter, 1874), 460. 
20 George Washington Parke Custis, Recollections and Private Memoirs of Washington (New 
York, Derby and Jackson, 1860), 242. 
21 Samuel Adams Drake, Nooks and Corners of the New England Coast (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1875), 428. 
240  
Massacres as Negotiators 
 
Massacres were used throughout the Revolutionary War to discredit, 
dehumanise and cow opponents while motivating sympathy and support from 
those who identified with the cause of the victims. Unsurprisingly, they 
continued to be used as the war drew to an end. Even as massacres still 
continued on the frontier and in the south, peace talks between Britain and 
her enemies opened in Paris on March 5 1782, twelve years to the day since 
the Boston massacre. The inauspicious date aligned well with a section of 
the strategy pursued by the American delegation. While attending the talks, 
part of the ‘centrepiece of the American peace commissioners’ negotiations’ 
involved highlighting ‘the use of Indians to massacre the colonists; the 
plundering and murder of colonial merchants, farmers, women and children, 
numbered at forty thousand; the incitement of insurrections among domestic 
servants (slaves).’22 In doing so they hoped to influence British public opinion 
as thoroughly as they had the colonial public, and ultimately weaken the 
position of the British delegation when it came down to negotiations. 
It immediately became apparent that two of the greatest obstacles to the 
success of peace talks between Britain and America would be the treatment 
of Loyalists and the quest by both sides for compensation over damage to 
personal property. The Crown initially demanded that all property taken 
during the conflict be returned along with damage reparations. In response 
the American party demanded that Britain return all the “property” it had 
stolen – particularly slaves. This was deemed unacceptable by Britain, and it 
ultimately fell to the discretion of individual States to recompense the 
Loyalists from their former colonies. 
The use of the phrase massacre as an important emotive tool during these 
negotiations is spelled out by how frequently it appeared as recriminations 
flew across the Atlantic in the closing months of the war. In 1782 a group of 
Loyalists from South Carolina sent a petition to Lord Germain listing three 
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hundred individuals who had been ‘massacred in this province’ and claiming 
that the actual number of those killed by the Patriots was three times as high. 
They desired restitution.23 On the other side, the State of New York initially 
answered Loyalist claims over the confiscation of property by stating that ‘the 
adherents to the King of Great Britain… have cruelly massacred, without 
regard to age or sex, many of our citizens, and wantonly desolated and laid 
waste a great part of this State.’24 Massacres continued to yield valuable 
propaganda benefits long after their occurrence, so much so that atrocities 
were even invented with fabricated evidence to put pressure on negotiations. 
In 1782 Benjamin Franklin published an entirely false newspaper report from 
his personal press at Passy, in France. It invented a New England militia 
captain named Gerish, a man who had come into the possession of some 
British packs and was seemingly: 
Struck with Horror to find among the Packages, 8 large ones 
containing SCALPS of our unhappy Country-folks, taken in the 
three last Years by the Senneka Indians from the Inhabitants of 
the Frontiers... and sent by them as a Present to Col. 
Haldimand, Governor of Canada, in order to be by him 
transmitted to England.25 
Franklin added a further fake letter from an unnamed British agent which 
offered more grim descriptions for each set of scalps, stating if they were 
taken from 'Farmers, killed in their houses,' or 'Prisoners burnt alive' or 
'Women... knocked down dead' or even 'little infants Scalps... ript out of their 
Mothers' bellies.'26 
The reason Franklin created the false reports – besides his love for well- 
made hoaxes – was to apply pressure to the British ministry mainly over the 
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sticking point of reparations. In short, he wished to harness the atrocity 
narrative once again to ‘bring the horrors of Indian warfare home to the minds 
of the rulers of England.’27 The initial targets in the scheme were ‘middling- 
level people’ who ‘would have found British-sponsored Indian scalping… 
shocking beyond belief.’28 Once the story had been disseminated by the 
Whiggish factions of British society it would then take traction in the British 
press and help to damage the British government’s reputation and weaken its 
hand in the midst of negotiations. Franklin had determined that ‘it was time to 
make a last stand against British atrocities, in an effort to convince Britons… 
of the cruelty of the treatment of Britons in North America and the essential 
importance of reparations.’29 
Franklin’s writings did indeed receive indignation and circulation within 
Britain’s press, but ultimately proved even more popular in the colonies, 
where it added another example to the list of Britain’s imperial brutalities 
during the revolution. The account remained popular, being ‘reprinted with 
great frequency before 1820’ and experiencing ‘a serious spike in its 
reprintings around the era of the War of 1812.’30 During that conflict it was 
used as the basis for at least one article about the ‘British Massacres’ that 
had occurred during the American Revolution.31 
The massacres of the Revolutionary War became tools that could be used 
directly in the political interplay between Britain and American at the war’s 
end. More than that, they continued to serve a political purpose right into the 
nineteenth century, whether agitating for war against Native American tribes 
or Great Britain. This shows how their importance – and utility – went beyond 
something as basic as attracting recruits or cowing an enemy during war- 
time. And while the memories of British and Loyalist victims of massacres did 
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not remain concentrated or coherent except in small Canadian enclaves, for 
both Native American tribes and the citizens of the new United States, 
recollections of suffering endured. Acts of massacre remained vivid and 
potent enough to fuel not only fresh violence but also influenced political 
decisions for decades after the revolution had ended. 
Massacres Memorialised 
 
While the revolution’s massacres continued to be turned to political ends, 
they would not have attracted the same resonance were they not likewise 
enshrined – both literally and metaphorically – in the consciousness of future 
Americans. Though historians of the war generally avoided emphasising 
incidents of massacre, in popular and local memory they remained. The Fort 
Griswold massacre serves as an example. Interest in the subject was kept 
alive by accounts such as Avery’s and Hemptstead’s, both of which were 
written decades after the end of the war. A memorial obelisk was erected on 
Groton Heights between 1825 and 1829 by the local Groton Monument 
Association ‘in memory of the brave Patriots, who fell in the massacre at Fort 
Griswold, near this spot, on the 6th of Sept. A.D. 1781.’ 32 During the 
dedication ceremony ‘a few of the survivors of the massacre were present.’33 
The monument was significant as one of only three to have been built on the 
site of a Revolutionary War engagement and dedicated to the regular rank- 
and-field soldiery in the near aftermath of the conflict. Before 1830 the only 
other large, permanent memorials to the war’s regular Patriots were to be 
found at Lexington and near Paoli’s Tavern. The significance is clear – all 
three were the sites of massacres, all three memorials ‘honoured soldiers as 
victims of, not participants in, violence. Their innocence proclaimed the 
justness of the patriot cause and the treacherousness of British tyranny.’34 
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These three were soon joined by monuments dedicated to other massacres – 
in 1832 the bones of those killed in the Wyoming Valley in 1778 were 
exhumed as part of a public event that included what the main ceremony 
described as ‘venerable citizens, who were in the rank that faced the enemy 
on the memorable 3rd of July.’35 Local newspapers printed emotive retellings 
of the massacre. The remains of those killed were reinterred a year later 
beneath a monument dedicated to the battle. 
As the years passed and America drew closer to another fratricidal conflict, 
the number of memorials dedicated to the Revolutionary War continued to 
rapidly increase. Waxhaws was graced by a fifteen-foot obelisk in 1860 that 
‘honoured the American soldiers killed in that “bloody massacre.”’36 In 
Groton, the obelisk commemorating Griswold was heightened by seven feet 
and was joined, in 1854, by a monument dedicated to Colonel Ledyard, 
commemorating ‘the burning of New London, the storming of Groton Fort, the 
massacre of the garrison and the slaughter of Ledyard, the brave 
commander of these posts who was slain by the conquerors with his own 
sword.’37 At Crooked Billet a monument was erected to ‘capt. John Downey 
and others who were cruelly slain on this ground in the struggle for American 
liberty.’ The monument drew direct parallels between the revolutionary 
massacre, the War of 1812 and the Civil War, with a further inscription 
reading ‘the Patriots of 1776 achieved our independence. Their successors 
established it in 1812. We are now struggling for its perpetuation in 1861. 
The Union must and shall be preserved.’ 
 
More monuments followed. One was dedicated to Captain William Foreman, 
the Patriot whose company had been massacred during a Native ambush in 
1777 – the plaque was to the men ‘slain by a band of ruthless savages – the 
allies of a civilized nation of Europe.’38 Cherry Valley’s monument was 
dedicated in front of a crowd of 10,000 people on August 15, 1878. Twenty 
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years later an American historian proudly related a history of ‘the settlers 
who, returning from their grand struggle for liberty, poor in worldly goods and 
broken in health, laid the second foundations of Cherry Valley’ and were 
visited in 1783 by Washington, who spent one evening listening to ‘the wild 
border tales.’39 In 1906 a memorial plaque was also laid in the local 
Presbyterian church remembering, in part, some of those who ‘were cruelly 
slain in the MASSACRE which scattered the flock, Nov. 11 1778.’40 
In the same year as the dedication of the Cherry Valley monument in 1878 
ongoing commemorative events also began to be held at the older Wyoming 
Monument, whose inscription declared that ‘numerical superiority alone gave 
success to the invader, and wide-spread havoc, desolation and ruin, marked 
his savage and bloody footsteps through the Valley.’ The Paoli monument, 
first erected in 1817, was described as having ‘become very much injured 
and defaced’ and was replaced by another in 1875 which recalled the event 
as ‘the atrocious massacre.’41 An oration during the new monument’s 
dedication described to the audience ‘the dreadful massacre, unparalleled by 
savagery or barbaric precedents.’42 Little Egg Harbor was memorialised with 
a monument in 1894, as well as a plaque dedicated by the Society of 
Cincinnati ‘to commemorate the massacre of a portion of the Legion 
commanded by Brigadier the General the Count Casimir Pulaski.’ The 
massacre perpetrated by William Cunningham at Hayes’ Station received a 
monument from the Henry Laurens Chapter of the Daughters of the 
American Revolution, which lists the names of those killed and declares that 
‘during the struggle for National Independence these fourteen gallant 
defenders of Liberty surrendered as prisoners of war and were massacred by 
Major William Cunningham and his Tories.’ At Hancock’s House, where 
sleeping militia were set upon by the Queen’s Rangers, a stone and plaque 
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laid in 1932 ‘by the patriotic order Sons of America of Salem County’ 
remembers ‘the Patriots massacred in the Hancock House.’ 
To save the location of the Baylor massacre from modern development – as 
well as to preserve the remains of some of its victims – part of the area that 
had once been Tappan was transformed in 1972 into a public park. Entitled 
the Baylor Massacre Park, it contains a number of plaques and stones, as 
well as information boards encouraging visitors to examine different 
contemporary accounts of the incident and consider its nature, on the one 
hand a highly successful military undertaking and, on the other, a ruthless 
massacre of near-defenceless men. The marker laid in the rededication in 
1972 reads: 
In memory of American soldiers killed during the Revolutionary 
War in the 'Baylor Massacre' on September 28, 1778. Lt. Col. 
George Baylor's 3rd Regiment of Continental Dragoons took 
quarters for the night on several nearby farms. Tories betrayed 
their presence to a British force who surrounded the Dragoons 
during the night. A number of Americans were killed or 
wounded after they surrendered. 
Memories of the revolution, particularly the memories ingrained by massacre 
and extreme violence, created a blood-bond in the minds of future American 
citizens between themselves and their perceived past. It proved especially 
potent during the antebellum, when the ‘increase in battlefield 
commemoration employed old rhetoric in new ways by using place as a 
legitimizing factor in sectional political rhetoric.’43 In this sense the 
revolution’s massacres had an impact reaching far beyond the years of the 
war itself. Did those who first immortalised the early events of Lexington and 
Concord or the killings in Boston with articles, artwork and poetry anticipate 
the legacy they would help to create? Certainly their foremost objective – 
rousing their fellow colonists to war with Great Britain – was a successful 
endeavour. From the depositions collated by the Sons of Liberty in Boston in 
1770 to General Gates’ letter to Burgoyne during the Saratoga campaign, 
from the publicised examination of the number of bayonet wounds suffered 
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by victims of the Baylor massacre to the cries of “remember Buford” 
throughout the South, the Patriots successfully harnessed a victim narrative 
that legitimised their political grievances against Britain and King George. A 
flurry of small-scale but violent British successes in 1777 and 1778 were 
offset entirely by the ability of the Patriots to delegitimise these victories by 
pointing out the more bloodthirsty mindset of British regular soldiers, an 
advantage that was further accentuated when killings did not – for whatever 
reason – always meet with full-scale reprisals. Counter-claims that surprise 
raids with few survivors and reliance on the bayonet were merely symptoms 
of a professional fighting force gained little traction with the colonial public, 
who had comparatively little first-hand experience of large-scale eighteenth- 
century warfare and the brutalities it entailed. Revolutionaries ‘presented 
such atrocities as part of a broader pattern of British excessive violence… 
British massacres thus became highly effective assets in the Patriots’ moral 
war: they helped them win the battle for the support of the American 
population while shaming Britain in the eyes of the world.’44 
Massacres as Decisive Acts of War 
 
Regarding acts of violence against defeated enemies or helpless non- 
combatants, the American Revolution was one of the most vicious conflicts 
either in North America or involving Great Britain in the eighteenth century. 
Soldiers and civilians on both sides and of all nationalities made note of its 
massacres and highlighted the often exceptionally antagonistic relationship 
between its combatants. Despite this, it is only in the last half century – and 
the previous decade in particular – that analysis of the war has started to 
acknowledge its bloody reality on a broader basis. Until then historians have 
too often been happy to enumerate the revolution’s violence on a case-by- 
case basis – even in the nineteenth century topics like Waxhaws, the Baylor 
massacre or Gnadenhutten were popular locally, but such events were 
discussed in isolation, held to be the exception and never used as a 
framework to properly contextualise the high levels of violence in evidence 
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throughout the war. These circumstances were accentuated by the fact that 
nineteenth-century American historians often wished to avoid tainting the 
increasingly hallowed memory of the Revolutionary War with a legacy of 
undue bloodshed. While the cause of liberty and independence had been 
well served by emphasising the atrocity narrative and lambasting British 
brutality during the war, after it there was no need to continue to highlight it 
beyond the limited remit of local history, memorialisation, and the occasional 
call to arms. Massacres were an expedient tool, not a field of study or an 
indicator of the revolution’s realities. Washington’s alleged comment to 
Thomas Mullett, that he would rather bury the memory of the war’s atrocities 
than continue to recount them, seems prescient. 
This thesis has set out to show that wartime massacres had a powerful effect 
on the military outcomes of the American Revolution. Research findings have 
shown how violence initially drove revolutionary sentiment. The killings at 
Boston in 1770 and later at Lexington and on the road to Cambridge in 1775 
were harnessed by a powerful revolutionary propaganda machine and helped 
sweep the colonies towards open war with Britain. Lexington in particular 
highlights the dichotomy at the heart of many of the massacre claims made 
during the war – it took on the guise of massacre to influence public opinion, 
but became a battle when it best suited the historical memory of its 
participants. Following the onset of war the British military continually 
heightened the aggression of the conflict, especially through the years 1777 
and 1778. Massacres like Paoli and Old Tappan proved the operational 
effectiveness of a cadre of elite British regiments, and while these influenced 
battlefield outcomes, such ostensible British successes had anything but the 
desired result. Unable to respond effectively in a direct military sense, the 
Patriots again made the most of their propaganda efforts, harnessing the 
atrocity narrative to bolster the revolution, while the British proved largely 
tone-deaf to the struggle for hearts and minds. Acts of massacre were also a 
driving force on the frontier, where deep racial divisions between colonists 
and Native Americans ensured a conflict that became increasingly ruthless. 
Often understated by broad studies of the Revolutionary War, frontier 
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massacres such as Cherry Valley diverted a great deal of Patriot manpower 
further east and refocussed priorities, while violence against Native American 
non-combatants, such as the Gnadenhutten massacre, emphasised the race 
aspect of the conflict and proved the basis for retaliatory campaigns by both 
sides. Unable to land a decisive blow and with the Patriot atrocity narrative 
succeeding in keeping the rebellion active, British hopes turned to the south 
at the close of 1779, but here again massacres and the complexities of racial 
antagonism would fatally undermine the efforts of Crown Forces. Waxhaws 
set the tone for Britain’s Southern campaign and helped Patriot recruitment, 
while Pyle’s massacre and King’s Mountain broke the last of the North 
Carolina Loyalist militia and helped to ensure that gains made by the British 
regulars would not be turned into permanent successes. 
The failure to acknowledge the violence inherent in the American Revolution 
has meant that there has been little appreciation for the pivotal role of 
massacres during the conflict. Even modern works such as Hoock’s concern 
themselves more with a broad-brush treatment of violence at the expense of 
building a military understanding of the unique and pivotal impact of 
massacres. In almost every case the massacres described had an influence 
on the war that outweighed the numbers of both the perpetrators and the 
victims involved. Whether the killings were harnessed and propagandised to 
act as incentive or deterrent, massacres during the American Revolution 
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